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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Anne F. Conaway 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
School of Journalism and Communication 
 
September 2012 
 
Title: An Analysis of First Amendment Protection for Student Expression,  
Mid-1900s-2011 
 
This dissertation sought to determine if federal-level, post-secondary student 
freedom of expression case law was developing in a similar path as that at the K-12 level 
of education. It also investigated the ways in which a K-12, highly speech-restrictive 
legal standard arising from the K-12 case Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier has been utilized at 
the post-secondary level of education. The question of this case’s applicability to  
post-secondary freedom of expression case law has resulted in a federal circuit court split 
on the matter. The U. S. Supreme Court has denied certiorari in these cases, leaving 
lower courts to guess as to whether or not to utilize it in decision-making.  
In answering these research questions, all federal-level case law found at both 
levels of education from 1940 to 2011 was analyzed through both traditional legal case 
analysis and an analytical process specifically designed for this project. The findings 
revealed that, for the most part, post-secondary student expression case law is, indeed, 
developing both substantively and at the same pace as that at the K-12 educational level. 
Much of this consistency is due to utilization of another K-12 freedom of expression 
case, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District. This case has been 
highly protective of student expression at both levels of education.  
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In regard to the second research question, this research found that one federal 
circuit court case declined to apply Hazelwood, indicating it was not an appropriate 
standard for use at the post-secondary level of education. Three federal circuit courts and 
one federal district court, however, have decided cases per Hazelwood. Application, 
however, has been neither consistent nor speech-protective. Further, it is expected that 
unless or until the U. S. Supreme Court rules on its applicability to post-secondary 
student expression, the number of cases in which it is utilized will continue to rise.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF STUDENT SPEECH  
For more than 50 years, courts have been wrestling with the issue of student 
freedom of expression, or, more pointedly, they have tried to answer the following 
question: Should students, both at the primary and secondary (K-12) and post-secondary 
levels of education, be restricted from expressing ideas school administrators would 
rather they not express? At the judicial level, answering this question involves trying to 
strike the appropriate balance among the dominant competing interests at play—the value 
of students’ First Amendment rights to speak and to hear, the roles schools play in 
protecting the well-being of students and in teaching students appropriate social 
behaviors, and the need for schools to maintain order so they are able to educate students 
to become capable and productive, self-governing citizens.  
 These interests have been pitted against each other in cases before the federal 
judiciary since 1940.1 At that time the doctrine of in loco parentis, or “standing in for the 
parent,” governed on the nation’s college and university campuses. Schools controlled 
nearly every aspect of students’ lives.  Prior to the U. S. Supreme Court’s 1961 decision 
in Dixon v. Alabama,2 in which the Court ruled that universities and colleges no longer 
were vested with the authority to act in loco parentis in disciplining and expelling 
                                                
1 Minersville School Dist., Bd. of Educators of Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) 
(Students at a K-12 school who were Jehovah’s Witnesses refused to salute the flag and were expelled. The 
U. S. Supreme Court held their expulsion constitutional.) 
 
2 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961). 
  
 
2 
students, students’ lives were greatly controlled by administrators. Under the doctrine, 
students virtually were without recourse to challenge administrative decisions.  
Dixon, however, ended the in loco parentis role of public, post-secondary educational 
institutions, and it was not long before the number of cases presented to the federal 
judiciary began to swell. 
At that time, the United States was engaged in the Vietnam War, and college 
students lived under the constant threat of being drafted to fight in a war with which 
many not only disagreed but could do nothing to change without the right to vote. 
Moreover, they lived in a segregated world, at war with itself. They lived in a world in 
which women legally could not buy contraception. Students demonstrated against the 
war; rode Freedom Busses to the Deep South; and picketed for women’s rights. 
Administrators, however, consistently obstructed such speech activities. 3 
It is within this context that the Free Speech Movement arose on the Berkeley 
campus during the 1964-1965 academic year. Its primary leader, Mario Savio, 
commanded the stage at the Sproul Hall sit-in to say with forceful conviction,  
I ask you to consider—if this is a firm, and if the Board of Regents are the 
Board of Directors, and if President Kerr in fact is the manager, then I tell 
you something—the faculty are a bunch of employees and we're the raw 
material! But we're a bunch of raw materials that don't mean to be - have any 
process upon us. Don't mean to be made into any product! Don't mean - Don't 
mean to end up being bought by some clients of the University, be they the 
government, be they industry, be they organized labor, be they anyone! We're 
human beings!...There's a time when the operation of the machine becomes 
so odious—makes you so sick at heart—that you can't take part. You can't 
even passively take part. And you've got to put your bodies upon the gears 
and upon the wheels, upon the levers, upon all the apparatus, and you've got 
to make it stop. And you've got to indicate to the people who run it, to the 
                                                
3 BOB ZELLNER, THE WRONG SIDE OF MURDER CREEK: A WHITE SOUTHERNER IN THE FREEDOM 
MOVEMENT (New South Books, Inc. 2008). 
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people who own it, that unless you're free, the machine will be prevented 
from working at all.4 
 
Eventually, the protests and negotiations ended, with the administration acknowledging 
students’ speech rights and lifting the ban on on-campus political activities.5  
Two years later, in Dickey v. Alabama State Board of Education,6 a federal court 
for the first time specifically stated that college students had First Amendment rights. In 
discussing the value of both students’ and professors’ rights7 to free speech, the court 
wrote,   
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is 
almost self-evident. … To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual 
leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our 
Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that 
new discoveries cannot yet be made. … Scholarship cannot flourish in an 
atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always 
remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and 
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.8 
 
Not all college campuses responded to student activism in the same way as Berkeley. In 
1970, for instance, 13 students were shot, with four being killed, at Kent State University 
                                                
4 Mario Savio, Sit-in Address on the Steps of Sproul Hall or Operation of the Machine Speech, 1964, 
accessed at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/mariosaviosproulhallsitin.htm. 
 
5See DAVID LANCE GOINES, THE FREE SPEECH MOVEMENT: COMING OF AGE IN THE 1960S (Ten Speed 
Press 1993); MAX HEIRICH, THE BEGINNING: BERKELEY, 1964 (Columbia University Press 1971). 
 
6 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967). 
 
7 At the time, professors also were coming under fire for their speech both inside of the classroom and 
outside of it. There are a handful of high-level federal cases involving requirements that faculty regularly 
sign statements indicating they weren’t members of subversive organizations. Of course faculty continue to 
find themselves in court defending their speech, but during the Cold War era, academic freedom was on 
trial. 
 
8 Supra note 7, at 619 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)). 
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during a protest against the U .S. incursion into Cambodia.9 Partially in response to this 
and to the many demonstrations against the Vietnam War, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States was ratified in 1971, dropping the voting age to 
18 years of age.10 As will be demonstrated in Chapter V, speech at the nation’s public 
colleges and universities was protected to a high degree during this turbulent era. 
Students in the K-12 schools during the 1960s and 1970s also were concerned 
with the social issues discussed above, in addition to concerns related to their imminent 
entry into the adult world in which they, too, would be confronted with the prospect of 
being drafted. Aside from their own demonstrations, students engaged in symbolic 
speech and regularly created “underground newspapers” to give voice to their concerns. 
At the K-12 level of education, however, the doctrine of in loco parentis remained. 
Nonetheless, as early as 1943, the U. S. Supreme Court wrote, in relation to the 
value of K-12 students’ free speech,  
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen 
against the State itself and all of its creatures—Boards of Education not 
excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary 
functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of 
Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for 
scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are 
not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount 
important principles of our government as mere platitudes.11  
 
                                                
9 Supra note 5. 
 
10 Gregory C. Lisby, Resolving the Hazelwood Conundrum: The First Amendment Rights of College 
Students in Kincaid v. Gibson and Beyond, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 129 (2002). 
 
11 West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). 
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And in 1969, the U. S. Supreme Court ruled in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
School District12 that the suspension of students wearing black armbands to school in 
protest of the war was unconstitutional. For the first time the Court declared that K-12 
students were “persons” under the Constitution. Their symbolic speech did not create a 
situation in which administrators could “forecast substantial disruption of or material 
interference with school activities.”13 The Court also argued that “undifferentiated fear … 
or mere apprehension” of a significant disturbance would not be enough to overcome 
infringement of students’ First Amendment rights.14 Tinker is heralded by many to 
represent the zenith of First Amendment protection for K-12 students. It would be used to 
strike down administrative punishment of K-12 student speech in a number of cases, as 
shown in Chapter V.  
It will be argued here that during this time period, students began to learn the 
meaning of freedom, in part through experiencing freedom of speech within the schools. 
They were prolific journalists learning to question authority and to write on government’s 
(administrators’ and school boards’) actions. In so doing, student journalists, specifically, 
were learning how to effectuate their future role as the Fourth Estate, or the watchdogs of 
government. They were learning to become citizens who would one day have the tools 
necessary to become self-governing.  
Following these highly turbulent times and the social and political reforms 
achieved during this era – enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, significant reforms 
                                                
12 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 
13 Id. at 514. 
 
14 Id. at 509. 
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relating to discrimination against women in the workplace and women’s access to 
contraception, the end of the draft in 1973, and the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 – 
litigation concerning protests, demonstrations, and “underground newspapers” at both 
levels of education decreased.  
The first K-12 case heard by the U. S. Supreme Court following this period of 
time was Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,15 in which a student gave a sexually 
suggestive speech during a high school assembly. The Court said that the school had the 
right to regulate and punish “lewd” and “indecent” speech even if it is not disruptive to 
the educational process. While the Court did not overrule Tinker, it created another way 
in which schools could regulate speech. The primary mission of the schools, the Court 
said, concerned the inculcation of values, and that schools had the right to “disassociate” 
themselves from speech that is “wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of 
public school education.”16 
By 1988, the U. S. Supreme Court decided in Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier17 that 
restrictions on K-12 student speech found to be part of the curriculum, and, as such, 
school-sponsored bearing the imprimatur of the school, need only be “reasonably related” 
to legitimate pedagogical concerns to pass constitutional muster. While the Hazelwood 
holding did not overrule Tinker, it created a new category of speech – the school-
sponsored – that easily could be regulated, whether disruptive to the learning process or 
not. And, according to the nation’s leading free speech advocacy organization, the 
                                                
15 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 
16 Id. at 685. 
 
17 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
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Student Press Law Center, calls from K-12 students regarding censorship have increased 
350 percent since Hazelwood.18  
Moreover, since 1989, this speech-restrictive K-12 legal standard has begun to be 
applied to post-secondary free speech case law. To date, six U. S. circuit courts of 
appeals19 have either chosen to analyze cases via Hazelwood20 or explicitly have declined 
to do so,21 saying it is not applicable to the post-secondary level of education. Two cases, 
however, were not included in this study. One case22 is currently on appeal without a 
final decision. While the circuit court utilized Hazelwood, questions persisted as to 
whether the punishment of the students’ curricular speech was retaliatory. Additionally, 
another case23 was decided at the federal circuit court level utilizing Hazelwood as 
precedent. Again, however, there were questions about whether the student’s punishment 
for her curricular speech was retaliatory. The case was settled out of court. Thus to date, 
six circuit courts have utilized Hazelwood in their decision-making, representing a circuit 
court split on both its application to post-secondary student expression and the manner in 
which it should be applied. 
With the knowledge that the framework has been used at the K-12 level of 
education to significantly curtail student speech, its utilization at the post-secondary  
                                                
18 Mike Hiestand, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier: A Complete Guide to the Supreme Court 
Decision, Student Press Law Center (2008), accessed at http://www.splc.org/legalresearch.asp?id=4. 
 
19 Alabama Student Party v. Student Government Association of the Univ. of Ala., 867 F.2d 1344 (11th 
Cir. 1989); Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F. 3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001); Brown v. Li, 308 F. 3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002); 
Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004); Hosty v. Carter, 412 F. 3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005); 
Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 
20 Alabama Student Party, Brown, Axson-Flynn & Hosty, supra note 19. 
 
21 Kincaid, supra note 19. 
 
22 Ward, supra note 19. 
 
23 Axson-Flynn, supra note 19. 
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level – and the U. S. Supreme Court’s refusal to hear these cases on appeal – leave 
questions about the future protection of post-secondary student expression.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS 
This dissertation, then, asked the following research questions: !"#$%&$'(&)*&+,(-./01$&)2.+-)$30++$+4'0+&&5(-$,/&+$6/7$3(66(75-8$/$.+9+6(':+-)/6$'/);$&5:56/0$)($);+$'/);$3(66(7+.$<1$=*">$&)2.+-)$30++$+4'0+&&5(-$,/&+$6/7?$$!>#$@(7$;/&$!"#$%&''()*+),-.%/$0$1$<++-$2)565A+.$/)$);+$'(&)*&+,(-./01$6+9+6$(3$+.2,/)5(-?$$
To answer these questions, 120 federal-level student freedom of expression cases 
found at both levels of education were analyzed utilizing traditional legal analysis and a 
method unique to this project to determine the dominant issues at play within this area of 
the law. Relying upon the 1969 U. S. Supreme Court case Brandenburg v. Ohio,24 in 
which the Court held that speech that is not directed to inciting or likely to incite 
imminent lawless action, this dissertation argued that, absent such a showing, speech 
should be free.  
This research revealed that post-secondary free expression case law is, in large 
part, following a similar developmental path to that at the K-12 level of education. When 
analyzing cases through the lens of the Tinker forecasting of material and substantial 
disruption standard, courts generally were supportive of student speech, which parallels 
protection of speech under Brandenburg, and should be the standard governing student 
speech at both levels of education. Further, this research found that, as at the K-12 level 
of education, utilization of the Hazelwood framework to analyze restrictions on post-
                                                
24 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
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secondary speech resulted almost exclusively in less protection for student speech. 
Potential disruption typically was not a consideration in such cases, indicating far from 
ideal protection of speech consonant with the Brandenburg framework.  
 This chapter will proceed with a discussion of the facts in Hazelwood and 
critiques of its restrictive legal framework before turning to a brief description of recent 
cases in which students have been punished for speech made online in the privacy of their 
homes. A short analysis of landmark, U. S. Supreme Court post-secondary First 
Amendment cases will follow, demonstrating the high level of protection historically 
afforded students at the college level. From here the discussion will address the federal 
circuit court of appeals split on the question of whether the Hazelwood framework is 
applicable at the college level.  
 Next, the purposes of education generally and the historical structures of higher 
education will be explored. Then the various purposes of K-12 and post-secondary 
education will be examined, concluding with the assertion that the differences between 
the two levels of education make application of Hazelwood to college and university 
speech antithetical to the goals and mission of higher education.  Finally, the content of 
each subsequent chapter will be discussed.  
 
HAZELWOOD v. KUHLMEIER 
At issue in Hazelwood was the principal’s deletion of two pages of the 
curriculum-based student newspaper that dealt with teenage pregnancy and divorce. 
Three student staff members sued the school for violation of their First Amendment 
rights. When the case reached the U. S. Supreme Court, the Court ruled in favor of the 
  
 
10 
school’s administrators, indicating that students in high school, particularly younger 
students, were not mature enough to be exposed to sensitive topics such as teenage 
sexuality.25  
The Court also indicated that the school has a right to “disassociate itself”26 from 
speech that members of the student body and community-at-large may “perceive to bear 
the imprimatur of the school.”27 If the speech “is inconsistent ‘with the shared values of a 
civilized social order,’”28 or “associate[s] the school with any position other than 
neutrality,”29 the Court reasoned, schools are entitled to censor material so they can 
“fulfill their role as a ‘principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his 
environment.’”30 
Thus the two-pronged Hazelwood framework was born. The Court decided that a 
student newspaper could be regulated if 1) it were subsidized by the school and was, thus, 
a nonpublic, curricular forum and 2) administrative control, or censorship, was related to 
“legitimate pedagogical concerns.”31 If the vehicle for expression, in this case a 
newspaper, purposefully had been intended to operate, through policy or practice, as a 
                                                
25 Supra note 17, at 271. 
 
26 Id. (quoting Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)). 
 
27 Id. at 271. 
 
28 Id. at 272. (quoting Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)). 
 
29 Id. 
 
30 Id. at 272 (quoting Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). 
 
31 Supra note 17, at 273. 
 
  
 
11 
public forum, however, the school could not constitutionally censor the particular speech 
in question.  
The Hazelwood framework has been criticized by a number of free speech 
advocates as far too ambiguous, and they have warned that applying this standard to  
post-secondary expression might lead to unwarranted censorship.32 What are “legitimate 
pedagogical concerns”? How do schools determine the “shared values of a civilized 
order”? Are schools even responsible for making such decisions?  
According to attorney Joe Murphy, the Hazelwood framework has been so 
variously interpreted and used in K-12 and post-secondary student speech and press cases 
that it is unclear if courts even have a clear understanding of the framework.33 The  
U. S. Supreme Court itself historically has expressed concern about the potential “chilling 
effect” that overly broad or unclear laws and standards may have on speech.  
Others have argued that application of the Hazelwood framework at both levels of 
education is inconsistent with one of the most critical missions of both schools—to 
educate students so they become self-governing citizens.34 As 19th century educator and 
statesman Horace Mann so eloquently put it, "The great moral attribute of self-
government cannot be born and matured in a day; and if school children are not trained to 
it, we only prepare ourselves for disappointment if we expect it from grown men.” 
                                                
32 Organizations include the Freedom Forum, the First Amendment Center, the American Civil Liberties 
Association, and the Student Press Law Center.  
 
33 Bait and Switch in Hosty v. Carter: The Seventh Circuit’s Recipe for Limiting Free Speech Rights of 
College Journalists by Extending the ‘Hazelwood Doctrine’ and Misusing Qualified Immunity, 81 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 429 (2007). 
 
34 See, for ex., Erwin Chemerinsky, Teaching that Speech Matters: A Framework for Analyzing Speech 
Issues in Schools, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 101 (2009).  
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Yet when students are censored, they are not learning one of the most important 
principles upon which our representative democracy relies—that free speech, particularly 
that which is political, is necessary if the people, not government, are to be sovereign.  
As Justice William J. Brennan, in his Hazelwood dissenting opinion wrote:  
Such unthinking contempt for individual rights is intolerable from any state 
official. It is particularly insidious from one to whom the public entrusts the 
task of inculcating in its youth an appreciation of the cherished democratic 
liberties that our Constitution guarantees … The young men and women of 
Hazelwood East expected a civics lesson, but not one the Court teaches them 
today.35 
 
Thus teaching students to avoid potentially controversial speech so they aren’t 
reprimanded by administrators very well may dissuade them from actively engaging in 
the deliberative process, which inherently includes criticism of governmental action. 
Further, when student journalists operate in such a suppressive environment, they are not 
being prepared for their future role as the Fourth Estate. 
And the problems only become more pernicious if college students also are taught 
not to speak. Application of the Hazelwood framework at the college level is 
contradictory to the distinction between secondary students and adult university students 
that the U. S. Supreme Court has articulated in a number of cases, both concerning 
student speech and not. Most prominently, this distinction has been made in 
Establishment Clause cases.36 The Court also has delineated a distinction between minors 
                                                
35 Supra note 17, at 290. 
 
36 See Lee. V. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992) (“We do not address whether that choice [between 
protesting and participating] is acceptable if the affected citizens are mature adults, but we think the state 
may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, place primary and secondary school children in this 
position.”); Bell v. Little Axe Indep. Sch. Dist. No 70, 766 F.2d 1391, 1407 (10th Cir. 1985) (referring to 
expert testimony that “It is not until the age of 18 that the child fully develops the ability to make decisions 
independent of authority figures and peers”); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (“University 
students are, of course, young adults. They are less impressionable than younger students and should be 
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in elementary and secondary schools from legally sanctioned adults in other contexts.37 
Moreover, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the Unites States, ratified 
in 1971, decreased the voting age from 21 to 18, giving college-aged students a higher 
stake in speaking out politically. 
According to attorney Mike Hiestand of the Student Press Law Center (SPLC),38  
“Student media continue to report censorship of articles, editorials and advertisements 
that are perceived as ‘controversial’ or that school officials feel might cast the school in a 
negative light,” he wrote.39 Advisers also have reported that their jobs become threatened 
if they do not censor when asked to do so by administrators. Nearly all of the advisers 
and students who have filed complaints with the SPLC attribute the asserted censorship 
to the Hazelwood ruling.40 The SPLC has not determined the number of unreported 
incidents of censorship.  
A Knight Foundation Study found that many students think government, indeed, 
has the right to censor.41 People for the American Way (PAW) also has documented a 
                                                                                                                                            
able to appreciate that the University’s policy is one of neutrality toward religion”); Tilton v. Richardson, 
403 U.S. 672 (1971) (“There is substance to the contention that college students are less impressionable 
and less susceptible than adolescents to religious indoctrination”).  
 
37 Belottti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (In determining the constitutionality of a state statute regulating 
the access of minors to abortions, the Court wrote, “during the formative years of childhood and 
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices 
that could be detrimental to them.”); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (In determining 
the constitutionality of a New York criminal obscenity statute prohibiting the sale to minors under 17 years 
of age of material defined to be obscene, the Court wrote, "[A]t least in some precisely delineated areas, a 
child — like someone in a captive audience — is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice 
which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.”).  
 
38 The SPLC is the leading U.S. student free speech advocacy organization. 
 
39 Mike Hiestand, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier: A Complete Guide to the Supreme Court 
Decision, Student Press Law Center (2008) http://www.splc.org/legalresearch.asp?id=4. 
 
40 Id. 
 
41 Warren Watson & Sarah Childers, High School Journalism, AMER. EDUCATOR, (Nov. 11, 2005). 
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steady increase in complaints regarding student censorship since Hazelwood. One of the 
most interesting aspects of PAW’s report is that school censors prevail in 50 percent of 
the reported challenges to censorship.42 PAW legal director Elliot Mincberg said, “Some 
school officials have interpreted Hazelwood as granting them broad, even unchecked 
authority.”43 
Student Speech in the Privacy of Their Homes 
  Within just the last few years, a series of K-12 cases have been decided 
concerning the constitutionality of punishing students for speech made in the privacy of 
their homes, but which have, to varying degrees, bled into the schoolhouse. In two of the 
four cases, students prevailed. In Doninger v. Niehoff,44 a member of the student council 
posted a message on her blog critical of administrators and subsequently was prohibited 
from running for class secretary. The Second U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals found that 
the school did not violate the student’s First Amendment rights because it determined that 
administrators need only forecast a material and substantial disruption at school per 
Tinker.  
In Layshock v. Hermitage School District,45 the Third U. S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals held for the student because it found that the online profile he created mocking 
his high school principal caused no substantial disruption on campus per Tinker. In the 
companion case Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District,46 another student created an 
                                                
42 Debra Gersh Hernandez, Censorship in the Schools, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, (Sept. 16, 1995). 
 
43 Id. 
 
44 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 
45 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010).  
 
46 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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online profile mocking her middle school principal. Again, the Third Circuit ruled for the 
student, reasoning that the profile caused no substantial disruption at school. In the final 
case, the Fourth U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the suspension of a student who 
posted online that another female student had an STD.47 Close reading of the cases 
indicates the decisions primarily turned on the courts’ understanding of Tinker, notably 
whether it allows punishment if a disruption is foreseeable or whether a disruption 
actually occurs. The U. S. Supreme Court just this term denied certiorari in all cases.  
 
POST-SECONDARY U. S. SUPREME COURT CASE LAW  
 Historically, college and university students’ freedom of expression has been 
protected stringently by the U. S. Supreme Court. The six cases heard by the Court, and 
the many others in this area of the law, have found solid footing in several bedrock First 
Amendment principles: 1) The right to association is inextricably tied to speech in that 
denial of the right to associate also denies speech,48 2) Speech that is offensive cannot be 
denied merely because it is distressful or even disgusting to others,49 3) Discriminating 
against or prohibiting speech based upon another’s viewpoint is repugnant to the First 
Amendment,50 and 4) Government cannot compel citizens to express beliefs with which 
                                                
47 Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 
48 N.A.A.C.P v. United States, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in 
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”) 
 
49 Bridges v. State of California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (“For it is a prized American privilege to speak one's 
mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions. And an enforced silence, 
however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably engender 
resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance respect.”). 
 
50 Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (“Above all else, the First 
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, 
its subject matter, or its content.”). 
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they disagree.51 Additionally, a brief note on public forum doctrine. Public forum 
doctrine was created as a means of determining the expression allowed on government 
property. Over time the Court carved out three fora – the open public forum, such as 
sidewalks where speech is rarely regulated; the nonpublic forum, such as prisons, in 
which speech is much more limited; and the limited public forum, which rests between 
these two and allows speech for certain purposes and for certain speakers. Speech 
typically is not regulated to a high degree in the limited public forum. In theory, 
viewpoint discrimination is not allowed within all types of fora. 
 The Court heard three cases pre-Hazelwood. In the 1972 case Healy v. James,52 
the Court held that Central Connecticut State College unconstitutionally infringed 
students’ rights to free speech and association in denying official recognition to the 
Students for a Democratic Society. The Court wrote, "State colleges and universities are 
not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment. . . . [T]he precedents of 
this Court leave no room for the view that because of the acknowledged need for order,  
First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses than in 
the community at large.”53 
 Just one year later in Papish v. Board of Curators of University of Missouri,54 the 
Court ruled that the university’s expulsion of a student for publishing two articles deemed 
indecent and offensive was unconstitutional.  The Court wrote, “… the mere 
                                                
51 West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) ("If there is any fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their 
faith therein."). 
 
52 408 U.S. 169 (1972). 
 
53 Id. at 180. 
 
54 410 U.S. 667 (1973).  
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dissemination of ideas—no matter how offensive to good taste—on a state university 
campus may not be shut off in the name alone of ‘conventions of decency.’”55  
In Widmar v. Vincent,56 the Court declared for the first time that once a forum for 
expression is opened, it cannot restrict expressive activities based upon viewpoint, as the 
university had done. The Court wrote,  
A university legitimately may regard some subjects as more relevant to its 
educational mission than others. But the university, like the police officer, 
may not allow its agreement or disagreement with the viewpoint of a 
particular speaker to determine whether access to a forum will be granted. If 
a state university is to deny recognition to a student organization — or is to 
give it a lesser right to use school facilities than other students — it must 
have a valid reason for doing so.57 
 
         Three cases appeared before the Court post-Hazelwood. The first, Rosenberger v. 
Rectors and Visitors of the University of Virginia,58 involved the university’s refusal to 
fund an extra-curricular newspaper dedicated to religious speech. The Court, speaking for 
the first time on the limited public forum, ruled that refusing to fund the newspaper due 
to its viewpoint while continuing to fund others was an unconstitutional violation of the 
students’ First Amendment rights. 
Five years later, in Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth,59 the 
Court was faced with a unique question: Should students have to fund, through 
mandatory student fees, organizations with which they ideologically disagreed? The 
Court ruled that because the student activities fee system was a metaphysical public 
                                                
55 Id. at 670. 
 
56 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
 
57 Id. at 280. 
 
58 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 
59 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
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forum in which fees supported a large number of organizations of a wide variety of 
viewpoints, requiring students to pay their full fees was constitutional. The second part of 
the decision, however, involved the university’s referendum process for determining the 
allocation of fees. The Court found this aspect of the fees scheme unconstitutional 
because its configuration did not allow for viewpoint neutrality. 
The final case, heard in 2010, was Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., 
Hastings v. Martinez.60 Here the Court was called upon to decide if an “all-comers” 
policy was constitutional. Officially recognized student organizations at the law school 
were required to accept all students who wished to join a particular organization. The 
organization at question refused to allow students to join as voting members unless they 
signed a statement of Christian faith and renounced homosexuality. The Court found that 
the all-comers policy was constitutional because it was a viewpoint neutral program. 
Thus in this case, while the Court ruled against students, it also could be said that it held 
for students’ First Amendment rights to association and, therefore, to speech at the same 
time. 
 
POST-HAZELWOOD FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT  
 As discussed above, six federal circuit courts of appeals have ruled on the 
applicability of Hazelwood to the post-secondary cases presented before them.  
 The first case, heard by the Eleventh Circuit Court,61 was Alabama Student Party 
v. Student Government Association of the University of Alabama,62 in which students 
                                                
60 319 Fed. Appx. 645 (2010). 
 
61 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit includes the following states: Alabama, 
Florida, and Georgia. 
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alleged violation of their First Amendment rights when the university restricted aspects of 
electioneering. The court found that the university’s rules on campaigning were 
reasonable per Hazelwood. The second case, heard by the Sixth Circuit,63 was Kincaid v. 
Gibson,64 which has been viewed variously as to whether or not it applied Hazelwood. 
The case involved the court-determined unconstitutional confiscation of yearbooks the 
administration considered “inappropriate” and of “poor quality.”65 While the court stated 
that Hazelwood was not applicable, it proceeded to utilize the case as precedent in 
determining that the yearbook was a limited public forum. As such, the school could not 
discriminate against the viewpoints expressed therein. 
 The third case, Brown v. Li,66 involved the university’s refusal to accept a 
student’s thesis because it contained a “Disacknowledgements” section, in which the 
student chastised certain university personnel, utilizing profanity in the process. The 
Ninth Circuit Court67 ruled that the university acted within its constitutional limits in 
refusing to accept his thesis. The next case, Axson-Flynn v. Johnson,68 concerned a 
student who refused to use the word “fuck” and to take the Lord’s name in vain during 
                                                                                                                                            
62 Supra note 19.  
 
63 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit includes the following states: Kentucky, 
Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee. 
 
64 Supra note 19. 
 
65 Id. at 345. 
 
66 Supra note 19.  
 
67 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit includes the following states: Alaska, Arizona, 
California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington. 
 
68 Supra note 19. 
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her acting class at the University of Utah. In its ruling, the Tenth Circuit Court69 ruled for 
the student, in part, and remanded in part. It was not included in the analysis here because 
the case was settled out of court. 
Then in 2005 the case that has raised the most concern among free speech 
advocates was Hosty v. Carter,70 in which the Seventh Circuit Court71 applied Hazelwood 
to an extra-curricular student newspaper, in which student writers and editors expressed 
criticism of various administrators. No court before this had applied the framework to a 
college newspaper, one of the principal means by which ideas are transmitted within the 
educational environment. One such administrator, Patricia Carter, Dean of Student 
Affairs and Services, ordered the printer to stop the presses.  
The court determined that the newspaper was a limited public forum and that 
neither its extra-curricular status nor age impacted forum determination, which goes 
against U. S. Supreme Court precedent indicating that extra-curricular activities and 
publications should receive the full protection of the law and not be subjected to a 
restrictive legal standard created for the review of K-12 student expression. Because 
Dean Carter, the court said, could not have known the law in this area, it determined that 
she was entitled to qualified immunity, which opened the floodgates for administrators 
nationwide to censor and to be held unaccountable if they simply proclaim convincingly 
enough –“I didn’t know.” Seen in this light, the students neither won their case entirely 
nor lost it entirely either.  
                                                
69 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit includes the following states: Colorado, 
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The final student expression case, which, as discussed above also will not be 
analyzed because it is in the appeal process, was Ward v. Polite,72 in which a graduate 
counseling student refused to counsel homosexuals because homosexuality was against 
her religion. After being kicked out of the program, she sued, claiming the school 
compelled her to speak against her beliefs. It is on appeal for factual determination. 
 Finally, another case utilizing Hazelwood, which will not be analyzed in this 
dissertation because it does not involve a student, but which merits comment nonetheless 
is Bishop v. Aranov,73 in which a professor spoke periodically in class about his personal 
religious beliefs. “He never engaged in prayer, read passages from the Bible, handed out 
religious tracts, or arranged for guest speakers to lecture on a religious topic during 
instructional time,” wrote the court.74 The university requested that he discontinue all 
references to his religious beliefs while in class. Pursuant to this, he filed suit, alleging 
violation of his First Amendment rights via professorial academic freedom. The Eleventh 
Circuit Court utilized Hazelwood to determine that the classroom was not a public forum 
and subsequently ruled in favor of the university. 
 Hazelwood and Hosty have raised enough concern for state legislatures to enact 
laws protecting free speech. For instance, in 2007, the Illinois General Assembly (Illinois 
being one of the three states directly affected by Hosty) passed the College Campus Press 
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Act (CCPA).75 The act declares all student media at public colleges and universities to be 
public forums and effectively prevents another Hosty-type case arising in Illinois.  
Since Hazelwood, a total of three states have passed legislation protecting college 
students, and seven states, including California and Oregon, have done so for secondary 
school students.76 Oregon is the only state that protects the speech of both groups of 
students.77 A 2007 Washington bill that would have better protected students died in 
committee.78 
The efficacy of state statutes protecting secondary free speech has, however, been 
called into question. One study concluded that, in the state analyzed, the statute itself had 
less influence on the protection of student expression than other variables, such as level 
of adviser education and differences between urban and rural schools.79 The study noted, 
however, that other states should be examined before generalizing. It also did not 
evaluate statutes designed to protect college students.  
 
 
EDUCATION, GENERALLY, AND HISTORICAL STRUCTURES OF HIGHER  
 
EDUCATION 
 
Explication of the centrality of education to the human experience begins at least 
with Plato and his allegory of the cave, a fictional account of his teacher Socrates’ 
                                                
75 110 ILCS 13 (2007). 
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exchange with Plato’s brother Glaucon.80  In this dialog, Socrates81 posited to Glaucon a 
scenario in which a group of people have lived, chained to a blank wall all of their lives, 
able only to see illuminated on the wall before them the shadows of figures crossing the 
path of the fire behind them. They begin to ascribe forms to these shadows, and to the 
sounds of the people walking along a raised pathway. They came to believe that the 
shadows and sounds were reality, not merely reflections of reality. Among themselves 
they guessed which shadow would appear next, praising the person who was right as the 
one who understood the nature of life.  
Next, Socrates proposed that were one of these people, or prisoners, to be set free 
and shown the true forms casting the shadows that had become the prisoner’s reality, 
would he believe the shadows were more real than the true forms to which he now was 
exposed? Initially, Socrates asserted, the prisoner would not, but with enough time he 
would begin to acclimate to the brightness of the sun, to the forms around him and to 
*see*, both literally and figuratively. And, Socrates asked, if this man were to return to 
the cave, no longer able to see the shadows, and attempt to explain to the other prisoners 
what he had learned, how would they view him? How would he view them? Socrates 
suggested that they likely would think him stupid in his inability to now see the shadows, 
which have constituted their reality, while in turn he would view them with pity.  
Such is the life of the philosopher, Socrates said—to enlighten the prisoners, who 
have no knowledge of the good, the last thing to be seen. “Once one has seen it, however, 
one must conclude that it is the cause of all that is correct and beautiful in anything, that 
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it produces both light and its sources in the visible realm, and that in the intelligible realm 
it controls and provides truth and understanding, so that anyone who is to act sensibly in 
public or private must see it.”82 
As professor of philosophy Jorn K. Bramann noted: 
While Plato thus describes the liberating and empowering nature of 
education, he was deeply pessimistic with regard to its popularity. In the tale 
of the cave great emphasis is placed on the difficulties of acquiring 
knowledge, and on the hostility and mistrust that many people feel toward 
education and educated people. The ascent out of the cave and into the light 
is neither easy nor necessarily voluntary, and it requires a persistence and 
willingness to undergo changes that most people would find too strange to 
consider, or too painful to endure.83     
 
Yet throughout the centuries education has been a central aspiration of many.  And, as 
one scholar noted, “The changing relationship between students and their college or 
university reflects the evolution of higher education in this country.”84  
Almost universally, analyses of student free speech at both the K-12 and post-
secondary levels have used Tinker as their starting point. Such analyses, however, fail to 
account for the more-than-century-long period of time prior to Tinker in which colleges 
and universities had, for all intents and purposes, absolute control of student speech due 
to the doctrine of in loco parentis. It is not surprising that scholars do not include this era 
in their analyses because courts were loathe to interfere with administrative discipline of 
students. Yet neglecting to discuss this period results in a landscape only half-painted. 
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During the colonial period, for instance, higher education was conducted through 
small, church-affiliated colleges. In general, they were modeled after England’s Oxford 
and Cambridge, and colleges were concerned not only with higher learning but also with 
the development of moral character and religious education. These early colleges retained 
near absolute control of both the curriculum and student behavior. They stressed social 
cohesion over heterogeneity. This familial quality was supported by the doctrine of in 
loco parentis, and courts stringently resisted interfering with administrative discipline of 
students.85 
 During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, higher education experienced a fairly 
rapid shift from this small, religious, and socially cohesive environment. Society’s 
increasing need for technically skilled workers led educational reformers to look to the 
German model of the university, in which research and specialized knowledge were 
emphasized. Most of the previously small colleges began the transition to this larger 
university model, and the student experience shifted from one in which the administration 
controlled nearly every aspect of the student’s life to a system in which students were 
quite free, in relative terms, from control by the administration.86 For instance, students 
generally were allowed to choose their courses, and they were relatively free from the 
daily supervision in place at the smaller liberal arts colleges.87  
 Because the Germanic model required growth to support its specialized research 
agenda and because of a significant influx of World War II veterans, university 
populations increased dramatically. These larger universities attempted to maintain the 
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intimacy characterized by the English college model; however, their student bodies were 
increasingly heterogeneous. This modern multiversity was characterized, in part, by a 
growing tension between a diverse student body and administrative desire for discipline 
and control.88  
This tension became more pronounced when the U. S. Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled in Dixon v. Alabama89 that the expulsion of six African-American students 
for participating in civil rights demonstrations was a violation of the students’ 
constitutional right to due process. Because public universities are state actors, the Court 
said, they could not infringe upon students’ constitutional rights. This was a monumental 
departure from the prevailing notion of judicial non-interference in matters relating to 
student discipline. Not only did the Court recognize that students did, indeed, have 
constitutional rights within the university setting, but it also appeared to ring the death 
knell for the doctrine of in loco parentis within post-secondary education. 
 
FREE SPEECH MOVEMENT OF THE 1960s  
Three years after Dixon, the Free Speech Movement (FSM) arose, most 
prominently at Berkeley from 1964-65.90 In 1958, students created SLATE, a campus 
political party with the aim of protecting the rights of student groups to support and to 
protest political issues unrelated to campus life, such as racial discrimination, war and 
peace, capital punishment, and civil liberties. The university, however, refused to 
recognize SLATE as a political party, deeming it only a student organization.   
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Further, the university created a set of directives regulating the rights of student 
organizations to sponsor speakers and to take stands publicly on controversial off-campus 
issues. By the fall of 1964, SLATE’S leaders consisted primarily of students who had 
been to Mississippi to participate in Freedom Summer, a campaign with the explicit goal 
of registering African-Americans to vote.91  
 In September, these Freedom Riders, along with University Friends of the Student 
Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and Campus Congress of Racial Equality 
(CORE), set up tables at the university’s entrance for the purpose of soliciting members 
and contributions for a variety of civil rights issues. (Under the directives, only members 
of the Democratic and Republican campus clubs could engage in fundraising for political 
parties and causes.)92  
When administrators learned that these groups were engaging in solicitation, they 
initiated disciplinary proceedings against the students. In rejection of this move, more 
than 500 students gathered outside the Dean’s office and presented him with a petition 
demanding 1) that all students be given the right to engage in political solicitation and 2) 
that all charges against the students be dropped immediately.93  
The Dean was unrelenting, and over the next two months students held protests 
and rallies against these restrictive policies. They also met repeatedly with administrators 
and professors in an effort to negotiate more inclusive policies relating to political 
organization and speech. Yet in December, police arrested 765 demonstrators. This 
fueled larger demonstrations, until, finally, in January, the new chancellor issued two 
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statements, supported by FSM students, indicating both his philosophy regarding the 
crisis and provisional rules for political activity and speech. The members of FSM held 
their first legal rally the following day.94   
 
PURPOSES OF MODERN K-12 and POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION IN THE  
 
UNITED STATES 
 
K-12 Education 
 It is within this context and the general political and social unrest within society-
at-large that the Tinker case was decided, which, as discussed, protected K-12 students’ 
freedom of expression to a high degree.  As noted by the Court,  
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen 
against the State itself and all of its creatures--Boards of Education not 
excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary 
functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of 
Rights.95  
 
Additionally, schools must promote interpersonal communication among students. “This 
is not only an inevitable part of the process of attending school; it is also an important 
part of the educational process.”96 And, most famously, the Court wrote, “’It can hardly 
be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."97 
 John Dewey also felt that the social life of the child was of extreme importance 
because it is the basis of personal growth through which social progress and reform can 
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95 Supra note 12, at 507 (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 US 624, 637 (1943)). 
 
96 Id. at 512. 
 
97 Id. at 506. 
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be achieved. Failing to recognize both the sociological and psychological aspects of the 
child will lead to “evil results,” he wrote. One such evil would be neglecting the moral 
education of the child, which “centers around this conception of the school as a mode of 
social life, that the best and deepest moral training is precisely that which one gets 
through having to enter into proper relations with others in a unity of work and thought.” 
Further, he believed in active learning through expressive and constructive activities, 
without which “The child is thrown into a passive, receptive or absorbing attitude” 
resulting in “friction and waste.”98   
 The National Association of Secondary School Principals’ “Statement of Values” 
says that the mission of K-12 education is to “educate the total child” through classroom 
instruction and other activities that “promote character, citizenship, and leadership.” 
Further, schools must teach students about indispensable virtues such as “honesty, 
dependability, trust, responsibility, tolerance, respect, and other commonly held values 
important to our society.”99  In Hazelwood, the Court said that a school’s principal role 
was to engender students with cultural values and skills necessary for citizenship. 
 
Post-Secondary Education 
Barlett Giamatti, former president at Yale University, once warned that a 
particular danger in higher education is, “…a smugness that believes the institution’s 
value is so self-evident that it no longer needs explication, its mission so manifest that it 
                                                
98 John Dewey, My Pedagogic Creed (1897), accessed at 
http://www.rjgeib.com/biography/credo/dewey.html.  
 
99 National Association of Secondary School Principals’, NAASP Statement of Values (2002), accessed at 
http://www.nassp.org/Content.aspx?topic=47103.  
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no longer requires definition and articulation.”100 Now, almost a quarter of a century 
later, with the dynamic changes that have occurred in society due to the swift 
advancement in technology, crises in funding and the resulting changes in the 
university’s funding structure, in addition to an ever-increasing heterogeneous, post-
secondary community, many are beginning to specifically describe the mission and 
purposes of higher education.  
Harold T. Shapiro, former President of Princeton University, wrote that 
universities serve society as both responsive servants and thoughtful critics. The modern 
university, he wrote, “…must serve society by providing the educational and other 
programs in high demand … [and] … the university must also raise questions that society 
does not want to ask and generate new ideas that help invent the future, at times even 
‘pushing’ society toward it.”101 The university, he contended, not only influences the 
direction a society takes but also is a reflection of the way in which a society changes.  
He further asserted that higher education is a requirement of “fully expressed 
citizenship.”102 “The university is an essential supplier of products and services on which 
the society is highly dependent, such as advanced training, expertise of various types and 
new ideas.”103 Further, democracy, in its demands of political responsibility among all 
citizens, and the reality of the demands placed on this modern multiversity, “…requires 
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all citizens to have an informed cultural awareness and a capacity for critical 
judgment.”104 
Former professor of Christian ethics and theology at Drew University Edward Le 
Roy Long, Jr., in recognizing that defining the essential purpose of higher education is 
often an elusive endeavor, went beyond discussion of the purpose of the university 
specifically to consider also the purposes of both the liberal arts and the religious college. 
His primary contention was that higher education was a moral enterprise. He asserted that 
each type of school had three primary functions: 1) “the responsibility of the college or 
university for the identification, maturation, and enrichment of selfhood,” 2) “the 
responsibility of the college or university for the discovery/construction, extension, and 
dissemination of knowledge and culture,” and 3) “the responsibility of the college or 
university for the well-being of society.”105  
He went on to write that while it has become evermore commonplace within the 
academy to teach ethics and values, the emphasis on developing character is often met 
with suspicion. Nonetheless, such concerns should not, he argued, be a justifiable reason 
for helping students to grow and to mature into socially responsible people and citizens. 
He wrote: 
Knowledge and learning, which are the assumed priorities within higher 
learning, like other human potential and achievements, are embodied in 
persons. If people are not taught to be properly curious, adequately 
motivated, concerned for truth as an object of personal commitment, and 
prepared to pursue learning with zest, they cannot function well in an 
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institution of learning … [and] …what goes on outside the classroom may 
well be of pivotal significance.106 
 
The importance of building community, and the resulting ideas that emerge within 
extracurricular activities and organizations, should not be overlooked. Nor should one 
neglect the significance of students within these communities learning about new ideas 
and about the experiences of others unlike themselves.  Such interactions in college are 
an essential means to help students develop a sense of duty to the larger community they 
will join upon graduation. 
 Richard Kahlenberg, a senior fellow at the Century Foundation and regular 
contributor to The Chronicle of Higher Education, recently was asked to be the 
commencement speaker at a small liberal arts college.107 In his speech, he outlined what 
he perceived as the central goals of higher education. First he said that every American 
should be afforded the opportunity to seek and to obtain a higher degree, regardless of 
wealth. Next he said that higher education should be geared toward educating leaders in 
our democratic state. In order for this to occur, he said, higher education should 
“…advance learning and knowledge through faculty research and by giving students the 
opportunity to broaden their minds even when learning does not seem immediately 
relevant to their careers.” 108 
Finally, and in a similar vein to Long’s observation above, he said that schools 
should be places in which students engage with and learn from those of all backgrounds, 
whether in or outside of the classroom. College and university campuses are particularly 
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important in that they are unique environments and have a duty to foster such inter-
personal learning. He hoped that through the goals stated, students would find both 
passion and purpose in their lives, leading to living meaningful lives in which they not 
only desire to but also are adequately equipped to be active participants in shaping 
society and dealing with the most critical issues facing the nation, now and in the 
future.109 
 In Healy v. James, the Court wrote, “The college classroom with its surrounding 
environs is peculiarly the `marketplace of ideas,' and we break no new constitutional 
ground in reaffirming this Nation's dedication to safeguarding academic freedom.”110 In 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire,111 the Court wrote, “Scholarship cannot flourish in an 
atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to 
inquire, to study and to evaluate.”112 
Frankfurter, in his dissenting opinion, wrote: 
In a university knowledge is its own end, not merely a means to an end. A 
university ceases to be true to its own nature if it becomes the tool of Church 
or State or any sectional interest. A university is characterized by the spirit of 
free inquiry, its ideal being the ideal of Socrates—`to follow the argument 
where it leads.' This implies the right to examine, question, modify or reject 
traditional ideas and beliefs. Dogma and hypothesis are incompatible, and the 
concept of an immutable doctrine is repugnant to the spirit of a university. 
The concern of its scholars is not merely to add and revise facts in relation to 
an accepted framework, but to be ever examining and modifying the 
framework itself.113 
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In Keyishian v. Board of Regents,114 the Court wrote, “Our Nation is deeply 
committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us, 
and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of 
the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the 
classroom.”115   
Finally, in Board of Regents of Univ. Of Wis. System v. Southworth,116 the Court 
wrote, “If it is difficult to define germane speech with ease or precision where a union or 
bar association is the party, the standard becomes all the more unmanageable in the 
public university setting, particularly where the State undertakes to stimulate the whole 
universe of speech and ideas.”117  
 
CONCLUSION 
 As discussed above, several organizations have found that application of the 
Hazelwood framework has resulted in increased censorship at the K-12 educational level, 
allowing administrators to censor if they can justify a legitimate pedagogical purpose, a 
part of the framework that many have argued is vague and opens the door for 
administrators to censor virtually at will. Thus its applicability at the post-secondary 
level, which, as of this time, has been discussed or applied in six student speech cases, is 
questionable at best. 
                                                
114 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
 
115 Id. at 603. 
 
116 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
 
117 Id. at 222. 
  
 
35 
Based upon the information presented above, it is clear that post-secondary cases 
reaching the High Court historically have been almost exclusively supportive of student 
freedom of expression. The same has not always been true in cases heard by federal 
circuit courts of appeals, which have split on utilization of Hazelwood in their analyses of 
post-secondary case law. Because the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in these 
federal-level cases, lower courts, administrators, and students are left wondering about 
the extent of college students’ First Amendment rights.  
One of the clear implications as to the purpose of education at the K-12 level is 
that value inculcation predominates, though preparing students for citizenship is also a 
factor. As for higher education, the central purpose of education at this level – from both 
a scholarly and judicial perspective – appears to revolve around providing students with a 
unique environment in which curiosity can be cultivated and ideas can be generated, 
tested, and disputed without fear. This leads to the underlying purpose for supporting 
students’ development in these areas – to produce a citizenry capable of critically 
analyzing social issues and making determinations about where that society should head. 
Due to the differences between the two institutions and the historical protection of 
college students’ First Amendment rights per U. S. Supreme Court decisions, application 
of the Hazelwood framework is arguably incompatible within higher education.  
As James Madison wrote, "A people who mean to be their own governors must 
arm themselves with the power knowledge gives. A popular government without popular 
information or the means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or 
perhaps both."118 
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This dissertation, then, will ask the following research questions: !"#$%&$'(&)*&+,(-./01$&)2.+-)$30++$+4'0+&&5(-$,/&+$6/7$3(66(75-8$/$.+9+6(':+-)/6$'/);$&5:56/0$)($);+$'/);$3(66(7+.$<1$=*">$&)2.+-)$30++$+4'0+&&5(-$,/&+$6/7?$$!>#$@(7$;/&$!"#$%&''()*+),-.%/$0$1$<++-$2)565A+.$/)$);+$'(&)*&+,(-./01$6+9+6$(3$+.2,/)5(-?$
 
Chapter II will delve into the normative theories historically associated with the 
First Amendment and their application to student freedom of expression. It also will go 
into significant detail about public forum analysis, upon which one prong of the 
Hazelwood framework relies, before offering a critique of the problems associated with 
public forum analysis generally.  
Chapter III will begin broadly by discussing the role of the doctrine of in loco 
parentis within First Amendment jurisprudence before highlighting and providing 
scholarly critiques of landmark U. S. Supreme Court cases at both educational levels. The 
discussion then will be narrowed further to critiques of the circuit court cases identified 
above, concluding that the myriad issues at play make application of Hazelwood to higher 
education quite problematic.  
Chapter IV will present the methodology utilized within this dissertation. 
Chapter V will analyze all federal-level student expression cases found at both 
levels of education. The discussion will focus on the outcomes in each of the 120 cases 
studied, in addition to themes discovered and the rationales utilized by courts to 
determine these outcomes.  
Chapter VI will begin with an overview of the findings before discussing the 
importance of freedom of expression, its protection within schools, and the degree to 
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which this protection measures up against the ideal concept of free speech articulated in 
Chapter II.
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CHAPTER II 
 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 Building upon a discussion of normative legal theory and an examination of the 
liberal origins of free speech, this chapter will focus primarily on the various normative 
theories put forth in support of the First Amendment both generally and in relation to 
student speech – the marketplace of ideas as the dominant paradigm both in the field 
generally and within student freedom of expression jurisprudence; the notion that citizens 
in our republic require information to make informed political decisions; the significance 
of the individual in our society and his or her right to autonomy and self-fulfillment; the 
importance of the press as the Fourth Estate, or the watchdog of government, a role that 
students will fill in their futures, particularly in journalism; and the significance given to 
free speech as a safety valve, allowing people to express themselves so that social 
stability can be maintained. Further, it will discuss the ideal concept of free speech 
articulated in this dissertation, and its relation to student speech. It will conclude with an 
in-depth discussion and analysis of public forum doctrine, which student freedom of 
expression case law increasingly has utilized to evaluate the constitutionality of speech 
restrictions and punishment. 
 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
While the First Amendment commands that, “Congress shall make no law … 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press …”1 the Framers of the Constitution 
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“provided few clues to the precise scope of free speech.”2 Unsurprisingly, then, a number 
of theories have been put forth to explain the values inherent in the First Amendment, to 
argue the reasons why freedom of expression should be protected, and to make 
determinations about how sweeping its protections normatively should be, in all variety 
of legal spheres.3  
The freedom to express oneself, as Justice Louis Brandeis famously wrote, is 
“both an end and a means.”4 It is within the realm of normative legal theory that these 
means and ends are fleshed out, discussed, contested, understood. As two scholars put it, 
“Until we know why we protect speech we cannot talk intelligently about whether any 
given effort to constrain speech is dangerous.”5  
Normative legal theory, then, concerns itself with values. It asks, “What should 
the law be?” It extends beyond discussions of the shape of legal doctrine and 
explanations for existing law to evaluate which laws or rules are better within a 
particularized area of the law.6  It is prescriptive, rather than descriptive in nature, and it 
generally is entwined with more general normative moral and political theories.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
2 Matthew D. Bunker, First Amendment Theory and Conceptions of the Self, 1 COMM. L. & POL’Y 241, 242 
(1996). 
 
3 Id. 
 
4  Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375  (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 
5 David F. McGowan & Ragesh K. Tangri, A Libertarian Critique of Restrictions of Offensive Speech, 79 
CAL. L. REV. 825, 833 (1991). 
 
6 Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 106: Positive and Normative Legal Theory, accessed at 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/12/legal_theory_le.html. 
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ORIGINS OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AS AN INDIVIDUAL’S NATURAL  
 
RIGHT  
 
Normative First Amendment theory is grounded within Enlightenment ideals, 
particularly the beliefs that through reason all humans are able to mature and to think for 
themselves, and that once humans attain this maturity, they are able to contribute to social 
progress and to become self-governing. Normative legal theory encompasses the liberal 
conception of the autonomous, self-governing citizen who is born with natural rights, and 
who should, therefore, be free from tyrannical government.7 During the Renaissance and 
the growing momentum of the Reformation, liberalism became the driving force for 
social change.  
The shift from a despotic monarchy to an emphasis on individual natural rights 
became a defining feature of a new conception of freedom, or exemptions from the 
arbitrary control of such rights, within economic, political, and social realms.8 The rise 
and centrality of the individual’s rights within the liberal state is intricately connected to 
constructions of liberty, “…if the term is meant that … liberty is the highest human good 
and that its preservation is the standard against which political institutions should be 
judged.”9  
                                                
7 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Cambridge University Press 1988). See, for an historical 
examination of European Enlightenment and its influence on the American Revolution, creation of the 
Declaration of Independence, and creation of the Bill of Rights, ROBERT R. PALMER, THE AGE OF THE 
DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION, VOL. 1: THE CHALLENGE (The Princeton University Press 1959) and ROBERT 
R. PALMER, THE AGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION, VOL. 2: THE STRUGGLE (Princeton University 
Press 1964).  
 
8 THE LIBERAL POLITICAL TRADITION: CONTEMPORARY REAPPRAISALS (James Meadowcraft, ed., Edward 
Elgar Publishing 1996).  
 
9 Matthew Simpson, Political Liberty in the Social Contract in: A Decade of Transformation, IWM Junior 
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In the liberal state, the rule of law is critical to enforcing individual natural rights 
and, therefore, supporting the social contract we’ve made with one another, or the 
positive liberty we collectively have granted each other.10 Yet the individual’s natural 
right to do also requires freedom from oppressive forces, notably government. This can 
be understood as negative liberty, or an absence of barriers to do.  
Renowned political philosopher Sir Isaiah Berlin indicated that negative liberty 
and positive liberty are best understood by answering the following questions. When 
thinking of negative liberty one must ask, ‘'What is the area within which the subject - a 
person or group of persons - is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, 
without interference by other persons?” To best understand positive liberty, the question 
to be asked is: “What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine 
someone to do, or be, this rather than that?” While the questions are quite different, the 
answers often overlap, he noted.11  
Within the context of the First Amendment, freedom of expression can be 
understood as both a positive and negative liberty.12 In the domain of negative liberty, 
                                                
10 See, for further discussion of the origins of social contract theory, THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (E.P. 
Dutton & Co. 1914), JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1924), and JEAN-
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (trans. Maurice Cranston, Penguin: Penguin Classics Various 
Editions 1968). Locke, whose ideas are generally recognized as particularly influential in the American 
Revolution, argued that within the state of nature all men are created equally in the eyes of God. He 
believed that reason dictates one should never harm another in terms of robbing that person of his life, 
liberty, and property. Individuals, in recognizing that their lives in the state of nature are unsatisfactory, 
freely consent to come together to form a community. In so doing they agree to relinquish some of their 
rights to a government, thereby creating a compact with this government that exists both to protect 
individual rights and to support the well-being of the community. If government no longer abides by this 
contract, the people have authority to overthrow it. 
 
11 Sir Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1958), accessed online at 
http://www.wiso.unihamburg.de/fileadmin/wiso_vwl/johannes/Ankuendigungen/Berlin_twoconceptsofliber
ty.pdf.  
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and when speech protections are not specifically spelled out, there has been much debate 
about the meaning of freedom from governmental control. Does it really mean absolute 
freedom to express whatever one chooses, as the First Amendment would seem to 
indicate?  
 
PRIOR RESTRAINT v. SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT 
Sir William Blackstone, a famous 18th century English jurist, said that freedom of 
speech proscribed prior restraint, but not subsequent punishment. Nonetheless, and 
contrary to popular scholarly opinion, a close reading of his “Commentaries” 
demonstrates that he did, indeed, make limited allowances for subsequent punishment. 
He wrote, “If man publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the 
consequence of his own temerity.” If a person publishes the truth with good motives, 
however, Blackstone said there should be no punishment.13  
The distinction between prior restraint and subsequent punishment made its way 
across the Atlantic, where it has, over time, been variously accepted or rejected. David A. 
Anderson argued that the Framers didn’t accept the idea that subsequent punishment was 
constitutional, that they were quite aware that free speech, without fear of punishment, 
was critical to democracy. This was due, in large part, because of their experiences with a 
repressive English monarchy. Fear of subsequent punishment can deter, he noted, speech 
and publication before the fact, constituting an informal method of prior restraint.14 As 
                                                                                                                                            
(http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/608). For a more contemporary discussion, see GERALD DWORKIN, THE 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (Cambridge University Press 1988).  
 
13 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Thomas E. Cooley, ed., The 
Lawbook Exchange, Ltd 2003). 
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indicated in Chapter I, fear of administrative punishment has increased the rate of self-
censorship among high school students significantly.  
Zechariah Chafee, Jr. and Leonard W. Levy discussed two periods of time in 
which the government was particularly unreceptive to absolute free speech, especially 
when it entailed criticism of government. The first period occurred when war with France 
was a possibility, and the government enacted the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, a set 
of four Congressional laws aimed at quelling any political unrest that might be 
“dangerous” to the peace and safety of the United States. The second set was the 
Espionage and Sedition Acts of 1917 and 1918, respectively, the first of which passed 
when the United States entered World War II.15   
Underlying both sets of Acts is the question of whether the First Amendment 
proscribes both prior restraint and subsequent punishment. This distinction is a critical 
component in fully understanding the issues at play in this dissertation, as both prior 
restraint and subsequent punishment have been held constitutional within the realm of 
student expression case law.  
Contrary to Anderson’s assertion above, Levy originally argued that the First 
Amendment, as formulated by the Framers, did not proscribe subsequent punishment. 
Twenty-five years later, following much critique of this position, he published 
Emergence of a Free Press, in which he reconsidered his earlier perspective and said that 
the Framers likely also meant to prohibit subsequent punishment.16  Nonetheless, 
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freedom of expression has never, as indicated in the introduction, been interpreted by a 
majority of the U.S. Supreme Court as an absolute liberty. 
 
VALUES ASSOCIATED WITH FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
One of the most influential expositions on the importance of expressive freedom 
can be found in John Stuart’s Mill’s On Liberty. He joined fellow thinkers in the view 
that liberty is a fundamental human right, critical if rationality would have a fighting 
chance to prevail. Yet to be free and to search for truth, humans must be able to exercise 
free expression. Readily admitting the fallibility of man, he wrote, “We can never be sure 
that the opinion we are endeavoring to stifle is a false opinion, and if we were sure, 
stifling it would be an evil still.”17 Our beliefs and actions are reasonable only if we are 
provided the chance to freely express our ideas. Indeed, our very self-development 
depends upon this.  
Moreover, only when our ideas have withstood disputation can we accept our 
ideas as rightly justified, as truth. Through the airing of a diversity of opinions, Mill 
reasoned, truth, or at least a part of truth, can be discovered. And it is precisely because 
man is intrinsically fallible that his ability to reason and to make informed decisions 
relies upon open discussion. Such unfettered deliberation, however, can be thwarted by 
the tyranny of the majority within the political process.  
Rational decision-making is also understood to include the premise that 
government also is infallible. Without seeking input from the people, the government 
would be acting irrationally in choosing not to know what may have impacted and even 
changed its decisions.  In the area of speech, then, restrictions on speech concerning 
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public matters accordingly means increasing the chances that governmental decision-
making will not enhance the search for truth.   
As esteemed First Amendment scholar Rodney Smolla asserted, “There is an 
inherent and inexorable tendency on the part of all governments to seek to expand their 
power over speech.”18 Yet, as Mill would argue, there is no ultimate rationality in seeking 
to do so. 
It is within the context discussed above that we find a gradual expansion of 
positivist First Amendment theory, understood, as mentioned at the outset of this chapter, 
as grounded in values. Thus it is within this context that five primary theories of free 
speech have been declared critical within a representative democracy if such a republic as 
ours is to be free. A critical distinction among these primarily utilitarian theories involves 
the principal goal to be supported through free expression – the social or the individual – 
yet, one might argue, they also can be understood to support both.  
1) The marketplace of ideas. The marketplace of ideas is the dominant 
paradigm in First Amendment theory. Mill, along with John Milton, 
later to be discussed, generally are considered the philosophical fathers 
of the marketplace of ideas. The essential premise here is that only 
through free and robust debate, in which there is competition among 
ideas, may people discern truth from falsehood.  
2) Political self-governance. The idea here is that the First Amendment is 
meant to protect individuals in the democratic self-governing process. 
This theory is most closely identified with the writings of Alexander 
Meikeljohn, who believed that protection for political speech absolutely 
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should be protected. Speech, in his view, is not understood as a natural 
right. Rather, it serves the process of self-governance. 19 As Berlin said, 
“Political words and notions and acts are not intelligible save in the 
context of the issues that divide the men who use them. Consequently 
our own attitudes and activities are likely to remain obscure to us, 
unless we understand the dominant issues of our own world.”20  
3) The checking value. This concept is typically associated with justification 
for First Amendment protection of the press as the Fourth Estate, as the 
institution most able to act as a counterweight to governmental power. 
Vincent Blasi most famously elaborated on the need for a free press to 
serve as the watchdog of government, the latter of which is understood 
to have the means and, often, the motive to abuse its power.21  
4) Individual self-fulfillment. This concept implies that free expression is 
understood as the natural right of all to form their own beliefs and the 
subsequent right to express those beliefs. Clearly, we see the influence 
here of the rise and general acceptance in the United States of the 
liberal, autonomous individual as described above. 
5) The safety valve. When this theory is applied, freedom of expression is 
understood as a means to allow people to “let off steam.” Without such 
ability, the fear is that the balance between change and social stability 
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seriously could be threatened, to the point of revolution. In providing 
people the opportunity to be heard, the idea is that they then will be 
more willing to accept various decisions, even if those decisions don’t 
align with their beliefs. As Justice Louis Brandeis once wrote, “fear 
breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable 
government; … the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss 
freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies.”22 
 
BALANCING OF INTERESTS 
Precisely because these interests may be individual, social, or both, and precisely 
because these interests often conflict with other social interests and constitutional rights, 
the courts – beginning at least with the opinions of Supreme Court Justices Louis 
Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes – have employed a balancing of all interests 
presented. This is referred to as the balancing test.  
During this period, and extending at least through the era of the Warren Court 
(1953-1969), the balancing of First Amendment values with the values associated with 
other social interests became predominant in U. S. Supreme Court decision-making, with 
the Court giving preference to speech over other interests in virtually all cases it heard. 
This is understood as the preferred position of speech, in which speech often trumps 
competing interests. After this time, however, the Court has been somewhat less 
supportive of the notion that there is a thumb on that side of the scale favoring free 
speech.  
 Within the domain of student free expression, the value of free speech is in direct 
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competition with other values, such as maintaining order within schools. The dominant 
First Amendment normative theories that explicitly are utilized in support of free speech 
within student speech cases include 1) the marketplace of ideas, in which truth can be 
found only through the open discussion of opinions and 2) the belief that free speech is 
critical to producing self-governing citizens. Nonetheless, the individual’s self-fulfillment 
is implicit in the case law as well, understandably, for it undergirds the value and worth 
in finding truth and in being politically sovereign. Thus attempts to draw a bright line 
between and/or among the theories are not an easy or, perhaps, even worthwhile task. As 
Smolla wrote: 
Many classic rationales have been advanced over the years to support the 
‘preferred position’ of speech in the hierarchy of social values. These 
rationales are sometimes put forward as if they were mutually exclusive. By 
singling out only one of them as the justification for freedom of speech, the 
theorist tends to build a model of free speech limited to advancing that 
rationale. If, for example, one sees ‘democratic self-governance’ as the only 
explanation for elevating free speech above other social values, then one will 
tend to treat the First Amendment as guaranteeing freedom of speech only 
when the speech relates to politics.23 
 
As demonstrated below and within the proceeding chapter, while the marketplace of 
ideas and political self-governance have, indeed, explicitly seemed of primary importance 
within student freedom of expression case law, even these do not always stand 
independently of each other. 
 
THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS  
Theoretically, the notion of a marketplace of ideas has dominated First 
Amendment scholarship and judicial decision-making. The marketplace of ideas 
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metaphor is typically traced first to John Milton’s Areopagitica. He famously wrote, 
"Though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the 
field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and 
Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open 
encounter?"24  
Yet to end the discussion of Milton there is to ignore the context and history upon 
which these widely quoted and highly influential words originated. Milton, a well-
regarded poet, sought divorce from his 16-year-old wife when she left one month into 
their marriage to return to her family. After this, Milton set out prolifically to influence 
Catholic canon law in England, which at that time had virtually no formalized regulations 
or laws relating to marriage and divorce.25 He wrote several controversial tracts regarding 
marriage and divorce and was met with considerable opposition from religious and 
political leaders, seeking to ban these writings.26 It is from this personal history with 
attempts to publish that he wrote Areopagitica, following institution of pre-publication 
licensing in England.  
As Erik Lundeby wrote,  
Milton’s Areopagitica is the colourful expression of a political orator, and 
contains strong emotional appeals to the Parliament. The members of 
Parliament are praised as humanist lovers of culture, as moral educators, but 
most important, as reformed Christians not wanting to be associated with 
anything medieval or Papist like the licensing of the press. Milton appears to 
be a well-informed intellectual, a humanist and liberal, but not obviously one 
who has a considered and comprehensive position on political philosophy. 
The structure of the argument is not entirely perspicuous: as the text is a 
means of changing opinions and attitudes rather than a work of calm 
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reflection, the themes and points are to some degree scattered and recurring, 
and expressed through exaggerations, ridicule and allegory. Despite these 
poetic and literary elements, Milton’s Areopagitica also allows a calmer 
reading, one that puts the weight on arguments. Read in this way, the 
Areopagitica may be seen as a classic expression of a consequentialist 
defence of freedom of expression, where liberty of the press is seen as 
circumstances of progress in education and knowledge, and licensing as 
leading to corruption of culture.27 
 
Following Milton, we later find strong support for such a marketplace within the writings 
of Mill, discussed above.  
The first reference made by the U. S. Supreme Court to the concept of a 
marketplace of ideas is found in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ dissenting opinion in 
Abrams v. United States,28 in which he wrote,  
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they 
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of 
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free 
trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get 
itself accepted in the competition of the market.29  
  
Much of the time, this marketplace takes concrete forms, such as newspapers or 
broadcast and cable news stations. Journalism is, then, charged with reporting upon 
governmental action, thereby supporting democracy through the creation and 
maintenance of a marketplace of ideas.30 As discussed in Chapter I, application of 
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Hazelwood to post-secondary education may well impede such abilities. 
The theory has been used by the U. S. Supreme Court to support expression in a 
number of other areas as well, such as political speech,31 libel law,32 broadcasting 
policy,33 and commercial speech.34   
Returning to expression within colleges and universities, the U. S. Supreme Court 
noted in Healy v. James that: 
...the precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because of the 
acknowledged need for order [emphasis added], First Amendment 
protections should apply with less force on college campuses than in the 
community at large. Quite to the contrary, ‘[t]he vigilant protection of 
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of 
American schools.’ … The college classroom with its surrounding environs is 
peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas,’ and we break no new constitutional 
ground in reaffirming this Nation’s dedication to safeguarding academic 
freedom.35  
 
In Board of Regents v. Southworth, the Court stated, “Recognition must be 
given as well to the important and substantial purposes of the University, which 
seeks to facilitate a wide range of speech.”36 In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors 
of Univ. of Va., the Court said that restricting university students’ curiosity “risks 
                                                
31 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); Cohen v. 
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Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 
32 See, e.g., Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1996); 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  
 
33 See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (The right of access the Court granted has 
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34 See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); 376 U.S. 
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the suppression of free speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers for the 
Nation’s intellectual life, its colleges and universities.”37  
And in Tinker v. Des Moines School District,38 the Court argued that schools may 
not be “enclaves of totalitarianism” and that “students may not be regarded as closed 
circuit recipients of only that which the State wishes to communicate.”39 The Court went 
on to say, “The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to 
that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, 
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.’”40 
 
POLITICAL SELF-GOVERNANCE  
The marketplace metaphor is woven together with the closely related theory of 
political self-governance. The latter is most associated, in terms of its usage in general 
First Amendment case law, with the 1964 libel case New York Times v. Sullivan, in which 
the Court said that open speech among citizens is vital to democracy. Justice William 
Brennan wrote, “Thus we must consider this case against the background of a profound 
national commitment to the principles that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes 
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”41  
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41 376 U.S. 264, 270 (1964). 
 
  
 
53 
As noted above, Meiklejohn believed that the First Amendment was designed, in 
fact, for the sole purpose of self-governance within the democratic state. Such a state, in 
its ideal form, cannot exist if those in power are provided with the means both to 
withhold information and to suppress criticism.42 Thus the stifling of unpopular ideas – 
both on the college campus and within the community-at-large – does not allow for 
unbridled discussion, debate, and criticism on matters of public concern.  As the Court 
said in Papish, “state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep 
of the First Amendment.”43 
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, the Court wrote,  
History has amply proved the virtue of political activity by minority, 
dissident groups, who innumerable times have been in the vanguard of 
democratic thought and whose programs were ultimately accepted. Mere 
unorthodoxy or dissent from the prevailing mores is not to be condemned. 
The absence of such voices would be a symptom of grave illness in our 
society.44 
 
And, as quoted in Chapter I, the Court wrote in Tinker that “educating the young for 
citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the 
individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount 
important principles of our government as mere platitudes."45 Armed with such 
knowledge, students should learn to hold governmental power in check. 
Yet students, particularly those in journalism, also must have access to the 
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marketplace to engage in free and robust debate so that they may learn how to effectuate 
their later role as the Fourth Estate. As Justice Earl Warren wrote, students [and teachers] 
are vested with individual rights and “must always remain free to inquire, to study and to 
evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate 
and die.”46  Based upon the above discussion, it seems quite clear that theories of the First 
Amendment are not mutually exclusive.  
 
 EMERSON AND A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Consequently, there seems to be power in Thomas Emerson’s argument that each 
theory alone lacks the explanatory power to fully justify protection of First Amendment 
rights. In his view, when only one theory is put forward as justification for free 
expression, the case for upholding First Amendment protections is significantly 
weakened. The stronger case results from the synergy resulting from a more holistic 
understanding of the various theories.47 (Nonetheless, each theory is recognized as having 
power to define the contours and the boundaries of free speech.)  
While readily acknowledging the importance of the above-mentioned values of 
free speech, his “general theory of the First Amendment”48 is built upon the premise that 
the primary purpose of the First Amendment is to ensure “an effective system of freedom 
of expression in a democratic society”49 such that the marketplace of ideas can flourish. 
At the core of his theory is the distinction between conduct that is expressive in nature 
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and conduct that consists of action. Regulation of non-expressive conduct can be 
controlled, but not through regulation of expression.  
Expression, though a form of conduct, should not, in his estimate, be regulated, 
except in the most rare of occasions.50 “The government may protect or advance other 
social interests through regulation of action, but not by suppressing expression,” he 
wrote.51 It is from this central position that various legal doctrines should be constructed 
to protect individual rights that are in conflict with social interests.  
While Emerson’s general theory has not expressly been accepted by the U. S. 
Supreme Court, his basic idea that theoretical segmentation is insufficient for full 
protection of expression is powerful and serves as the basis for the contention made here 
that, ideally, speech, as expressive conduct supporting the marketplace of ideas, should 
not be regulated unless it is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action 
and is likely to incite or produce such action.”52 This standard was articulated in 
Brandenburg v. Ohio,53 a landmark case in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled Ohio’s 
criminal syndicalism statute unconstitutional because it broadly regulated and punished 
inflammatory speech that merely advocated violence or violations of the law.  
In the area of student speech, the Tinker standard requiring school officials to 
forecast a material and substantial disruption prior to restricting rights, absent a clear 
showing that the speech was directed at or that imminently would create such a 
disruption, should be the standard against which restrictions on or punishment for student 
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speech should be evaluated. While the material and substantial standard will be shown to 
benefit students to a great degree in protection of their speech rights, potential abuse of 
what forecast entails exists, particularly because the Court did not clearly elaborate on 
this aspect of the standard.  
As will be demonstrated in the findings, courts have upheld speech restrictions 
based upon prior history of disruption associated with the speech at hand within K-12 
schools. This is a departure from Brandenburg in that the Court did not require a showing 
that similar incidents in the past can be the basis for speech restrictions or punishments. It 
also deviates from Brandenburg in that students may not direct their speech or intend for 
their speech to produce harm. While the school environment is one in which order must 
be maintained and is, indeed, different from society-at-large, a forecasting of disruption 
leaves not only students but also administrators unsure about the extent to which 
forecasting applies. And, as mentioned above, it allows great discretion on the part of 
school officials, discretion that could be exploited. Additionally, schools are places where 
expression should be encouraged; if that expression is not intended to cause harm and/or 
a material and substantial disruption or if it is not imminently likely to cause the same, 
student speech should be nurtured, not prohibited or punished. 
Finally, the Hazelwood standard is a significant departure from Brandenburg and 
Tinker. It arguably is an overly restrictive standard to evaluate speech if the core purposes 
of education are to inculcate in students an appreciation of their Constitutional rights, to 
prepare them for self-governance, and to create productive and contributing citizens. 
Further, as previously discussed, and as will be shown in Chapter V, it has been used to 
curtail speech that arguably is far from materially or substantially disruptive to the 
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learning process and that does not support these educational goals. 
 
PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE  
This research will demonstrate that while the theories discussed above still have 
weight when deciding student free expression cases, the application of public forum 
doctrine in Hazelwood – and its later use in post-secondary cases – dramatically has 
changed the parameters of free speech within our schools. While it is not a First 
Amendment theory as traditionally understood, the doctrine has been used extensively in 
a number of student speech cases. It is critical, then, to have a clear understanding of 
what it is, how it has been utilized, and the problems associated with its usage. 
Public forum analysis was designed as a means to determine the level of 
judicial review applicable to speech in various government-owned spaces. Its 
origins can be traced to the 1939 U. S. Supreme Court case Hague v. Comm. for 
Indus. Org., in which the Court argued that lands designed for public use and that 
have been used for public gathering and discussion, such as parks, streets, and 
sidewalks, were traditional public forums.54   
Specifically, the Court wrote that such places “have immemorially been 
held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for the 
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing 
questions … from ancient times.”55 According to the Court, the open public forum 
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“has as a principal purpose promoting ‘the free exchange of ideas.’”56 Restrictions 
on expression in traditional public forums receive strict scrutiny review and may 
not discriminate based upon content or viewpoint.57 Strict scrutiny is the most 
stringent standard of judicial review and means that for a law or policy to pass 
constitutional muster it must 1) be justified by a compelling government interest 
and 2) be narrowly tailored to achieve that goal or interest. Very few laws or 
policies survive strict scrutiny review.  
Beginning in the mid-1960s, the Court began to distinguish the open, 
traditional public forum from other forums.58 These cases indicated that there are 
two more categories of forums – the nonpublic forum and the limited public forum 
(often referred to as the designated public forum, though at times one will see the 
courts refer to them as separate forums, which has led to considerable confusion).  
According to the Court, nonpublic forums stand at the opposite end of the 
spectrum from the public forum—they are government lands that generally are not open 
for public use, though the government may open them for specific purposes. Examples of 
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nonpublic forums include prisons,59 military bases,60 and, increasingly, the schools. As 
opposed to public forums, restrictions on speech within the nonpublic forum are only 
subject to rational basis review, or as it often is called, the “reasonableness standard.” 
Rational basis review is the least stringent standard of judicial review. For a law or policy 
to be constitutional, the government need only show 1) that the action is “reasonably 
related” to 2) a “legitimate” government interest. “The reasonableness requirement 
mandates that restrictions ‘be reasonable; [they] need not be the most reasonable or the 
only reasonable limitation[s]’ … [and] … some commentators have viewed this as being 
‘highly deferential.’ In fact, one has asserted that it is ‘essentially no review at all.’”61  
Nonetheless, technically, exclusions cannot be content-based.62 Here, then, is one 
example of the problems associated with forum analysis; if content-based restrictions and 
viewpoint-based restrictions are both subject to strict scrutiny, why are nonpublic forums 
subject only to rational review, when exclusion should not be content- or-viewpoint-
based?  
Moreover, the nonpublic forum is recognized as being governmental property that 
almost exclusively exists for purposes other than expression. It seems antithetical to 
consider a student publication a nonpublic forum, as the Court did in Hazelwood, if a 
nonpublic forum is characterized as existing nearly exclusively for purposes other than 
expression. As Erwin Chemerinsky aptly observed in arguing that a school newspaper is 
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not a nonpublic forum, “A newspaper, unlike a prison or military base, exists for speech 
purposes.”63 Moreover, much of one’s educational experience revolves around 
expression, in cultivating students’ critical thinking skills through exposure to new ideas 
and debate on issues. 
The middle category of fora that is purported to lie between these two extremes is 
the limited public forum.  The limited public forum is a governmental space that 
traditionally has not been opened up as a public forum but that the government has 
designated as open at certain times, for certain purposes, and for certain groups of people. 
Examples may include public schools (including public universities) and libraries. While 
the government can limit the forum to certain speakers and certain subjects,64 viewpoint 
discrimination is unconstitutional within a limited public forum. Restraints on expression 
are supposed to be subject to strict scrutiny just as is the case with the open forum, 
though, as will be shown in Chapter V, courts have employed Hazelwood to determine a 
variety of speech activities are limited public forums but then subjected them only to the 
reasonableness requirement. 
It should be noted that the government does not create a limited public forum 
through inaction but only by “intentionally opening a nontraditional forum [nonpublic 
forum] for public discourse.”65 Thus intent becomes a defining factor in determinations 
of a forum’s status. In an effort to determine if there has been intent to open a nonpublic 
forum, the Court looks to the “policy and practice” of the government’s usage of the 
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property, in addition to looking at the “nature of the property and its compatibility with 
expressive activity.”66   
This language would be taken up in Hazelwood to find that the newspaper was a 
nonpublic forum. Additionally, and some might say disturbingly, once government has 
created a limited public forum, it may revoke it at will. It is “not required to indefinitely 
retain the open character of the facility.”67  
Slowly, both the U. S. Supreme Court and federal circuit courts began to 
elaborate, or at least try to make sense of, these three forums, though utilization has been 
far from consistent. Because of this, scholars have jumped on the discrepancies with 
which the various fora have been interpreted and subjected to various levels of review.68 
Differences in the usage of forum analysis by the courts are numerous. In United 
States v. Kokinda,69 for example, a case dealing with citizens who set up a table on the 
sidewalk outside of a post office to sell various publications, individuals were arrested 
and subsequently brought suit, claiming their First Amendment rights had been violated. 
In ruling against the citizens, the Court determined that the sidewalk in this case was a 
nonpublic forum.  
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In a forceful dissent, Justice William Brennan wrote, “Ironically, these public 
forum categories, originally conceived of as a way of preserving First Amendment rights, 
have been used in some of our recent decisions as a means of upholding restrictions on 
speech.”70 He used Hazelwood as one such example. Interestingly, the Court seven years 
prior found in United States v. Grace71 that the sidewalks surrounding the  
U. S. Supreme Court were public forums. 
In Int. Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee,72 a case in which the Society 
solicited funds for its organization within an airport and then was banned from the 
airport, the Court found that the airport was a nonpublic forum, requiring only rational 
basis review. Justice Anthony Kennedy, in his dissent, argued that those parts of the 
airport that were open to the public were, essentially, no different from public streets in 
that they were “broad, public thoroughfares full of people and lined with stores and other 
commercial activities.”73 He went on to note that even though people who come to 
airports do so for air travel, there’s little difference in that and the sidewalks and roads 
people also use for travel.  
The discrepancies only become more convoluted when one enters the domain of 
the limited public forum, particularly as it relates to the nonpublic forum. Deutsche 
persuasively argued the following:  
In dicta in cases involving exclusions from nonpublic forums, the Court has 
equated limited public forums with designated open access public forums and 
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asserted that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review.74 
Nonetheless, in cases actually involving exclusions from limited public 
forums, the Court has effectively equated limited public forums with 
nonpublic forums and has applied the same standard of review [that is, 
rational basis review] from exclusions from the former that it applies from 
the latter … Of course, the fact that the Court has applied the same standard 
of review in both types of restricted forum cases does not necessarily mean 
that it must always do so.75 
 
Further, he went on to note that the Court “has not applied strict scrutiny in limited 
public forum cases on the theory that the government had excluded persons or topics 
otherwise within its scope; rather, it has applied strict scrutiny only after making a 
preliminary determination that the exclusions were either content or viewpoint 
discriminatory.”76  
And it is because of these conflicting interpretations that the federal circuit courts, 
in both school- and non-school-related cases, have had little guidance in applying forum 
analysis, and, consequently, have utilized it in ways leading to different results. Because 
of these issues, utilizing the doctrine within education – both at the K-12 and post-
secondary levels – seems suspect at the least. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This chapter has explored the meaning of normative First Amendment theory, 
which is concerned with values and is grounded in Enlightenment ideals, in addition to 
the five normative theories that have been constructed to make sense of what the First 
Amendment is meant to protect. As noted, while student speech cases most explicitly 
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discuss the marketplace of ideas and political self-governance, other theories, such as the 
individual’s natural right to self-fulfillment and the role of the press as the Fourth Estate 
are implied. This lends support to Emerson’s contention that the theories are not mutually 
exclusive. And it is Emerson’s distinction between conduct that is expressive and that 
which is not that forms the basis for the ideal concept of speech presented here – that 
speech should be free absent intent to incite imminent lawless action. In the final chapter 
of this dissertation, the findings pertaining to protection of student speech will be 
measured against this concept of free speech.  
The discussion in this chapter also examined differing conceptions of the 
Framers’ position on the constitutionality of prior restraint v. subsequent punishment, 
which, as noted, is a critical issue in the area of student freedom of expression precisely 
because government has engaged in both in this area of the law.  
Finally, this chapter examined public forum doctrine, which has been used to 
restrict student speech not only at the K-12 level but also, as the next chapter will 
demonstrate, within a number of states covered by the federal circuit courts of appeals 
that have heard cases involving the applicability of Hazelwood to post-secondary 
education. Because the doctrine and the appropriate levels of judicial review associated 
with each have not produced consistent results, its utilization within education is an issue 
of extreme importance.
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CHAPTER III 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 This chapter will begin broadly with a discussion of the doctrine of in loco 
parentis –its roots, contemporary usage in K-12 schools, and a brief exploration of its 
utilization at the post-secondary level of education. From here the discussion will turn to 
analyses and critiques of the “venerable trilogy” of landmark U. S. Supreme Court cases 
at the K-12 level –Tinker v. Des Moines School District,1 Bethel School District No. 403 
v. Fraser,2 and Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier.3  Next, landmark U. S. Supreme Court post-
secondary cases, both before and after Hazelwood, will be analyzed before turning to 
scholarly discussions of the federal-level circuit court split concerning usage of the 
Hazelwood framework at the post-secondary level of education.  
 
IN LOCO PARENTIS 
 To situate historically and to better make sense of the case law presented in the 
next chapter, it is necessary to begin this review of the literature by returning to a 
discussion of the doctrine of in loco parentis.  At the outset it is important to note that 
while the doctrine is often associated with judicial noninterference in matters of 
education, courts continue to decide cases and frequently utilize the doctrine (even if not 
always specifically referring to it as in loco parentis) to decide the constitutionality of 
                                                
1 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 
2 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 
3 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
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school action. As demonstrated in Chapter V, the modern judiciary has not shied away 
from deciding disputes at either level of education even while indicating displeasure at 
being called upon to intervene in school-related matters. Therefore, the doctrine requires 
examination as it, and the values associated with it, provide context for and lend insight 
into judicial decision-making.  
The term originally was used in Sir William’s Blackstone’s “Commentaries on the 
Laws of England: 1765-1769.”4 In discussing the relationship of the child and parent, he 
wrote that once a parent brings a child into the world, the maintenance of that child is a 
“principle of natural law,” such that the life of that child needs to be “supported and 
preserved” through physical protection and an education “suitable to their station in 
life.”5  Civil law, he said, provides for these parental obligations yet also allows for 
punishment of the child to maintain “order and obedience.”6 In relation to education, he 
wrote,  
He [the father] may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his 
life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis (in 
place of a parent), and has such a portion of the power of the parent 
committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint and correction, as may be 
necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed.7 
 
In his “Commentaries,” Blackstone was discussing education at its most introductory 
stages. As Susan Stuart said, “restraint and correction” extended beyond mere discipline 
and has been, to an extent, utilized in American jurisprudence to protect teachers in the 
                                                
4 Full text accessed at http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/blackstone/. 
 
5 Book One, Chapter 16, Of Parent and Child, § 1. It should be noted, however, that he made allowances 
for the father’s duties when the child was a “bastard.” 
 
6 Id. at § 2.  
 
7 Id.  
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corporal punishment of students.8 While this aspect of in loco parentis has waned, she 
argued, the doctrine now is used primarily as a justification to maintain order, to 
discipline students, and to violate their civil rights, particularly in the areas of student 
searches and the First Amendment.9 She argued that because the doctrine still is being 
utilized to violate student rights, the courts need to “articulate some other, more modern 
justification for school disciplinary actions.”10 
Another expert in the field observed,  
The view of public schools as acting purely in loco parentis was dominant for 
much of this country's history and is still advocated by many today. Though 
schools do not have as complete authority as they once did, one of a school's 
primary functions is still to act in loco parentis. The school educates, 
disciplines, and ensures the children's safety while the children are in its care, 
just as any parent would. Even though a public school today has discernible 
limits on the rules it can make and enforce, students, while in school, do not 
have the same constitutional rights as …[adults].11 
 
 Historian John E. Nichols indicated that between 1658 and 1966, only nine cases 
were decided in lower courts relating to K-12 students’ First Amendment claims. Schools 
won in all but one case, and in this case the court found the school had acted without 
statutory authority in that the school had no regulations allowing for student dismissal on 
the basis of publication of materials critical of administration.12  
 In each of the other cases, the courts’ deferred to the judgment of school officials 
                                                
8 Susan Stuart, In Loco Parentis in the Public Schools: Abused, Confused, and in Need of Change, 78 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 969 (2010).  
 
9 Id. at 977. 
 
10 Id. 
 
11 Matthew Sheffield, Stop With the Exceptions: A Narrow Interpretation of Tinker for All Student Speech 
Claims, 10 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 175, 199 (2011). 
 
12 John E. Nichols, The Pre-Tinker History of Freedom of Student Speech and Press, 56 JOURN. Q. 727 
(1979). 
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under the common law doctrine of in loco parentis. Only when schools acted arbitrarily 
in expelling students or where there was a gross violation of law did courts intervene. 
“And those were seldom found” in cases extending even beyond the First Amendment.13  
 In fact, it was not until Tinker14 that the U. S. Supreme Court explicitly stated that 
students were even “persons” under the Constitution, vested with Constitutional 
protections.15 According to Preston C. Green III et. al., while Tinker diminished the 
doctrine to a certain degree in that the Court was unwilling to give administrators free 
reign to punish students absent a showing of a “material and substantial disruption,” the 
doctrine appears to have experienced a revival in the context of the First Amendment 
with the Court’s decisions in Bethel v. Fraser, Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, and Morse v. 
Frederick.16 They suggested that Tinker was, perhaps, aberrant in that it was decided 
during the Civil Rights Movement, during which time significant unrest at both levels of 
education led students to demand greater freedom of expression.  
 In Bethel,17 they wrote, “The Court based the authority of school districts to 
prohibit vulgar speech on their in loco parentis power [term specifically used] to 
‘inculcate the habits and manners of civility.’”18 In Hazelwood,19 they argued, the Court 
took a major leap forward in stating that educators are entitled significant control over 
                                                
13 Id. at 730. 
 
14 Supra note 1. 
 
15 Frank D. LeMonte, Shrinking Tinker: Students are “Persons” Under Our Constitution—Except When 
Whey Aren’t, 59 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 1324, 1339 (2009). 
 
16 Preston C. Green, III, Julie F. Mead & Joseph O. Oluwole, Parents Involved, School Assignment Plans, 
and the Equal Protection Clause, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 503 (2011). 
 
17 Supra note 2. 
 
18 Id. at 528. 
 
19 Supra note 3. 
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students, particularly relating to speech associated with school-sponsored activities from 
which the school would want to disassociate itself.20 And finally, in Morse,21 the Court 
specifically referred to the doctrine to allow the school to punish a student for speech 
made outside of school, based upon a determination that the school was entrusted to deter 
students from using drugs.22 
 As for post-secondary students, the doctrine was alive and well throughout the 
country for centuries. Brian Jackson wrote, “When students sought legal remedies for 
school disputes, courts invoked the doctrine of in loco parentis to justify either their 
nonintervention” or to find, largely, against students.23  With the birth of the multiversity, 
courts became more sensitive to the rights of students, and many were able to win 
disputes via usage of contract law. “If disciplinary rules held students to certain standards 
of conduct, then the educational institution reciprocally could be bound by its own 
representations.”24   
 After this time, as discussed in the Introduction, in loco parentis appeared to die on 
public, post-secondary campuses due to the Dixon v. Alabama25 case, in which several 
African-American students were expelled for participating in civil rights demonstrations. 
It was here that the court indicated that judicial deference given to universities in matters 
of student discipline and Constitutional rights was no longer absolute. 
                                                
20 Supra note 16, at 508. 
 
21 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 
22 Id. at 529-30.  
 
23 Brian Jackson, The Lingering Legacy of In Loco Parentis: An Historical Survey and Proposal for 
Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1135, 1144 (1991). 
 
24 Id. at 1148. 
 
25 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961). 
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 Most scholars agree that in loco parentis is no longer a factor in post-secondary 
education.26  Nonetheless, others have argued there has been a resurgence in its 
utilization even if, again, it is not specifically referred to as in loco parentis. For instance, 
based upon the contention that colleges enter into a special relationship with students, 
Christopher Jayson Swartz asserted that schools have a duty to physically and to 
emotionally protect students, even from themselves. 27  Oren R. Griffen suggested that 
the policies developed by colleges to protect students can be viewed as devices of in loco 
parentis, thus subjecting a number of schools to tort liability claims.28 Finally, Smolla 
wrote in 2012, “While the students, faculty, staff, and administrators who populate a 
university campus are not children, the university does retain some residual 
responsibilities in loco parentis.”29  
 
LANDMARK K-12 FIRST AMENDMENT U.S. SUPREME COURT CASES  
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School30 
 To many, Tinker represents the height of First Amendment protections afforded 
                                                
26  See for ex., Perry A. Zirkel & Henry F. Reichner, Is the In Loco Parentis Doctrine Dead?, 15 J.L. & 
EDUC. 271 (1986); Theodore C. Stamatkos, The Doctrine of In Loco Parentis, Tort Liability and the 
Student-College Relationship, 65 IND. L.J. 471 (1990).  
 
27 Christopher Jayson Swartz, The Revivification of In Loco Parentis Behavioral Regulation in Public 
Institutions of Higher Education to Combat the Obesity Epidemic, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 101 (2010). 
 
28 Oren R. Griffen, Confronting the Evolving Safety and Security Challenge at Colleges and Universities, 5 
PIERCE L. Rev. 413 (2007). 
 
29 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, THE CONSTITUTION GOES TO COLLEGE: FIVE CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS THAT HAVE 
SHAPED THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 108 (New York University Press 2012). 
 
30 Supra note 1. 
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students in K-12 schools.31 “For its dramatic infusion of democratic speech values into a 
classic authoritarian relationship—that between powerful adults and powerless children 
in an institutional setting—the Tinker decision was remarkable at its inception,” wrote 
James B. Raskin.32  
 To recap, in ruling that students who wore black armbands to school in protest of 
the Vietnam War, the Court said that censorship only was allowed if actual facts existed 
that would lead administrators to “forecast substantial disruption of or material 
interference with school activities”33 and if the speech “would [emphasis added] 
materially or substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the 
operation of the school,”34 such that the speech would collide with the right of other 
students to be properly educated.35  
 Raskin went on to praise the decision in that it  “advanced not only a constitutional 
theory of democratic rights but a democratic theory of education.”36 In a democracy, the 
people are sovereign, and this includes students. “Thus in democracy,” he wrote, “the 
citizen occupies the highest office in the land, and public officials are public servants 
who cannot dictate political dogmas to their masters: the people.”37 Students should not 
be “closed-circuit” recipients of only that which a school board desires, but, rather, they 
                                                
31 See, for ex., Erwin Chemerinsky, Teaching That Speech Matters: A Framework for Analyzing Speech 
Issues in Schools, 42 U. CA., DAVIS 101 (2009); James B. Raskin, Tinker Turns 40: Freedom of Expression 
at School and Its Meaning for American Democracy, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1193 (2009). 
 
32 Raskin, supra note 31, at 1194. 
 
33 Id. at 514. 
 
34 Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)). 
 
35 Id. at 513. 
 
36 Supra note 31, at 1200. 
 
37 Id. at 1198. 
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should be free to become active and responsive participants in their learning.38  
 Education, he wrote, is “not something that the school system does to the 
student.”39 It is, in part, a tool by which the community of students investigates the world 
through communication amongst themselves, an aspect of schooling that not only is 
inevitable but also a critical part of the democratic and educational processes. Further, he 
contended, this free exchange of ideas cannot be confined to out-of-class discussion or 
activities; for the process to work, it also must be free to take place inside the classroom 
as well. It is not so important that students agree, he said, but that they “all feel 
empowered to think, act and speak for themselves.”40 Tinker, in his view, represents these 
elements.  
Not all, however, have been so praise-worthy. Kristi L. Bowan critiqued the case 
by pointing out that, while the Court has never spoken to the issue, Tinker appears to 
signify usage of a “reasonable anticipation test,” as opposed to the reasonableness 
standard articulated by the Fifth Circuit Court just three years earlier in Burnside41 and 
Blackwell.42 Reasonable anticipation of disruption is notably different from upholding 
student punishment due to actual disruption under the reasonableness standard and should 
not be a standard used in school speech cases, she said. It is antithetical to Brandenburg 
                                                
38 Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)). 
 
39 Id. at 1200. 
 
40 Id. at 1201. 
 
41 Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966). 
 
42 Kristi L. Bowman, The Civil Rights Roots of the Tinker’s Disruption Test, 58 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 1129, 
1152 (2009) (citing Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education, 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
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v. Ohio,43 in which the Court ruled that inflammatory and controversial speech only can 
be punished if it is intended to incite and likely to incite “imminent lawless action.”44 
Speech could be and has been quashed before the fact and potentially still be held 
constitutional under the purview of Tinker, she said. Additionally, the reasonable 
anticipation test and the particular speech at hand – the political, which rests at the top of 
the hierarchy of protected speech – have given little guidance to lower courts when 
disruptive speech cases have appeared before them, she maintained. 
This concern is echoed by Valerie Schmidt, who said that because the speech was 
political, did the Court mean to “rule exclusively on political speech, or all student speech 
in general?”45 She expressed concern that courts do not know and have not known when 
to rely on Tinker, if at all, especially in light of its much more restrictive progeny. She 
also reiterated Raskin’s concern that by restricting student speech, schools are not 
preparing them for the “real world” they soon will enter, especially those students in high 
school. “The ultimate goal of the educational process is to prepare students for citizenship 
in the United States,” she wrote in closing.46 Nonetheless, in light of cases such as Bethel 
and Hazelwood, courts, she recommended, should utilize Tinker’s material and 
substantial disruption test in all but the narrowest of cases. 
Yet another concern is addressed by Edward L. Carter et. al., who said that in 
Tinker, the majority implicitly discussed what is becoming an important issue both within 
student speech case law and free speech jurisprudence generally – the extent of the 
                                                
43 395 U.S. 444 (1969).  
 
44 Id. at 447.  
 
45 Valerie Schmidt, Dirty T-Shirts, Pure Speech and the Law, 23 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 355, 362 (2008). See 
also, Green et. al., supra note 16. 
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government’s right to speak.47 In recognizing that schools have the right to choose the 
messages they want to convey to students, the Court also wrote that “students may not be 
regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate 
[whether in the classroom or outside of it]” and “may not be confined to the expression of 
those sentiments that are officially approved.”48  
They wrote, “The Court did not yet manifest the concern it would in later cases 
for the right of the school to disassociate itself from messages with which it disagreed … 
[yet] … it is significant that the tension between individual speech rights and the 
government's own speech right was recognized as early as the Tinker case in 1969.”49 
They also wondered if courts today would even consider utilizing the case independently 
as precedent in subsequent cases because it was decided during an era of unrest. (As the 
results will demonstrate, schools at both levels of education have, indeed, utilized Tinker 
on numerous occasions both to uphold and to strike down speech restrictions and 
punishments.) Another important consideration, according to at least two scholars who 
wrote shortly after the case was decided, regards the Court’s implication that schools 
have at least some of the characteristics of a public forum. Of particular significance was 
the Court’s rationale that public schools are dedicated to “intercommunication among the 
students” and that neither teachers nor students shed their First Amendment rights at the 
“schoolhouse gate,” wrote Susan Garrison50  
                                                
47 Edward L. Carter, Kevin R. Kemper & Barbara L. Morgenstein, Applying Hazelwood to College Speech: 
Forum Doctrine and Government Speech in the U.S. Court of Appeals, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 157, 162 (2006). 
 
48 Tinker, supra note 1, 511. 
 
49 Supra note 47, at 170.  
 
50 Susan Garrison, The Public School as Public Forum, 54 TEX. L. REV. 90 (1975); R. Allan Horning, The 
First Amendment Right to a Public Forum, 1969 DUKE L.J. 931 (1969). 
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Geoffrey Stone wrote in 1974 that “Tinker might properly be viewed as resting 
upon the proposition that, although functionally unlike the streets and parks, the schools 
in their own way have nevertheless been dedicated to the exercise of First Amendment 
rights,” and, because schools are government spaces, forum-hood is insinuated.51 Also, as 
Scott C. Breneman indicated, after Tinker, a few lower courts, both federal and state, 
began integrating public forum analysis into their rationales.52  Thus, this issue had begun 
to brew before Hazelwood, though the cases would not reach the same conclusion as to 
forum status. 
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser53 
The Tinker decision was precedent for nearly twenty years until Bethel was 
decided in 1986, representing a departure from the Tinker holding.  To review briefly, at 
issue was a student’s sexually suggestive speech at a voluntary school assembly. Fraser’s 
speech was made in support of a student’s nomination for an elective office. The Court 
ruled that the First Amendment did not protect student speech that was “vulgar” or 
“lewd”54 and was careful to note that the “constitutional rights of students in public 
school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”55 It is 
here that we see for the first time the Court discussing, in the context of student speech, 
                                                
51 Geoffrey R.  Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 SUP. Ct. REV. 233, 250 (1974). 
 
52 Scott C. Breneman, Widmar v. Vincent and the Public Forum Doctrine: Time to Reconsider Public 
School Prayer, 1984 WIS. L. Rev. (1984). 
 
53 Supra note 2. 
 
54 Id. at 680. 
 
55 Id. at 682. 
 
  
 
76 
the role of public schools in “inculcat[ing] the habits and manners of civility”56 and 
teaching students the “boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”57 It is also here that 
we first see the Court, in relation to student speech, indicate that a school has the right to 
“disassociate itself” from speech it finds contrary to the “fundamental values of public 
education.”58 
In an article published in 1987, one year after Bethel and one year prior to the 
Hazelwood decision, Royal C. Gardner III noted that because students voluntarily 
attended the Bethel assembly, the Court’s assertion that the speech was unprotected 
because it reached a “captive audience” was simply incorrect.59 Furthermore, outside of 
one teacher having a ten-minute discussion with students in class, there was virtually no 
disruption at all.60 
Gardner went on to write forcefully,  
Ironically, the decision in Fraser may undermine what it sought to protect: a 
school's interest in value inculcation. Affording school officials discretion to 
punish speech based on subjective notions of propriety hardly serves as a 
valuable civics lesson to students. Instead, it may breed intolerance and 
reduce the first amendment to a mere platitude in students' eyes. Moreover, 
any chilling effect that Fraser produces will contribute to this intolerant 
                                                
56 Id. at 683 (The Court goes on to say that “The inculcation of these values is truly the ‘work of the 
schools’” and attributes this to Tinker; however, the Court in Tinker does not say the inculcation of socially 
appropriate values and behavior is the “work of the schools.” Rather, it utilizes this phrase to emphasize 
that the case before it did not interfere with schools’ need for order so that students may be educated. The 
Court in Tinker said that prohibition of a viewpoint that collides with the preferred viewpoint of the school 
is unconstitutionally impermissible unless schools officials reasonably forecast that a material and 
substantial disruption might or would ensue (both words were used within the opinion, causing uncertainty 
in lower courts). 
 
57 Id. at 681. 
 
58 Id. at 682. 
 
59 Royal C. Gardner III, Protecting a School’s Interest in Value Inculcation to the Detriment of Students’ 
First Amendment Rights: Bethel School District v. Fraser, 28 B.C. L. REV. 595, 620 (1987) (quoting 
Bethel, supra note 2, at 680). 
 
60 Id. at 619.  
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atmosphere. Clearly, a ‘silence born of fear’ does not foster respect for the 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. In sum, the Court's extension 
of the substantial disruption standard to include speech that disrupts the 
school's value inculcation mission is detrimental to student free speech rights 
because value inculcation is a vague term that will give school officials wide 
discretion in curtailing student speech when the school official disagrees with 
the propriety of that speech. This increase in school officials' authority will 
naturally result in a chilling effect on student speech.61  
 
He recommended that when the Court hears Hazelwood, it should avoid giving school 
officials the great deference afforded in Bethel.  
 In another article discussing Bethel, Therese Thibodeaux took great care to 
highlight Justice William J. Brennan’s concurring opinion and Justice Thurgood 
Marshall’s dissenting opinion.62 She stated that Justice Brennan specifically advocated 
against “school officials [having] limitless authority to regulate high school students’ 
speech.”63 Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, said that the school district had 
failed to prove that the student’s speech had been disruptive in any way. Additionally, he 
argued that, “where speech was involved, the Court need not adopt a teacher's or 
administrator's opinion [emphasis added] that certain speech interferes with the school's 
educational mission.”64 Thibodeaux went on to address concerns that both school-
sponsored and non-school-sponsored speech would be viewed by the public to bear the 
imprimatur of the school. Nonetheless, such considerations, she said, should not be 
enough to overcome student freedom of expression. 
                                                
61 Id. at 622. 
 
62 Therese Thibodeaux, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser: The Supreme Court Supports School in 
Sanctioning Student for Sexual innuendo in Speech, 33 LOY. L. REV. 516 (1987). 
 
63 Id. at 524 (quoting Bethel, supra note 2, at 688).  
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 In an article published one year after the decision, it was argued that the Court 
erred in not treating Fraser’s speech as political.65 Paul Siegel wrote, “This is not a novel 
posture for the Court—leaving an important issue with respect to the Court’s view of the 
communication act itself unresolved by finding that even when seen in the most positive 
light from the communicator’s point of view, the challenged infringement upon speech 
would still be constitutional.”66 
 On top of that, he argued, Fraser’s use of sexual innuendo was not novel in a high 
school, therefore casting doubt on the Court’s “facile dichotomy between political and 
sexual speech.”67 He also wrote that the Court claimed it did not base its decision on the 
“messages’” or “ideas” conveyed. Instead, “they were aimed in a content-neutral fashion 
at the ‘manner’ of the speech.”68 He disagreed with the Court’s assertion that “manner” 
could be determined in a content-neutral fashion as the law requires. He wrote, 
The problem is … that the form and content of communication are so 
inextricably tied that to control the former is, in fact, to modify the latter … it 
may well be that ‘manner’ needs to be separated from this venerable trilogy 
[time, place, and manner regulations] and recognized as a dimension of the 
communication process that warrants nearly as much first amendment 
protection as the content of the message.69 
 
He concluded that schools and courts should be mindful of a landmark 1927 case in 
which the Court wrote, “…if there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood 
                                                
65 Paul Siegel, When is a Student’s Political Communication Not Political?: Bethel School District vs. 
Fraser, 36 COMM. EDUC. 347 (1987). 
 
66 Id. at 349. 
 
67 Id. at 351.  
 
68 Id. at 352. 
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and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is 
more speech, not enforced silence.”70 
 Stanley Ingber, in addressing the paradox between schools instilling values in 
students and the question of what those values should be, wrote,  
The dilemma of public education is thus manifest. Because few institutions 
affect young, impressionable personalities as profoundly as do our schools, 
we as a community are justifiably concerned that our educations program 
should promote the “right” skills and values for the development of an 
individual capable of contributing in a meaningful way to our community. 
Yet by authorizing schools to develop this “right” environment, we leave our 
children highly vulnerable to “village tyrants” who might pervert the 
education process. Under the guise of properly educating the young, 
government could predispose children to accept and defer to authority while 
passively adopting prevailing values and current attitudes. The school system, 
consequently, epitomizes the tension between liberty and authority.71 
  
It should be noted as well that one Susannah Barton Tobin specifically addressed 
the role of in loco parentis within the case.72 She began by saying that the Court has 
confronted a number of issues concerning disputes between parents/students and schools, 
and that they typically have tried to find the middle ground through certain types of local 
control, specifically in terms of parents serving on parent-teacher associations, through 
volunteering, and electing school boards.73  Yet the Bethel court specifically mentioned 
the duty of schools in loco parentis to teach students manners and civility, subsequently 
using this as partial justification for its decision.  
                                                
70 Id. at 354 (quoting Whitney v California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927)). 
 
71 Stanley Ingber, Liberty and Authority: Two Facets of the Inculcation of Virtue, 69 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
421, 430 (1995). 
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73 Id. at 241. 
  
 
80 
“The catch, of course, is the existence of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate 
speech and the evolving scope of those reasons over the years, depending on the 
circumstances of the country, the composition of the Court and the behavior of school 
districts.”74 John C. Hogan and Mortimer D. Schwartz argued that because K-12 
education is compulsory and because many parents cannot afford to pay for private 
school, in loco parentis “is no longer a viable concept in American schools.”75 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier76 
 Just two years after Bethel, Hazelwood, and its restrictive framework, 
significantly reduced the free speech rights of K-12 students. Additionally, in writing that 
its “oft-expressed view that the education of the Nation’s youth is primarily the 
responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal 
judges,” the Court clearly implicated the continued role of schools in loco parentis.77  
Research in the social sciences has painted a picture of a high school press that is 
very unfree. In fact, surveys have found both increased censorship and no change in 
censorship since Hazelwood.  Some of the deciding factors included: already high levels 
of censorship at schools, administrative control over editor and adviser selection, degree 
to which stories are critical of administration, and urban v. rural schools.78 In their, 
“Students Learn About Free Press Through Censorship,” William Click and Lillian 
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Lodge Kopenhaver found that the majority of advisers and administrators in their 
nationwide survey believed 1) they both censored student newspapers, 2) the school’s 
funding had an impact on this, 3) principals should be able to withhold publication, and 
4) students are self-censoring.  Only 27 percent of all principals and advisers said their 
student newspapers are not censored.79  
Regarding self-censorship, the findings (thus far) are not conflicting—self-
censorship is prevalent.  Click and Kopenhaver found that 65 percent of the principals 
and 60 percent of the advisers they surveyed felt that students self-censor.80 This aligns 
with the SPLC’s assertions mentioned in Chapter I.  
In a content analysis examining student-written editorials before and after the 
Hazelwood decision, Carol S. Lomicky found that the types of editorials written prior to 
and after Hazelwood changed dramatically.81 Whether this resulted from direct 
censorship or self-censorship was unclear. The number of editorials of criticism written 
post-Hazelwood decreased significantly from those published prior to Hazelwood. She 
also found that those editorials of criticism prior to Hazelwood were much more critical 
of teachers, administrators, and administrative policies. Those written post-Hazelwood 
tended to be critical of “safer issues,” such as crowded hallways, activities for 
Homecoming Week, and parking issues. The number of entertainment-oriented editorials 
also dramatically increased post-Hazelwood.  
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Further, the number of editorials about controversial issues, such as drugs, sex, and 
teen pregnancy, also declined appreciably. She wrote, “At minimum, the decision 
[Hazelwood] gives school administrators a means by which to censor articles when they 
believe publication of the information may cause public controversy or upset school 
board members.”82 She continued, “As one newspaper columnist noted, it is important for 
students to have a free press while in high school so that students will be better prepared 
for real life journalism.”83 Instead, Hazelwood gave principals across the country the 
ability to control the student press, in large part so the speech would not be perceived as 
the school’s. 
High school newspaper advisers also have been generally critical of the decision, 
she said; they say that the ruling teaches bad journalism by allowing school officials to 
put a lid on controversy—or any news that administrators may feel would cast the school 
in a “bad light.”84  
Finally, she wrote,  
Although the Hazelwood decision requires that school officials who wish to 
restrict student speech provide a valid educational reason for their 
intervention, critics believe that many administrators have interpreted the 
decision as license to censor anything they choose (for example, articles on 
sensitive topics, if, in their judgment, the topics are unsuitable for immature 
audiences or are deemed to be controversial). The result of the decision: a 
highly vague and subjective First Amendment standard for the public high 
school press.85  
 
                                                
82 Id. at 472. 
 
83 Id. 
 
84 Id. at 468. 
 
85 Id. at 465. 
  
 
83 
A review of legal analyses concerning Hazelwood reveals that, almost universally, 
legal scholars believe that Hazelwood has and only will continue to chip away at student 
speech rights.  
A central concern among many scholars is the inherent viewpoint discrimination 
allowed by the ruling. As Tobin pointed out, this has led the federal circuit courts to split 
at both levels of education because the Hazelwood ruling left the issue of viewpoint 
discrimination, among others, unresolved.86 She said that when the Court indicated that 
schools have a right to disassociate themselves from speech “that is, for example, 
ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or 
profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences,”87 it implicitly allowed for viewpoint 
discrimination, particularly in saying that biased or prejudiced speech was 
unconstitutional in the school setting.88 Shari Golub said that even though the Hazelwood 
principal’s testimony and actions contained elements of viewpoint discrimination, such as 
his unilateral decision to refuse publication due to content and the viewpoint expressed 
therein, the majority refused to consider these elements of his testimony.89  
In another article discussing viewpoint discrimination, Marjorie Heins insisted that 
words such as “controversial,” “offensive,” and “vulgar,” are quintessentially viewpoint-
based.90 They are culturally and ideologically driven and ultimately construed by the 
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decision-maker, which can make for a particularly speech-repressive environment. “Thus, 
the Supreme Court's approval in Hazelwood of the exclusion of ‘controversial’ articles 
from a school-sponsored student newspaper was profoundly antithetical to free speech 
values even if, as the Court ruled, school officials plainly may exercise significant control 
over publications produced as part of the curriculum.”91 
Administrators, she asserted, can create virtually any reason for discriminating and 
restricting based upon the elusive “legitimate pedagogical concerns” prong of the 
framework, which also can be used as a form of viewpoint discrimination.  W. Wat 
Hopkins also took aim at this prong of the test, though not for the same reasons. He 
wrote, “The ruling legitimizes censorship as a pedagogical tool, which it is not. 
Censorship teaches that the first amendment works only when school officials are willing 
for it to work.”92 He claimed it was unsound pedagogy to say, as the Court did, that the 
state – through the school board – was the publisher of an educational tool, the 
newspaper. If it is an educational tool, then logically the school board, as an agency of 
the state, should not be considered the publisher. Instead, he argued, it makes more sense 
to think of the adviser, with academic freedom, as the publisher.93 Faculty advisers, he 
argued, should have ultimate authority over a newspaper used as an educational tool; in 
this way students can be taught about journalistic responsibility. This is sound pedagogy. 
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R. George Wright94 observed that while the Hazelwood Court said speech 
regulations in nonpublic forums need only be reasonable, the Court also made no explicit 
requirement that restrictions also should be viewpoint-neutral, going against precedent.95 
We are “left to wonder,” he wrote, “why the Court … failed to consistently follow its 
own teaching, before and since, that regulations of speech in even non-public fora must 
be not only reasonable but, separately, must also be viewpoint neutral, or not based on 
viewpoint.”96 He argued that viewpoint-neutrality cannot be dismissed solely on the 
grounds of the special characteristics of the school as cases already exist explicitly stating 
that most nonpublic forums will, indeed, have special characteristics and purposes.97 
Much also has been written on the curricular/non-curricular and school-
sponsored/non-school-sponsored reasoning in the decision, which the Court used, in large 
part, to decide the newspaper was a nonpublic forum. As J. Mark Abrams and Mark 
Goodman pointed out, when the Court decided that the newspaper was school-sponsored 
and, therefore, part of the curriculum, it was determined to be a nonpublic forum.98  
They contended that the Court misapplied an earlier non-student-related case that 
indicated if, by “policy or practice,” school activities have been opened for 
“indiscriminate use” by the public or a specific group of the public, it had created a 
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limited public forum, not a nonpublic forum.99 “The Supreme Court, in its rush to find an 
expansive rationale for handing schools more control, neglected to properly analyze the 
forum issue,” they wrote.100  
Because Hazelwood High indeed had, through written policies, established the 
paper for students, a limited public, to present their views and opinions, the newspaper 
clearly should have been classified as a limited public forum. Because the newspaper was 
funded almost exclusively by ad sales, they argued that this further established the 
newspaper as a limited public forum. 
They wrote, 
By misapplying Perry to what was in fact a public forum, the Supreme Court 
provided schools with an easy mechanism for determining whether or not 
their student newspaper is a forum for public expression. Most schools will 
interpret the decision as giving them the authority to control a student 
newspaper unless they designate it a public forum. However, schools that 
censor will not do their students or their educational goals a service.101 
 
They vigorously argued that the Hazelwood Court taught students that their constitutional 
rights do, in fact, largely stop at the schoolhouse gate, which the Tinker court famously 
pronounced they did not. Not only that, but the decision indicates to students that while 
they must abide by the Constitution and learn the values behind the Constitution, their 
ability to enforce their Constitutional rights only is allowed after they graduate. 
 Hopkins – though he felt that the Hazelwood case was not entirely going against 
precedent – asserted that the Court, in ruling that schools are entitled to exercise control 
over the curriculum even if student activities take place outside the classroom, was really 
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supporting the school’s concern that student expression would be perceived as the 
school’s speech, to “bear the imprimatur” of the school. He also reiterated what the 
dissenting Justices wrote “in a biting dissent,” in which they felt the appropriate balance 
was struck in Tinker and that the majority was offering “an obscure tangle” of reasons to 
allow administrators even more control over student expression.102  
 Other scholars, such as Wright, have insisted that schools should, indeed, have the 
right to control students’ speech. He said that great latitude should be given to school 
officials not only so order can be maintained but also so schools can prepare students for 
citizenship. As long as the restrictions are reasonable, schools should be able to regulate 
as they see fit.103 Wright, while acknowledging that viewpoint discrimination is 
repugnant to the First Amendment, nonetheless said an exception should be made for 
school-sponsored speech that might be perceived as “bearing the imprimatur of the 
school,” or speech that others would think the school had approved. In its educational 
mission, a K-12 school seeks to promote tolerance, civility, inclusion, equality, and 
responsibility. But, he wrote, such messages are “blurred” when student speech appears 
to be the school’s own, thus contradicting these goals.104 
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There is a dearth of scholarly articles and legal reviews discussing early,  
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pre-Hazelwood post-secondary cases. Perhaps this simply is due to student victories. 
Discussions appear almost exclusively within subsequent case law, generally quoted in 
brief to support a specific part of the Court’s argument. The latter appears true in relation 
to journal articles as well.105  
Healy v. James106  
The first post-secondary case heard by the U. S. Supreme Court was Healy v. 
James. The Court found that student members of the Students for a Democratic Society 
(SDS) were denied First Amendment rights to association (and, thereby, to speech as 
well) when the university declined to allow them to form a local SDS chapter on campus. 
The case, it should be reiterated, occurred in 1972 during a period of considerable unrest 
on campuses and in society generally. While citing Tinker in its assertion that 
administrators have the right to maintain order and to control conduct on school grounds, 
the Court, nonetheless, also quoted Tinker to indicate that “undifferentiated fear or 
apprehension of disturbance … is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of 
expression.”107   
As Lauren C. Tanner wrote, Healy descended directly from Tinker in that the 
Court used the Tinker material and substantial disruption rule to find in favor of the 
students.108 While the SDS nationally was known to cause significant disturbances, she 
wrote, the Court did not find any reason to believe the campus group would pose a 
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substantial threat of significant disturbance.  Thus, as in Tinker, mere apprehension was 
not enough.  
Lewis Bogaty said that while Dixon was a very important case, and often 
attributed as causing the demise of in loco parentis in post-secondary education, Healy 
marked the first time the U. S. Supreme Court indicated its support for the view that 
schools do not have absolute control over students. 109 Additionally, he wrote,  
The Court treated recognition as an affirmative obligation imposed by the 
first amendment's right of association rather than a right contingent upon the 
university's voluntary grant of recognition to any group. Thus, the Healy 
decision anchored the right to recognition firmly in the first amendment 
rather than in any obligation imposed by the equal protection clause that 
would require a university to treat similar groups similarly.110 
 
Yet because the Court failed to fully define all aspects of this associational right, 
it was unclear, he said, if student groups could make a constitutional claim for funding.111 
“While Healy requires the universities to provide students with two elements of 
associational freedom – a place to meet and the means necessary to publicize such 
meetings, the Court deliberately left open the question of whether funding also is an 
element of the right of association that a university is required to provide.”112 (This issue, 
as discussed below in Rosenberger and Southworth, eventually would be taken up by the 
Court.) Even though universities, specifically in the context of academic freedom, may 
not want to be associated with a student organization’s message, that desire is not 
enough to overcome students’ associational rights under the First Amendment.  
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Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri113  
One year later in Papish, a graduate student was expelled following the 
publication in a non-school-sponsored newspaper of a political cartoon and an article, 
both considered indecent by school administrators. While it acknowledged that a 
university has authority to govern student conduct, the Court wrote, “the mere 
dissemination of ideas—no matter how offensive to good taste—on a state university 
campus may not be shut off in the name alone of ‘conventions of decency.’"114  
 “In an era of protracted political and social conflict, the use of constitutional 
protection for this kind of speech [offensive] has accordingly grown,” wrote Mark C. 
Rutzick.115 The law is clear, he said, that vulgarity and indecency, though not obscenity, 
are held constitutional in student press cases.  
 McGowan and Tangri116 analyzed the rise of “political correctness” on the college 
campus. Though their discussion did not focus exclusively on Papish, the case was used 
frequently to support the idea that while offensive speech may be repulsive to some or 
even to many, and could lead to potential conflicts, there is inherently no conflict in 
offensive speech.117 One of their supporting reasons is that even offensive speech 
enhances the marketplace of ideas. They wrote, “’Politically correct’ beliefs may or may 
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not prevail, but to the extent the debate takes place in a free marketplace, all concerned 
will be the better for it, regardless of the outcome.”118 
Widmar v. Vincent119  
Roughly eight years later, in Widmar v. Vincent, the Court addressed the question 
of whether a university could open a forum for expressive activities but bar from the 
forum expressive activities of a religious nature. In Breneman’s assessment, though the 
Court stated only that this particular university had created a public forum, it actually was 
a limited public forum in that the university had opened certain facilities purposefully for 
use by students.120 Smolla agreed with this assertion and said that, unfortunately, 
“Widmar didn’t tell us how much latitude universities would have in deciding the extent 
to which its places and spaces would become limited public forums.”121 Due to this, he 
claimed, lower courts have not “yielded any clear and consistent legal principles” for 
deciding the issue.122   
 According to Rosemary C. Salomone,123 although the Equal Access Act124 was 
not held constitutional until 1990, the Widmar Court upheld equal access principles 
within its decision. Even though the case involved the barring of a religious organization, 
which lower courts have upheld under the Establishment Clause, equal access principles, 
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in which content-neutrality is required, did not interfere with the Establishment Clause. 
Further, because the university had “taken affirmative steps to disassociate itself from the 
‘aims, policies, programs or opinions of any organization or its members,’” allowing the 
organization to meet was not considered an endorsement of the group’s ideology, or of 
“confer[ring] any imprimatur of state approval.”125  
 
LANDMARK POST-HAZELWOOD, POST-SECONDARY FIRST AMENDMENT  
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Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia126  
 The Rosenberger case involved the Thomas Jefferson-created university’s refusal 
to fund a student newspaper that “primarily promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in 
or about a deity or an ultimate reality.”127  Holding for the first time that funding of an 
extracurricular program made it a limited public forum, the Court asserted that once a 
limited public forum has been created, restrictions cannot be based upon viewpoint. And 
the Court found withhold funding for the newspaper in question violated the viewpoint-
neutrality principle. 
 One of the primary critiques of the case revolves around the separation of church 
and state. One year after Rosenberger, the journal Academe highlighted a discussion one 
year after Rosenberger among former Eighth U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge 
Michael McConnell, who argued the case for the plaintiffs before the High Court; Robert 
O’Neil, founding director of the University of Virginia’s Thomas Jefferson Center; and 
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the editor of Academe at the time, John Lyons.128 Through extensive searches, there 
appears to be no better illustration of the issues and problems at hand in Rosenberger 
than those represented in their discussion. 
At one point during their conversation, O’Neil said, “There is the distinction that 
when one is dealing with religious expression, there is a unique concern not applicable to 
any other category of expression: that simply providing governmental support, a physical 
site, endorsement, or perceived endorsement in any form is something that government 
constitutionally may not do.”129 This was the position, he said, of the federal court of 
appeals that heard the case, finding that the university had no option but to withhold 
funding due to the Establishment Clause. Such a concern, he said, is unique to religious 
expression.  
 McConnell agreed, saying,  
…there is an aspect of free speech jurisprudence that prohibits the 
government from compelling citizens to support positions with which they do 
not agree … and the cases go various ways … but the common thread [in 
university speech cases of this kind] is that as long as the university is 
supporting a range of viewpoints with its mandatory fees, then there is not a 
problem under the compelled speech doctrine of the free press clause. I think 
the Rosenberger decision is probably consistent with that.130 
 
When McDonnell went on to say that the decision brings jurisprudence regarding 
religious speech much more closely in line with that of other forms of speech, thus 
making it more consistent with the First Amendment overall, O’Neil countered by saying 
that was precisely one of the main things that had troubled him about the case – “I have 
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always felt that religious expression was fundamentally different and ought in certain 
contexts – including this one – to be treated differently.”131  
 In relation to the viewpoint discrimination and content discrimination the Court 
discussed, Lyons said that the Court was very clear in saying that religion is a category of 
speech that describes a viewpoint, or a set of viewpoints, just as political speech does, 
and, consequently, it could not be proscribed in Rosenberger as a basis for exclusion. 
O’Neill said, “It certainly is tricky,” and he felt that prior to Rosenberger the Court had 
established that there was a difference between content discrimination and viewpoint 
discrimination. He felt that Rosenberger “blurred that difference … in the context of a 
category of speech which is unique and which is treated, in some respects, differently 
from any other category of expression – and understandably so.”132   
McConnell didn’t quite agree, saying pointedly, “I think the blurring exists simply 
because these are blurry things by their nature.”133 He went on to say he believed the 
Court was slowly moving “toward the idea that where various forms [emphasis added] of 
content discrimination bleed into viewpoint discrimination, the close-to-absolute 
protections of the First Amendment begin to kick in.”134 
Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth135 
In Southworth, students challenged having to fund, from mandatory student fees, 
organizations with which they ideologically and politically disagreed. The Court held that 
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the act of charging students fees to promote extracurricular speech was constitutional, in 
large part because it determined the overall fees scheme was a limited public forum, 
though a metaphysical one, and was viewpoint-neutral. It also held, however, that one of 
the ways in which student groups applied for funding – through a referendum process –
was unconstitutional based upon the viewpoint-neutrality principle. 
 At least two scholars have critiqued the case via the government speech doctrine, 
which is relatively new and quickly evolving. The doctrine essentially states that when 
the government speaks, its speech does not have to be viewpoint-neutral. It is up to the 
courts to decide if the speech made within a public forum is private and bound by the 
viewpoint-neutrality principle or if the speech is the government’s. According to Joseph 
Blocher,  
Government speech creates a paradox at the heart of the First Amendment. In 
order to satisfy traditional First Amendment tests, the government must show 
that it is not discriminating against a viewpoint. And yet if the government 
shows that it is condemning or supporting a viewpoint, it may be able to 
invoke the government speech defense and thereby avoid constitutional 
scrutiny altogether. Government speech doctrine therefore rewards what the 
rest of the First Amendment forbids – viewpoint discrimination against 
private speech. This is both a theoretical puzzle and an increasingly important 
practical problem.136 
 
The best approaches for handling this paradox, he wrote, would be to 1) allow 
government speech as a defense only if the speech allows “sufficient alternatives for 
private speakers,” 2) allow government speech as a defense only when the government 
itself has no alternative channels of expression, or 3) allow government speech as a 
defense only if it purposefully “creates equal alternatives for private speakers.”137 
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In a recent development, the Ninth U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a high 
school teacher’s display of religious banners within his classroom was unconstitutional; 
because the teacher was a public employee, the teacher’s speech was deemed 
governmental, not private. The case was not determined via the Establishment Clause.138  
Academic freedom at the post-secondary level generally has insulated professors 
from restrictions on their speech; however, as Smolla wrote,  
The Court often acknowledges academic freedom as a value, or a factor, in 
its analysis, but it always holds short of explicitly enshrining academic 
freedom as an independent, freestanding constitutional right … the Supreme 
Court of the United States has been stubbornly unreceptive to the formal 
recognition of academic freedom as even an implied constitutional right.139   
 
Rather, it is understood as a special concern under the umbrella of the First Amendment. 
 According to Nicole B. Casarez, because a university is not required to create a 
limited public forum, it can 1) continue supporting it, 2) modify its features and 
parameters, or 3) discontinue support, as long as the reason for doing so is viewpoint-
neutral.140 She hypothesized a situation in which there was a change in administration, 
one less tolerant of student speech than the preceding administration. Administrators 
easily could revise general newspaper policies, adding the requirement that someone in 
the administration engage in prior review, for instance, and this action still could be held 
constitutional. Once administration established its authority over the newspaper, it could 
be viewed by a court as government speech. This is a significant reason why forum 
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analysis is unsuited to speech issues at the post-secondary level, she said. It opens the 
door to application of the government speech doctrine. Returning to her hypothetical, she 
said that post-secondary journalists are “vulnerable under this rationale” because if 
college officials create a policy of prior review, they then can turn  “an otherwise student 
publication into government speech.”141  
 Steven G. Gey wrote that utilizing public forum doctrine, as was done in 
Southworth, was problematic, but, even more troublesome was the Court’s “suggestion in 
Southworth that government speech may in some way be relevant to the university 
enterprise.”142 Though the Court said the facts of the case made government speech 
doctrine inapplicable, the Court spent considerable time discussing the doctrine, which, 
she said, raises several concerns: 1) the Court’s suggestion that if a college or university 
expresses a desire to make activity-fee-funded “activities part of the University’s own 
speech, the First Amendment analysis of the case likely would be altogether different”143 
(the intent aspect of public forum doctrine, 2) the Court offered the possibility that 
“traditional political controls to ensure responsible government action would be sufficient 
to overcome First Amendment objections and to allow the challenged program under the 
principle that the government can speak for itself,”144 and 3) of considerable importance, 
the Court wrote, “In the instant case, the speech is not that of the University or its agents. 
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It is not, furthermore, speech by an instructor or a professor in the academic context, 
where principles applicable to government speech would have to be considered.”145 
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez146 
 
 In Christian Legal Society, a student organization at the university law school 
challenged the school’s “all-comers” policy that required all officially recognized student 
organizations to allow all students desiring to join a particular organization to do so. One 
student organization refused to accept at voting members students who would not sign a 
statement of Christian belief and renounce homosexuality. When the university indicated 
to the students that they would have to allow students who would not do these things, the 
students brought suit. The Court held that the “all-comers” policy was a limited public 
forum, allowed for alternative channels for the students to communicate if they wished to 
forego official recognition, was viewpoint neutral in that it only regulated the 
organization’s conduct and was, then, constitutional. 
 Michael R. Denton147 argued that the policy was not viewpoint-neutral in that 
some conduct, in this case excluding non-Christians, is inextricably linked to speech. To 
regulate conduct, the Court should have determined if the conduct is “indistinguishable 
from the beliefs such that a regulation against the conduct is really a regulation against 
the beliefs.”148  Moreover, he argued, because the organization did allow students to join 
the group, even if they could not vote, such restrictions not only hinder the intellectual 
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growth of those non-voting members but also impede the ability of the organization to 
express its views within the larger student marketplace of ideas. 
 According to Toni M. Massaro, the case is yet another example of schools 
walking the fine line between student speech and their own, governmental speech when 
the majority reasoned that the school “had a significant interest in preserving diversity 
and prohibiting discrimination when its name and resources were involved.”149 She, too, 
agreed that the Court, in fact, limited the diversity of views in the marketplace through its 
policy and power of the purse in allocation of student fees. She wrote, “The government's 
spending power is not a license to twist recipients' messages unreasonably, invade their 
autonomy unduly, or compel them to cede basic liberties in exchange for government 
support where it is not necessary to do so to promote government ends.”150  
 Blake Lawrence, on the other hand, approached his analysis of the case through 
the Court’s own holdings involving school-subsidized student organizations.151 He said 
the decision was in keeping with the Court’s earlier holdings in Healy, Widmar, and 
Southworth, in that having a variety of student organizations enhances the marketplace. 
Anti-discrimination policies like that in Christian Legal Society help diversify the limited 
public forum of student organizations that it creates.  
Further, the case reaffirmed the Court’s position that administrators who are “on 
the ground” are the ones most able to create and enforce rules governing association and 
speech. He wrote, “CLS v. Martinez, while not ruffling too many feathers, reaffirms 
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Supreme Court deference to reasonable school policies protecting freedom of speech and 
association while maintaining the university sphere as a ‘marketplace of ideas.’ Though 
the opinion may have some weaknesses in dicta, its holding will remain strong in the 
future.”152 
 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS SPLIT ON APPLICATION OF  
 
HAZELWOOD  
 
At the outset, it is critical to indicate that in footnote 7 of the Hazelwood opinion, 
the Court wrote, “We need not now decide whether the same degree of deference is 
appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and 
university level,” leaving many to wonder if and/or when it might do so. The High Court 
has not spoken to the issue beyond this footnote. 
 As Sarabyn explained, because the federal circuit courts are without clear guidance 
from the U. S. Supreme Court on utilization of Hazelwood at the post-secondary level, 
they have applied incongruent standards. While some federal and circuit courts clearly 
have utilized Hazelwood, others have refrained from doing so. “This legal pastiche leaves 
university students across the country with varying levels of free speech rights, creating a 
noticeable instability with respect to a fundamental constitutional right.”153 She 
recommended that the U. S. Supreme Court make the in loco parentis university 
unconstitutional so that universities and colleges are required to treat their students like 
adults. Without something of this sort, she said, the circuit court split was inevitable.  
                                                
152 Id. at 657. 
 
153 Sarabyn, supra note 106. 
  
 
101 
 
 
Alabama Student Party v. Student Government Association of the University of  
 
Alabama154 
 
 In the case, a student sued the university in response to various provisions of the 
school’s policies regarding electioneering. The court, in utilizing Hazelwood, found 
electioneering to be a non-public forum and that the university’s restrictions were 
constitutional. David W. McClamrock et. al. contended that the court in Alabama Student 
Party went against long-standing post-secondary precedent when it applied Hazelwood to 
the case. In utilizing a K-12 standard for evaluating speech, the court ignored the 
holdings in Healy and Widmar, in which the U. S. Supreme Court made clear that college 
students are young adults who are “less impressionable than younger students.”155 
 In applying Hazelwood to the case, they argued, it ignored several of the key facts 
upon which the Court in Hazelwood relied: 1) There was no faculty supervision involved 
in overseeing the elections to make it a learning experience as the Court in Hazelwood 
characterized the newspaper, 2) The court did not suggest that the elections might in any 
way bear the imprimatur of the school, which the Court in Hazelwood also concerned 
itself with, 3) The style and content of the elections were not a factor considered as they 
were in Hazelwood, and 4) The court made no mention of funding. “Considered in the 
context of its decisive facts, Hazelwood—even if it were generally applicable on the 
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university level—would not support the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Alabama Student 
Party,” they wrote.156 
 Brian S. Black157 focused on the differences in the age and maturity of the 
students in both cases, in addition to the different missions at the two levels of education. 
He said that a critical theme throughout the Hazelwood decision was the age of the 
students, yet in Alabama Student Party, age did not seem to matter at all. The court did 
not discuss this distinction and instead “blindly” applied Hazelwood to the case. He 
wrote,  
A university does not possess the same features or fulfill the same mission as 
an elementary or secondary school. Therefore, the standards employed in 
scrutinizing restrictions on expression in a university forum are not 
necessarily applicable when analyzing such restrictions in a public school. In 
fact, the Hazelwood Court specifically noted that it was not deciding 
‘whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with respect to school-
sponsored expressive activities at the college and university level.’158 
 
Kincaid v. Gibson159 
 To briefly restate the facts of the case: Copies of the student yearbook, produced 
with university funds but not as part of the curriculum, were confiscated after 
administrators deemed the yearbook “inappropriate” and of “poor quality.”160 The Sixth 
U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, holding for the student, said that Hazelwood was 
inapplicable to the case, yet the court proceeded to utilize the case extensively as 
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precedent to determine forum status. As one Jeff Sklar noted, “In one breath in Kincaid, 
the Sixth Circuit refused to apply Hazelwood. In another, it did exactly what Hazelwood 
would have required it to do--a forum analysis, and a lengthy one at that. In effect, it did 
‘apply Hazelwood,’ even though it said it did not.”161 The court decided the publication 
was a limited public forum that administrators unconstitutionally had censored via 
viewpoint discrimination. 
As Gregory C. Lisby claimed,162 one of the chief problems with the case involves 
the court’s decision to use “age of majority” as only a minor reason in its decision.  He 
said that the court “deliberately sidestepped the question” of age.163 Instead it focused 
almost exclusively on whether the yearbook was a public forum. Because forum status is 
not affected by age, maturity, capacity, or status, he said, utilizing it in the context of the 
college setting allows the speech of adult students to be regulated if the speech is deemed 
a nonpublic forum. He wrote, “While the Sixth Circuit reached the correct result in 
Kincaid, its method of legal analysis [forum analysis] will have dire consequences for 
free expression by adults in higher education settings.”164   
 The clear focus, he wrote, was on who exercised control of the yearbook – the 
administration and/or faculty or the students. If the university gave students relatively full 
reign, then there was clear intent on the part of administrators to create a limited public 
forum. Nonetheless, he wrote,  
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At what point along a continuum of control does an educational institution 
retain or give up its control over student expressive activities?  The myriad of 
combinations of school sponsorship, of funding options, of faculty 
involvement in the role of teacher and/or advisor, of administrative 
supervision, of student participation and of learning environments make this 
problem a potential legal quagmire. Certainly, it is a factual determination 
based upon policy language and practice, yet also quite likely one dependent 
upon context, nuance and interpretation of both intent and practice—in other 
words, one likely to belong, in the final analysis, to the determination of the 
courts.165  
 
He suggested that resolving this issue would require an “age of maturity” analysis, which 
would give college students the full First Amendment protections afforded other adults.  
Sarabyn, in discussing ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, said that those 
on both sides of the ratification debate recognized that enfranchisement of those 18 and 
older conferred upon them all the rights and responsibilities of full-fledged citizenship.166 
“The Twenty-Sixth Amendment, as well as Justice Douglas's concurrence [in Healy], 
proceeded to ground the judiciary's subsequent move to eliminate the university's role in 
loco parentis in civil law,” she wrote.167 
But cases like Kincaid, and those discussed below in which Hazelwood was 
utilized, she said, imply an in loco parentis power of colleges inconsistent with the 
Twenty-Sixth Amendment and U.S. Supreme Court precedent. “As it is, some federal 
circuits have already tied university students' rights to secondary students' rights, letting 
them sink together as a bundle,” she wrote.168  She recommended that proper resolution 
involved making in loco parentis unconstitutional as applied to post-secondary education. 
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This means, she said, that a public university “must treat its students like adults, and 
therefore cannot perform the paradigmatic duties of an in loco parentis institution: 
reproducing and inculcating the current morals and manners of society in its charges.”169 
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment, she argued, made it unconstitutional to regulate or 
restrict student expression “for the purpose of acting in loco parentis.”170 
Brown v. Li171 
 One year later in Brown v. Li, the Ninth U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals applied 
Hazelwood to rule that the university’s refusal to accept a graduate student’s thesis due to 
a two-page  “Disacknowledgements” section was constitutional. The 
“Disacknowledgements” section contained profanity and in it Brown complained that 
several administrators had hindered his academic career. The majority considered 
Brown’s thesis a nonpublic forum and found that the committee’s refusal to accept the 
thesis was reasonable and based upon sound pedagogical purposes. 
 According to Karyl Roberts Martyn, while the court acknowledged that the Sixth 
Circuit in Kincaid dealt with an extracurricular activity, the court in Brown said 
application of Hazelwood was appropriate in relationship to curricular activities as 
well.172 Both, however, represent “significant departures from the Court's traditional free 
speech doctrine as applied to the university setting,” she said.173 Adam R. Gardner 
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rejected the decision because, he reasoned, Brown’s thesis wasn’t pulled due to its 
substantive research but, rather, for the viewpoint he expressed in the 
“Disacknowledgements” section.174 “Brown dramatically threatens the dynamic and 
vibrant nature of students' speech in public universities,” he wrote.175  
 Because the U. S. Supreme Court has never ruled on the speech limitations 
universities may impose on students within the curricular context, he stated, the Ninth 
Circuit had no precedent upon which to draw and, thus, utilized Hazelwood as it 
“appear[ed] to be the most analogous to the present case.”176 Yet, Gardner argued, simply 
not having precedent at the university level does not mean a court should utilize a K-12 
restrictive legal standard at the post-secondary level. “The Ninth Circuit failed to 
distinguish a critical point that makes the factual premises in Hazelwood and Brown 
starkly different: the educational setting where the students’ speech occurred.”177 
 The court also should have determined that the differences between high school 
and university students and settings implicate different pedagogical purposes. Not only 
was the section of the university’s official theses guide “ambivalent” and “flexible” as to 
writing an acknowledgment, an issue the court did not consider, but more importantly the 
guide stated that the “real pedagogical purpose of any thesis project is its scholastic 
usefulness,” not the style of the acknowledgements section.178 Because of the great 
deference (reasonableness standard) given schools under the Hazelwood framework in 
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determining a legitimate pedagogical purpose, he said, as long as schools can “conjure” 
up an even remotely legitimate pedagogical purpose, the school most likely will win the 
case.  
 He recommended that utilizing an intermediate level of scrutiny would require 
universities to demonstrate that the regulation was substantially related to the purported 
pedagogical concern. Alternatively, he suggested that Tinker should be applied at the 
post-secondary level.179  
 Laura K. Schultz began her discussion of Brown by quoting an Illinois court case 
from 1891, in which the court said that when a student voluntarily attends a university or 
is “placed there by those having the right to control him,” the student necessarily then 
surrenders many of his individual rights to those “who, for the time being, are his 
masters.”180 The in loco parentis role of the university in this early case is clear. 
“Fortunately for today’s undergraduate and graduate students, such a view – at least in 
theory – no longer prevails,” she wrote. “However, sometimes, the more things change, 
the more they seem to stay the same.”181 
 She went on to say that over time the courts, in determining student speech cases, 
have analyzed a myriad of factors – the type of speech, such as the vulgar and the lewd, 
the school-sponsored and non-school-sponsored; the medium through which the speech 
occurred; the place in which it occurred; the type of forum it represents, etc. Yet courts, 
she asserted, have consistently failed to decide cases based upon the distinction between 
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the speech rights of students at the K-12 and post-secondary levels. Brown is just another 
example of this failure, she said. 
 In discussing the SPLC’s claim that reports of censorship dramatically have 
increased at the K-12 level post-Hazelwood, Schultz wrote,  
Most cases that actually rule censorship improper under the deferential 
Hazelwood standard are ‘rare.’ Based on such ramifications from the 
application of Hazelwood at the pre-collegiate level, the ramifications for 
college and graduate students would be just as devastating, if not more. 
According to its terms, the Hazelwood standard tips the balance in favor of 
school officials, giving them much authority and discretion to censor student 
speech. In a setting where students are more mature, have more legal rights, 
and where the emphasis is on independent thinking instead of indoctrination, 
such censorship could ultimately lead to the demise of the ‘marketplace of 
ideas.’182 
 
Courts must, she recommended, take the purposes of both levels of education into much 
greater consideration. 
Axson-Flynn v. Johnson183  
 When a Mormon student, enrolled in an acting class at the University of Utah, 
refused to say “fuck” or to take the Lord’s name in vain during a classroom exercise, her 
instructor told her to “get over it,” and Axson-Flynn decided not to re-enroll the next 
semester. She sued the university claiming the university had violated her First 
Amendment right against compelled speech. The Tenth U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the university, said that 
Hazelwood was the applicable standard, and remanded to determine if Axson-Flynn was 
required to use such language because the teacher had discriminated based upon Axson-
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Flynn’s faith or because, as the university argued, it constituted a legitimate pedagogical 
concern. The parties settled out of court.  
 Brandon C. Pond contended that this case is a classic representation of the already 
present tension existing between the quintessential four essential freedoms of a university 
– “to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how 
it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study” – and the “essential” freedoms of 
others, notably students.184 While the lower court utilized U. S. Supreme Court 
precedential cases involving compelled speech, the Tenth Circuit “rejected that approach, 
asserting that a person’s interest in compelled speech merited no different analysis than 
that of restricted speech, and it proceeded to analyze the case via Hazelwood because this 
was an issue of school-sponsored speech.185 
 Pond vehemently critiqued the court’s assertion that compelled speech and 
restricted speech should be treated the same. First of all, he said, the motivations behind 
restricting speech are many, such as disagreement with viewpoint, use of offensive 
content, or inappropriate usage of time, place, and manner regulations. The motivations 
to compel a person to speak could range from the mundane, such as trying to create a 
particular appearance to others, to offensive motives like “mandat[ing] compliance with a 
particular viewpoint.”186 Despite the fact the U. S. Supreme Court has delineated 
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“analytical” and “motivational” differences between the two, the “Tenth Circuit rejects 
this approach and conflates two radically different aspects of free speech protection.”187 
 When compelled speech is analyzed under Hazelwood and the great deference 
given to administrators and educators in the classroom, the only protection left for the 
student is that compelling certain speech must be related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns. And this, he held, is not difficult for a school to do. “Extending this analysis to 
compelled speech cases may potentially allow unconstitutional motivations to compel 
student speech to be used as the very pedagogical concerns that justify such 
compulsion.”188 
 While he acknowledged that one of the essential freedoms of the university is to 
decide what is taught, that freedom is not universal. Compelling a student to espouse 
certain beliefs, ideas, or viewpoints is unconstitutional, thus making Hazelwood totally 
inapplicable in this case and all others in which “school-mandated speech exceeds the 
boundaries of permissible curricular requirements.”189 
 McGowan and Tangri said that compelling or limiting speech in the classroom 
displaces one of the primary places in which students are free to inquire, to develop and 
to learn the tools necessary to disprove or argue against speech. It is here where an 
“erroneous idea expressed … is likely to meet searching scrutiny and be effectively 
disproved.”190 To render such an environment as nonpublic does a great disservice to the 
learning that occurs in the classroom; it is for this reason that such environments 
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absolutely, they concluded, should be considered public forums, as opposed to nonpublic 
forums. 
Hosty v. Carter191 
 Of the cases that fall into this category, Hosty undoubtedly has raised the most 
concern among First Amendment scholars and organizations, in large part because it 
applied the Hazelwood framework in full to a student newspaper.  
 In one of the most comprehensive analyses of Hosty (and by extension the cases 
above), Derigan A. Silver noted that in both Hazelwood and Hosty the Court determined 
forum status based both upon subsidization and the policy, practice, and intent of 
administrators toward the publication.192 Yet the court held that the facts were 
insufficient to determine forum status, but because it had to find in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, it determined that newspaper was a limited public forum. 
The courts, he said, have been very inconsistent in determining the degree to 
which sponsorship and the curricular/non-curricular distinctions play in determining 
forum status.  Building upon this, he said the “fundamental flaw” in the Hosty decision 
revolved around the court’s presumption that government funding of the newspaper was 
enough to apply Hazelwood to the case.  
He listed four principal problems associated with such an approach: 1) The court 
did not acknowledge that the curricular nature of the Hazelwood paper was a “decisive 
factor” in determining that it was a nonpublic forum, 2) The court went against U. S. 
Supreme Court precedent when it said that government sponsorship allows for speech 
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regulation. Government speech doctrine, in his estimation, has established that 
government may only regulate its own speech or the speech of a private entity 
representing the government, 3) Application of forum analysis to non-curricular 
publications “forced the court to place too much emphasis on interpreting policy and 
practice to determine government intent and not enough on First Amendment values,” 
and 4) In applying Hazelwood, the court failed to  “recognize the unique nature of non-
curricular student publications, the important role they have historically played at public 
colleges and universities, and forty years of Supreme Court precedent acknowledging that 
‘[t]he college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the ‘market-place of 
ideas.’” 193 
He argued that the U. S. Supreme Court has ruled that it is inapposite to equate 
non-curricular and curricular expression, thus suggesting that non-curricular publications 
at the post-secondary level require a different standard of review – strict scrutiny.194 
Additionally, the court erred, he asserted, when it said that age was not an issue in 
determining forum status within the context of education. Beyond this, he contended that 
courts must examine to whom readers might attribute the publication’s messages. If they 
do not do this, he said, it very well might lead to a determination that the speech was the 
government’s, which it can control, instead of an unconstitutional abridgement of student 
speech based upon content.195  He found the emphasis courts place on government 
funding and intent to be particularly disturbing. 
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Because forum analysis, and its focus on policy, practice, and intent (the latter of 
which is especially hard to determine), allows for the creation of all different types of 
forums, reviewed under different standards, it creates an ad-hoc situation that lends no 
guidance to other courts. Ideally, he said, all student publications would be financially 
independent and, as such, forum analysis wouldn’t even be needed. The reality, however, 
is that this is not the case with the majority of college newspapers, meaning courts will 
find them to be either nonpublic forums or limited public forums.196  
Finally, he relied upon general forum cases to argue that because the U. S. 
Supreme Court has written that, “mechanically extending forum analysis to all situations 
is inappropriate and courts must take into account the special nature and context of 
expression,” courts need to take into account the special characteristics of post-secondary 
education, the unique aspects of newspapers, the role that young journalists play on 
campus and will play once in the field, and the differences between curriculum-based 
publications mostly found at the K-12 level and the extra-curricular publications typically 
found on the university campus.197 Forum doctrine, he said, is simply not a good fit in the 
post-secondary context.  
 Another scholar, Jessica Golby, wrote that, “By extending Hazelwood's 
framework to extracurricular activities, the Hosty court granted more power to public 
university officials to censor student speech than any court of appeals had done 
previously. Prior to Hosty, college students enjoyed broad free speech rights, at least with 
regard to their extracurricular activities, which has allowed a thriving college journalism 
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community to develop.”198 The decision, however, conflated the rights of college and 
high school students. 
 Golby, too, took aim at the intent aspect of determining forum status by arguing 
that all administrators need to do to suppress speech rights is to express a wish or desire 
to do so. Moreover, there is the danger that a university could create the appearance of a 
public forum, but “through written policy alone … shatter that appearance and intervene 
as censor whenever convenience dictates.”199 As found in almost all K-12 cases utilizing  
Hazelwood, censorship prevailed, she wrote, and if that serves as a representation for 
what might occur at the post-secondary level following Hosty, a chilling effect is likely. 
Since the Hazelwood Court didn’t even mention the general prohibition of viewpoint 
discrimination in discussing the school’s right to censor if for “legitimate pedagogical 
purposes,” where does that leave college expression in relationship to viewpoint 
discrimination, she wondered.200 
 She recommended that courts either 1) abandon public forum analysis in favor of 
utilizing an intermediate level of scrutiny to all speech or 2) modify forum analysis as 
applied to post-secondary education such that most student speech would be categorized 
as either a limited public forum or an open forum.201 The latter could be achieved by 
simply declaring that all college newspapers or other expressive activities are limited 
public forums as a matter of law, or courts could base their forum analysis solely on the 
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curricular/extracurricular distinction, in which all extracurricular speech would be 
determined to be or to occur in a limited public forum.  
The university still could enforce reasonable time, place, and manner regulations, 
and it would be given leeway in regulating speech in the curricular context as long as the 
restrictions were based upon “legitimate pedagogical reasons.”202 Even in Hazelwood, 
she said, the Court limited its decision to curricular activities (once it determined the 
newspaper was a curricular enterprise), “albeit with a broad definition of curricular.”203 
 As Richard Bradley Ng indicated, because the circuit courts have split on the 
applicability of Hazelwood to post-secondary education, “geography [now] defines the 
extent of both a student journalist's First Amendment rights and the states' ability to 
regulate university- sponsored speech at public universities.”204 Not only has this created 
disparities in protection, but, he said, more importantly it has opened a “qualified 
immunity loophole” that he suggested likely will be exploited because administrators can 
claim that due to the split, this area of the law is unsettled. In Hosty, the court held that 
the dean could not reasonably have known that confiscation of the newspapers was an 
unconstitutional infringement of students’ rights and was, thus, immunized from liability. 
Ng said that legal remedies sought by students in cases involving prior review or other 
“encroachment” on their First Amendment rights have been seriously hampered by the 
doctrine.205 The U. S. Supreme Court must soon address if Hazelwood applies on the 
                                                
202 Id. at 1282-84. 
 
203 Id. at 1283. 
 
204 Richard Bradley Ng, A House Divided: How Judicial Inaction and a Circuit Court Split Forfeited the 
First Amendment Rights of Student Journalists at America’s Universities, HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 345, 346 
(2008). 
205 Id. at 347. 
 
  
 
116 
college campus, which would then close this qualified immunity loophole, no matter how 
the Court rules. 
 Ng isn’t the only scholar who has expressed great concern over qualified 
immunity. Azhar Majeed argued that the doctrine undoubtedly will chill speech.206 He 
said that the U. S. Supreme Court has stated on more than one occasion that vagueness 
and overbreadth void regulations on speech that intrude upon protected freedoms. Yet, 
until the Court clarifies if Hazelwood applies to university student speech, qualified 
immunity will act as a shield for unconstitutional abridgments of speech not only because 
the law is unclear but also because administrators can hide behind the doctrine itself.  
Even if the Court does not speak to this issue, however, students, he said, should 
pursue personal capacity suits for “applied violations of their free speech rights” pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a federal civil rights statute that allows individuals who have been 
deprived of a federal statutory or constitutional right to collect monetary damages from 
the responsible official.”207 “If courts pierce qualified immunity in such cases … 
knowing that they will face personal [emphasis added] liability for monetary damages if 
their actions are found to violate the law, officials at public colleges and universities will 
be less likely to restrict the exercise of speech and expressive activity protected by the 
First Amendment, he wrote.”208 Section 813 is a powerful incentive for administrators to 
think twice before infringing upon students’ constitutional rights. 
                                                
206 Azhar Majeed, Putting Their Money Where Their Mouth Is: The Case for Denying Qualified Immunity 
to University Administrators for Violating Students’ Speech Rights, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 
515 (2010). 
 
207 Id. at 516. 
208 Id. at 575. 
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 Not all agree that Hosty will stop the presses. Sklar contended that Hazelwood's 
application to post-secondary speech is unlikely to create any substantial contraction of 
students’ rights. “Most of Hosty's critics are grasping at straws,” he declared, “trying to 
find fault in a decision that, for two reasons, changes little to nothing about students' 
rights.”209 First, he argued, the vast majority of college publications are public forums 
[not just limited public forums], thereby making the “legitimate pedagogical concerns” 
prong of the test inapplicable.  Second, he claimed, those that are nonpublic appear 
[emphasis added] to be subject to less administrative control than many of Hosty's critics 
believe.”210 
 He claimed that courts have repeatedly applied forum analysis to post-secondary 
education, though, it should be mentioned, he only referenced those cases discussed 
above, post-Hazelwood. He also said that critics concerned about Hosty’s potential 
chilling effect are “irrational” because, he continued to argue, that most student 
publications are public forums.  
Next he said that most courts will take age and maturity into account when 
making decisions about the constitutionality of regulations on speech, though the 
literature does not support this assertion. In conclusion, he wrote, “The word 
‘Hazelwood’ has struck fear in the minds of high school journalists for nearly two 
decades, so one can understand why college journalists might have initially reacted with 
trepidation when the Seventh Circuit said in Hosty that Hazelwood's framework should 
                                                
209 Sklar, supra note 161, at 642.  
 
210 Id. at 642.  
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apply to colleges as well. But trepidation and hysteria are hardly the same, and much of 
the reaction to Hosty is better characterized as the latter.”211  
 
CONCLUSION 
As Lisby212 indicated, the numerous issues at play within both K-12 and post-
secondary educational cases – curricular v. extracurricular speech, school-sponsored v. 
non-school-sponsored speech, government speech, viewpoint discrimination and content 
discrimination, differing purposes of both levels of education, distinctions between the 
age and maturity of students, concerns about speech being viewed as bearing the 
imprimatur of the school, utilization of public forum doctrine, the types of speech at 
hand, the common law doctrine of in loco parentis, associational rights, utilization of 
Hazelwood at the post-secondary level of education, questions about First Amendment 
values, and qualified immunity – do present, as he said, a “legal quagmire,” one in which 
the courts appear to approach cases in an ad-hoc fashion.  
As demonstrated within this literature review, the courts appear to utilize three 
frames when deciding cases – the disruptive speech frame as in Tinker and Healy; the 
offensive speech frame as in Bethel and Papish; and the school-sponsored speech frame 
as in Hazelwood, Widmar, Rosenberger, Southworth, and those federal circuit court cases 
utilizing Hazelwood.  
Concerns abound about Hazelwood generally and its application at the post-
secondary level of education. Many of these concerns involve the viewpoint 
discrimination inherent in the case and those cases utilizing it; the elusive “legitimate 
                                                
211 Id. at 695. 
 
212 Supra note 162, at 154. 
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pedagogical concerns” prong of the Hazelwood test, which many have argued allows 
administrators to censor at will and to discriminate based upon viewpoint; the potentiality 
that the government speech doctrine already has been incorporated into the case law and 
could become even more influential in future cases; the appropriateness of utilizing 
public forum doctrine, which has, to at least a degree, supplanted the open marketplace of 
ideas, particularly at the post-secondary level; and the question of whether differing 
institutional purposes and the age and maturity of students at both levels of education 
should render the Hazelwood framework inapplicable on college and university 
campuses, particularly in light of the historical protection afforded students in the latter 
context.  
Almost universally, scholars have indicated that utilization of Hazelwood within 
post-secondary education is antithetical to the mission of colleges and universities – to 
prepare students for citizenry through an education occurring within an open marketplace 
of ideas, not one existing in a restrictive in loco parentis environment. Its utilization does 
no favors for budding journalists while in school or when they enter the “real world.” 
Moreover, while public forum doctrine appears inevitable because the university is a state 
actor, the ad-hoc manner in which it is used per Hazelwood does not, many contend, lend 
consistency or provide guidance to lower courts, which is the principle reason, it appears, 
the federal circuit courts have split on its applicability.  
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
This dissertation, then, asked the following research questions: !"#$%&$'(&)*&+,(-./01$&)2.+-)$30++$+4'0+&&5(-$,/&+$6/7$3(66(75-8$/$.+9+6(':+-)/6$'/);$&5:56/0$)($);+$'/);$3(66(7+.$<1$=*">$&)2.+-)$30++$+4'0+&&5(-$,/&+$6/7?$$!>#$@(7$;/&$!"#$%&''()*+),-.%/$0$1$<++-$2)565A+.$/)$);+$'(&)*&+,(-./01$6+9+6$(3$+.2,/)5(-?$
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CHAPTER IV 
 METHODOLOGY 
 
To determine if post-secondary student free expression case law has followed a 
developmental path similar to that followed by K-12 student free expression case law, 
federally litigated student expression cases at both the public K-12 and post-secondary 
levels of education were located and reviewed. Case outcomes were categorized either as 
protecting student expression or as one of three identified competing social interests in 
this area of the law – protecting the well-being of children, teaching students appropriate 
social behaviors, and protecting school systems. The competing social interests identified 
were not ranked in importance within the analysis.  
All majority opinions of reported federal-level cases (at the highest level of 
appeal) found concerning student expression at both the public K-12 and post-secondary 
levels of education were analyzed. Majority opinions, as opposed to concurring and 
dissenting opinions, were selected because it is here that the guiding rationales leading to 
determined outcomes are established by the courts. Cases were located through both 
targeted searches and Shepardizing in Westlaw Campus Research, LexisNexis Academic, 
and the Decennial Digest; by mining scholarly articles and cases already identified; and 
by online searches of the Websites maintained by the SPLC and the First Amendment 
Center. Two cases relating to restriction of student speech per Hazelwood at the post-
secondary level were not included because they are on appeal without a final decision.  
Cases first were divided by level of education.  From here they were grouped by 
time period. The analysis was divided by time periods as follows: 3/3/40—2/23/69, 
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because the first student free expression case to be decided by the U. S. Supreme Court 
was on March 3, 1940, and another U. S. Supreme Court decision regarding student free 
expression rights, Tinker v. Des Moines, which commonly is regarded as a milestone 
decision in this area of law, was decided on February 24, 1969; 2/24/69—1/12/88, as the 
Hazelwood case (another U. S. Supreme Court case), which significantly altered the 
interpretation of student free expression cases, was decided January 13, 1988; and 
1/13/88—2001, as this is the remaining time frame and many cases are governed by the 
Hazelwood decision.  
The method of analysis was specifically constructed for this research, as no 
existing method fit the needs of the research. Rationales were determined primarily 
through reading a variety of cases before conducting the research, to identify rationales 
commonly used by federal courts deciding student free expression cases. Additional 
rationales were added throughout the research process, as they were discovered.  It was 
thought that analyzing the similarities and differences in outcomes and rationales over 
time would indicate whether post-secondary case law is following trends within K-12 
case law.  
As mentioned above, cases were analyzed based upon the outcomes and rationales 
in support of these outcomes, all of which are listed below. Thus, for instance, 
“Protecting K-12 Student Expression” (“A” below) would be the outcome in a case, and 
“Fostering an environment of robust debate” (directly beneath “A”) might be the court-
provided rationale. Themes within the case law and the driving rationales were 
determined through traditional legal textual analysis. Where a case litigated more than 
one issue, each was evaluated to determine its driving rationale. Because there were cases 
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in which this occurred, at times the total number of rationales exceeded the total number 
of outcomes and categories of speech, also listed below. The outcome categories 
“Protecting the Well Being of Children/Students,” “Teaching Students Acceptable Social 
Behaviors, and “Protecting the School System” were all understood as speech-restrictive. 
The identified outcomes and rationales were: 
K-12 
A) Protecting K-12 Student Expression  
Fostering an environment of robust debate  
Providing access for all voices to be heard  
Preparing students for self-governance and citizenship 
Protecting viewpoint neutrality 
Protecting speech in public or limited public forums 
Protecting speech from prior restraint 
Protecting non-disruptive, off-campus speech 
Protecting speech against overbreadth and/or vagueness 
Protecting pure speech 
 
B) Protecting the Well-Being of K-12 Children 
Taking age into consideration 
Recognizing that students are often a “captive audience” 
Considering the sensitivity of topics 
 
 
C)       Teaching K-12 Students Acceptable Social Behaviors 
            Teaching civility 
            Teaching good taste  
            Teaching boundaries of socially appropriate behavior 
Awakening students to cultural values  
 
 
D)      Protecting the K-12 School System  
                       Avoiding controversy 
           Protecting right of school to regulate speech in non-public forums  
           Maintaining student discipline and control 
           Confirming the right of the school to speak for itself/control its message 
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           Controlling the curriculum  
           Promulgating reasonable rules and conduct 
           Controlling speech in school-sponsored activities 
 
 
 
Post-Secondary 
 
A) Protecting Post-Secondary Student Expression  
Fostering an environment of robust debate  
Providing access for all voices to be heard  
Preparing students for self-governance and citizenship 
Protecting viewpoint neutrality 
Protecting speech in public or limited public forums 
Determining that age and maturity require special consideration 
Protecting speech from prior restraint 
Protecting against overbreadth and vagueness 
Protecting pure speech 
 
B) Protecting the Well-Being of Post-Secondary Students 
Taking age into consideration 
Recognizing that students are often a “captive audience” 
Considering the sensitivity of topics 
 
 
C)       Teaching Post-Secondary Students Acceptable Social Behaviors 
            Teaching civility 
            Teaching good taste  
            Teaching boundaries of socially appropriate behavior 
Awakening students to cultural values  
 
 
 
D)      Protecting the Post-Secondary School System 
           Avoiding controversy 
           Protecting right of school to regulate speech in non-public forums  
           Maintaining student discipline and control 
           Confirming the right of the school to speak for itself/control its message 
           Controlling the curriculum  
           Promulgating reasonable rules and conduct 
           Controlling speech in school-sponsored activities 
  
 
125 
 
 
Cases also were categorized by type: 1) content of published student works, such 
as official and unofficial student publications, including newspapers, magazines, 
yearbooks, Web postings, leaflets, posters, questionnaires, and theses; 2) verbalizations, 
such as student speeches and student comments made in class and out of class; 3) 
symbolic speech, such as wearing special indicators of political or social positions 
(armbands, t-shirts with photographs/drawings); 4) speech plus, such as issues involving 
distribution and physical demonstrations, 5) funding and 6) miscellaneous issues, such as 
access to public fora and refusal to speak. Categorization was used to determine whether 
certain types of expression were driving the overall results.  
Tables were constructed for case outcomes at both levels of education, for each 
set of outcome rationales at both levels of education, and for case categories at both 
levels of education. Appendices included lists of cases at both levels of education, a list 
of case names categorized under outcomes, a list of case names for K-12 rationales, and a 
list of case names for post-secondary rationales. 
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CHAPTER V 
 FINDINGS 
 
 Following a brief review of the way in which cases were classified by outcomes, 
rationales, and categories (types of speech), this chapter will begin with a discussion of 
the federal judiciary’s reluctance to intervene in school decision-making in this area of 
the law. From here, the chapter will focus on K-12 and post-secondary free expression 
case law outcomes and rationales. Beginning with K-12 cases, it first will discuss case 
outcomes – “Protecting K-12 Student Expression,” “Protecting the Well-Being of K-12 
Children,” “Teaching K-12 Students Acceptable Social Behaviors,” and “Protecting the 
K-12 School System” – for each period of time. From here, each of the outcomes will be 
analyzed through discussion of the dominant rationales and themes for each time period. 
The K-12 section will end with an examination of how the outcomes may have been 
driven by case categories, or the types of speech analyzed. Next, the discussion will focus 
on post-secondary case law, following the same format, to examine the dominant 
rationales and themes within each of the outcomes – “Protecting Post-Secondary Student 
Expression,” “Protecting the Well-Being of Post-Secondary Students,” “Teaching Post-
Secondary Students Acceptable Social Behaviors,” and “Protecting the Post-Secondary 
School System.” It also will conclude with discussion of how the outcomes may have 
been driven by case categories, or types of speech analyzed. Further, a discussion of how 
student speech measures up against the ideal concept of speech expressed throughout this 
dissertation will be examined. 
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Because explanations concerning rationales and categories are somewhat complex 
for this project, some notes about the methodology would be useful at this point. During 
the analysis, several cases led to more than one rationale and, therefore, more rationales 
and more case outcomes than total cases due to multiple issues being litigated. This 
explains why the number of cases may be unequal to the number of case outcomes, the 
number of rationales, and the number of speech categories.  
For example, if a case involved student punishment for both a demonstration and 
the content of an “underground newspaper,” and if the court struck down punishment for 
the underground newspaper but upheld punishment for the demonstration, the driving 
rationale for protecting the underground newspaper might be “Fostering an environment 
of robust debate,” while the driving rationale for protecting the school system might be 
“Maintaining discipline and order.” There would, then, be two rationales for one case. 
One tally for this case would be included under the outcome “Protecting K-12 Student 
Expression,” while another tally for this case would be included under the outcome 
“Protecting the K-12 School System.” Additionally, the demonstration would be 
categorized under “Speech plus,” and the newspaper would be categorized under 
“Content of student-published works.”  
Alternatively, the court might have upheld protection of both types of speech 
under the same rationale, “Protecting against prior restraint.” In such a situation, both 
types of speech would be included under the outcome “Protecting K-12 Student 
Expression,” and both types of speech would be included in the rationale category 
“Protecting against prior restraint.” Nonetheless, in both situations, there would be more 
total driving rationales, more total case outcomes, and more total categories of speech 
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than the total number of cases. Appendices C and D list by time period case names under 
both case outcomes and case rationales. One actual example of the totals discrepancy is 
the following: In Appendix C, during the time period 2/24/69—1/12/88, under outcome 
“Protecting K-12 Student Expression,” one case is listed twice under the rationale 
“Protecting against prior restraint” and one case is listed twice under the rationale 
“Protecting against overbreadth and/or vagueness.” Each case involved more than one 
litigated issue, but in both, the rationales were the same. As discussed above, however, 
they could have different rationales and/or different outcomes.  
Additionally, before discussing the findings, it should be noted that at the K-12 
level of education, nearly all courts from all time periods declared that schools, absent a 
constitutional infringement, should have the power to determine how youth will be 
educated, which necessarily also included the right of schools to create and to enforce 
rules governing student conduct. Courts made exceptionally clear their belief that such 
decisions were best left to local officials in their in loco parentis role, not to the judiciary.  
Many courts quoted directly from Tinker in saying that it is the right of “school 
officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control 
conduct in the schools.”1 When not directly referencing or citing Tinker for this 
proposition, courts used other language to convey this message. One representative 
sample of such language is as follows: “It is not the policy of the Federal Courts to 
intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of the school 
system and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values.”2 
                                                
1 Tinker v. Des Moines Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969). 
 
2 Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 57 (4th Cir. 1971). 
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It was much the same at the post-secondary level, though the reasoning was less 
in an in loco parentis role of universities. Rather, courts typically expressed their 
reluctance to intervene in post-secondary decision-making based upon academic freedom 
and the different missions of K-12 schools and higher education. Typically, the language 
used to affirm these positions came from, though is frequently not attributed to, Justice 
Felix Frankfurter’s dissent in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,3 a case cited in Chapter II that 
involved the refusal of a professor to answer questions directed at determining if he was 
involved in subversive activities or organizations, such as the Communist Party.  
In his dissent, Justice Frankfurter quoted from a statement, also rarely attributed, 
presented during a conference in South Africa as a plea for greater educational freedom 
in the country:  
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most 
conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in 
which there prevail ‘the four essential freedoms’ of a university—to 
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be 
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.4  
 
A number of courts at the post-secondary level utilized parts or all of this language to 
state their reluctance to become involved in matters of post-secondary student discipline 
of expression, absent an unambiguous constitutional claim. 
 
K-12 FREE EXPRESSION CASE LAW 
 Overall, 77 K-12 cases in this study were analyzed, with six being decided in the 
first time period, 24 being decided during the second time period, and 47 being decided 
                                                
3 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
 
4 Id. at 263.  
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during the third time period. Clearly there has been a constant increase in the number of 
cases from one time period to the next. 
 March 3, 1940, marked the first freedom of expression case determined by the  
U. S. Supreme Court at the K-12 level of education. From this time until the decision in 
Tinker in 1969, the federal courts heard but six cases, as indicated below in Table 1. 
(Appendix B lists case names and citations related to numerical values in each cell of 
Table 1.) Of those six, two cases (33.3%) were categorized under the outcome 
“Protecting K-12 Free Expression,” two cases (33.3%) were categorized under the 
outcome “Teaching K-12 Students Appropriate Social Behaviors,” and two cases (33.3%) 
were categorized under the outcome “Protecting the K-12 School System.”  Thus 
restrictions on student speech were upheld in four of the six cases, or 66.6% of the time. 
As may be recalled from the methodology, “Protecting the Well Being of 
Children/Students,” “Teaching Appropriate Social Behaviors,” and “Protecting the 
School System” are understood here to represent the constitutionality of speech 
restrictions. 
The second period of time begins with the U. S. Supreme Court’s holding in 
Tinker that, void a foreseeable material and substantial disruption to the orderly operation 
of schools, students, as persons under the Constitution, should be free to express 
themselves whether in or outside of the classroom. An “undifferentiated fear or 
apprehension” of a material and substantial disruption is not enough to overcome 
students’ First Amendment rights.5 The Court did add a caveat that regulations of speech 
that involved “collision with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone” 
                                                
5 Tinker, supra note 1, at 508. 
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would be permissible.6  Many courts during this time period made a point to discuss the 
material and substantial disruption standard, even while frequently avoiding making 
decisions per this rule.  
 
Table 1: Timeline of Outcomes in K-12 Free Speech Cases 
 
Protecting K-12 
Free Expression 
 
2 (33.3%) 
 
19 (73.1%) 
 
16 (34%) 
Protecting the Well-
Being of K-12 
Children 
 
0 
 
2 (7.7%) 
 
 
2 (4.3%) 
Teaching K-12 
Students Appropriate 
Social Behaviors 
 
2 (33.3%) 
 
1 (3.8%) 
 
2 (4.3%) 
 
O 
U 
T 
C 
O 
M 
E 
S 
 
Protecting the K-12 
School System 
 
2 (33.3%) 
 
4 (15.4%) 
 
 27 (57.4%)   
Total number of case 
outcomes 
 
6 
 
26 
 
47 
 
Total number of 
cases 
 
6 
 
24 
 
47 
 Time Periods:     3/3/40—2/23/69      2/24/69—1/12/88       1/13/88—2011     
 
During this time, there were 26 total case outcomes and 24 total cases. Of the total 
26 cases outcomes, 19 case outcomes (73.1%) were categorized under “Protecting K-12 
Free Expression,” two case outcomes (7.7%) were categorized under “Protecting the 
Well-Being of K-12 Students,” one case (3.8%) was categorized under “Teaching K-12 
Students Acceptable Social Behaviors,” and four case outcomes (15.4%) were 
categorized under “Protecting the K-12 School System.” Thus student restrictions on 
speech were upheld in seven of the total 26 case outcomes, or 27% of the time, and 19 
                                                
6 Id.  
  
 
132 
case outcomes were protective of student speech, or 73% of the time. During this time 
period, the courts almost always ruled in favor of protecting students’ First Amendment 
rights.  
 The third period of time begins with the Hazelwood ruling, in which the Court 
held that if a student activity, in this case a newspaper, was school-sponsored and part of 
the curriculum, it was a non-public forum bearing the imprimatur of the school and could 
be regulated per legitimate pedagogical concerns. The regulation need only be 
reasonable, as distinguished from the only reasonable way to regulate or the most 
reasonable way to regulate the speech at hand.  
During this time, there were 47 total case outcomes and 47 total cases. Sixteen 
cases (34%) were categorized under “Protecting K-12 Free Expression,” two cases 
(4.3%) were categorized under “Protecting the Well-Being of K-12 Students,” two cases 
(4.3%) was categorized under “Teaching K-12 Students Acceptable Social Behaviors,” 
and 27 cases (57.4%) were categorized under “Protecting the K-12 School System.” 
Therefore, restrictions on student speech were upheld in 31 out of 47 cases, or 66% of the 
time, while protection of speech occurred in 16 out of 47 cases, or 34% of the time. Not 
only were many more cases litigated during this time period, but the outcomes also were 
almost the reverse of the second time period, post-Tinker/pre-Hazelwood.  
In addition to case outcomes, rationales that guided court opinions and dominant 
themes discovered within all three time periods also were analyzed. During the first time 
period, one set of cases from the 1940s, one set of cases from 1966, and one case from 
1968 related to the Table 1 data deserve particular attention and will be discussed 
relatively at length because 1) they are historically formative, 2) when read closely, it 
  
 
133 
became clear that one or even a few phrases have greatly impacted future cases in this 
body of law, and 3) they will serve as a demonstration of how case rationales were 
determined.7 Due to the rationales classification system used in this research, this 
explanatory discussion requires some non-sequential references to Tables 4, 2, 5, and 3, 
prior to the main discussion of those tables. The set of cases from the 1940s involved 
student refusals to salute the American flag, and the set from 1966 involved two cases in 
which the concept of substantial and material disruption first emerged, which later would 
form the basis of the Tinker holding.  
The first case was Minersville v. Gobitis8 in 1940, in which the U. S. Supreme 
Court upheld the school’s expulsion of students who refused to salute the flag and to say 
the Pledge of Allegiance. The students were Jehovah’s Witnesses, and their refusal was 
based upon scripture indicating that the law of God was superior to the laws of man. The 
Court discussed at length its belief that “National unity is the basis of national security.”9 
The United States flag represented, according to the Court, that the foundation of any free 
society is based upon national cohesion.  
While the Court expressed deep concern over the conflict between the freedoms 
of religion and expression, it avoided ruling on this basis by instead asserting that 
denying legislatures the ability to craft laws to support national unity was not 
appropriately the domain of the judiciary. Awakening students to political and social 
values was the work of those elected by the people of the states; this case, then, was 
                                                
7 One must bear in mind, however, that these phrases do not necessarily originate in student expression 
cases. The point is, whether or not they first appeared in this body of case law, they were utilized in these 
early cases, and the ideas became influential in later cases. 
 
8 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
 
9 Id. at 595. 
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categorized under the rationale “Awakening students to cultural values,” shown below in 
Table 4. Interestingly, it also reasoned that the legislature clearly indicated its belief in 
the ultimate good of the flag “exercise [as] appropriate in time and place and setting,”10 
which could be viewed as a prelude to the powerful doctrine of “time, place, and 
manner.” The concept of “time, place, and manner” came up first indirectly in the 1939 
case Schneider v. New Jersey,11 in which the Court said some place and manner 
restrictions would be constitutional, but that the ones being litigated in the four combined 
cases under Schneider were not. 
Just three years after Minersville, the U. S. Supreme Court again was called upon 
to decide another case involving students, also Jehovah’s Witnesses, who refused to 
salute the flag. In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,12 the Court, in ruling for 
the students this time, distinguished Barnette from Minersville in two predominant ways. 
The conflict in this case, the Court said, was between authority (specifically, compulsion 
to attend school and, thus, adhere to school rules) and the individual, particularly when 
the freedom does not “bring them into collision with rights asserted by any other 
individual,”13 language that would be modified though taken up in a number of later 
student freedom of expression cases. The Court then stated that the students’ refusal was 
also peaceful and orderly, yet another idea upon which many future cases would be 
decided per the material and substantial disruption rule.  
                                                
10 Id. at 597. 
 
11 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
 
12 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 
13 Id. at 630. 
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The second distinction was grounded in the 1931 ruling in Stromberg v. 
California,14 a case in which the U. S. Supreme Court held that a California statute 
prohibiting the display of red flags, understood as associated with Communism, was 
unconstitutional. In its decision in Barnette, the Court made clear that this case, as in 
Stromberg, required the individual to express a belief, and, more importantly, a political 
belief with which he or she may not agree. “Government of limited power need not be 
anemic government,” the Court wrote. “To enforce those rights [Bill of Rights] today is 
not to choose weak government over strong government. It is only to adhere as a means 
of strength to individual freedom of mind in preference to officially disciplined 
uniformity for which history indicates a disappointing and disastrous end.”15 The Court 
reasoned that requiring students to profess certain beliefs was antithetical to their 
preparation for citizenship, thus this case was driven by the rationale “Preparing students 
for self-governance and citizenship,” as shown in Table 2 below. In further support for 
this choice in rationales, the Court wrote, quite famously, 
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen 
against the State itself and all of its creatures—Boards of Education not 
excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary 
functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of 
Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for 
scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are 
not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount 
important principles of our government as mere platitudes.16 
 
The second set of cases was the first in which the material and substantial 
disruption doctrine emerged. Though it later would be modified by Tinker in that the 
                                                
14 283 U.S. 359 (1931). 
 
15 Barnette, supra note 12, at 637.  
 
16 Id. at 637. 
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Court in Tinker said that schools could restrict speech before the fact if they could 
reasonably forecast a material and substantial disruption, the essence of its holding was 
first enunciated in Blackwell v. Issaquena17 and Burnside v. Byars.18 Both cases were 
decided in 1966 by the Fifth U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, though the cases resulted in 
different outcomes for students. In each case, the court was presented with students 
choosing to wear “freedom buttons” to school in protest of racial segregation. In 
Burnside, the court emphasized that, while schools clearly cannot ignore expression with 
which they disagree, “They cannot infringe on their students' right to free and 
unrestricted expression as guaranteed to them under the First Amendment to the 
Constitution, where the exercise of such rights in the school buildings and schoolrooms 
do not materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate 
discipline in the operation of the school.”19  
Because there was no disruption of this kind, the students’ suspensions were held 
unconstitutional and, therefore, categorized under the rationale “Providing access for all 
voices to be heard,” also shown below in Table 2. In Blackwell, however, the court again 
relied upon its material and disruption test but found that because there had, indeed, been 
a significant amount of disruption caused by the wearing of the freedom buttons, the 
school’s suspension of the students was constitutional. This case, then, was categorized 
under the rationale “Maintaining discipline and order,” shown below in Table 5. 
                                                
17 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 
18 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).  
 
19 Id. at 749.  
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Additionally, the driving rationale in a 1968 case20 was “Protecting the right of 
schools to regulate speech in non-public forums,” as indicated in Table 5. Though the 
opinion does not specifically refer to the school as a “forum,” “limited public forum,” or 
“non-public forum,” the court proceeded to base its decision in large part on the public 
forum case Adderley v. State of Florida,21 for the contention that speech may not be 
“exercised at any time, in any manner, on any state-owned property without regard to the 
primary use which the property has been dedicated.”22 This, then, it would seem, 
indicates the first discussion of how the concept of the “forum” can be a defining aspect 
of decision-making within the student expression body of law.  
Nonetheless, the court also noted, and this is of particular importance given future 
cases emphasizing the right of schools to have greater leeway in regulating speech that is 
part of the curriculum, that, “Even in a special purpose public building such as a high 
school, speech may not be suppressed where it presents absolutely no threat to the state’s 
legitimate interest in providing an orderly, efficient classroom atmosphere.”23 Therefore, 
the driving rationale for this case was classified under “Maintaining Discipline and 
Order.”  
Rationales for Protecting K-12 Student Expression  
In Table 2, there are a number of cells, or rationales, in which there are few-to-no 
entries. As demonstrated in the discussion to follow, however, several of these rationales 
are still included in the courts’ reasoning.  
                                                
20 Scoville v. Board of Ed. of Joliet Tp. HS Dist. 204, County of Will, State of Ill., 286 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. 
Ill. 1968). 
 
21 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
 
22 Scoville, supra note 20, at 991-92. 
 
23 Id. at 991. 
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During the second time period, as shown below in Table 2, the rationale 
“Protecting against overbreadth and/or vagueness” clearly dominated the courts’ 
reasoning when protecting K-12 student expression, with seven case rationales (six total 
cases) driven by overbreadth and/or vagueness (see Appendix C for case names and 
citations). Four of the total six cases dealt with either the content of or distribution 
policies directed at underground newspapers.24 The courts during this time period 
typically dissected school policies rather than apply Tinker to the cases. Indeed, courts in 
13 of the total 24 cases indicated disagreements with and uncertainties about how to 
apply Tinker, particularly as to the extent to which it allowed prior restraint.25   
In fact, the four underground newspaper cases noted above, which were classified 
under “Protecting against overbreadth and/or vagueness,” used this rationale to rule 
unconstitutional prior restraints in each case. They were not classified under “Protecting 
speech from prior restraint” because the courts in all four cases ruled that the prior 
restraint was unconstitutional due to overbreadth and/or vagueness. Three case outcomes 
(two total cases) were classified under “Protecting speech from prior restraints.” 26 
Because there were 19 case outcomes in the second time period categorized under 
“Protecting K-12 Student Expression,” these six cases accounted for 32 percent of all 
case outcomes protective of student expression during this period.  
                                                
24 Fujishima v. Board of Education, 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972); Shanley v. Northeast Ind. Sch. Dist., 
Bexar County, Tex., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972); Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975); 
Quarterman, supra note 2.  
 
25 Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1973); Pliscou v. Holtville Unified School Dist., 411 F.Supp. 842 
(S.D. Cal. 1976); Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville Central School District, 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 
1979); Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. N.Y. 1979); Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200 (4th 
Cir. 1980); Reineke v. Cobb County School District, 484 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Dodd v. Rambis, 
535 F. Supp. 23 (S.D. Ind. 1981); Fujishima, Sullivan, Shanley & Nitzberg, supra note 24. 
 
26 While this rationale was utilized three times, it was used twice in one case. 
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Table 2: Rationales for Protecting K-12 Student Expression 
 
 
Fostering an 
environment of 
robust debate 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
           
Providing access for 
all voices to be 
heard  
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
Preparing students 
for self-governance 
and citizenship 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
Protecting viewpoint 
neutrality 
 
0 
 
0 
 
2 
 
Protecting speech in 
public forums 
 
0 
 
3 
 
1 
 
Protecting speech 
from prior restraint 
 
 
0 
 
 
3 
 
 
5 
Protecting non-
disruptive, off 
campus speech 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
 
3 
 
Protecting against 
overbreadth and/or 
vagueness 
 
0 
 
7 
 
1 
 
Protecting Pure 
Speech 
 
0 
 
2 
 
0 
    Time Periods:          3/3/40—2/23/69       2/24/69—1/12/88        1/13/88—2011     
 
 
One case during this period, and the first of its kind, was driven by the rationale 
“Protecting non-disruptive, off-campus speech.”  In Thomas v. Board of Education, 
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students published a newspaper off-campus (and did not distribute it on campus), which 
was considered by the administration to be obscene.27 Many more cases arose concerning 
off-campus speech in the third time period. And not all of those courts were as friendly as 
the court in Thomas, regarding punishment for off-campus speech, specifically speech 
created on home computers. The court wrote,  
It is not difficult to imagine the lengths to which school authorities could take 
the power they have exercised in the case before us. If they possessed this 
power, it would be within their discretion to suspend a student who purchases 
an issue of National Lampoon, the inspiration for Hard Times [the student-
created newspaper at issue], at a neighborhood newsstand and lends it to a 
school friend. And, it is conceivable that school officials could consign a 
student to a segregated study hall because he and a classmate watched an X-
rated film on his living room cable television.28 
 
The remaining rationales tallied in Table 2, though used minimally, were 
thematically influential within the case law. For instance, 11 of the total 24 cases during 
the second time period included either brief or extended discussions involving the 
rationales “Fostering an environment of robust debate” and “Providing access for all 
voices to be heard,”29 whether or not the courts ultimately decided for or against student 
litigants. Taken together, these two rationales symbolize the marketplace of ideas. Thus 
the courts clearly emphasized the importance that the marketplace of ideas played within 
schools.  
                                                
27 Supra note 25. 
 
28 Id. at 1051. 
 
29 Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. (S.D. NY 1969); Butts v. Dallas Independent School District, 436 F.2d 
728 (5th Cir. 1971); Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education, 40 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971); Bayer v. Kinzler, 
383 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. NY 1974); Sullivan & Shanley supra note 24; Karp, Thomas & Reineke, supra 
note 25; Tinker, supra note 1. 
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Moreover, four of these cases underscored the importance of the rationale 
“Preparing students for self-governance and citizenship.”30 The court in Shanley v. 
Northeast Independent Sch. Dist., Bexar County, Texas, firmly stated the importance of 
both the marketplace of ideas and teaching students to be self-governing citizens during 
this formative time in their lives. Because this passage from the Shanley decision is 
representative of the general tenor during this time period, it will be quoted in full. The 
court wrote,  
It appears off to us that an educational institution would boggle at 
‘controversy’ to such an extent that the mere representation that students 
should become informed of two widely-publicized, widely discussed, and 
significant issues that face the citizenry should prompt the board to stifle the 
content of a student publication. Perhaps newer educational theories have 
become vogue since our day, but our recollection of the learning process is 
that the purpose of education is to spread, not stifle, ideas and views. Ideas in 
their pristine form, touching only the minds and hearts of school children, 
must be freed from despotic dispensation by all men, be they robed as 
academicians or judges or citizen members of a board of education. One of 
the great concerns of our time is that our young people, disillusioned by our 
political processes, are disengaging from political participation. It is most 
important that our young become convinced that our Constitution is a living 
reality, not parchment preserved under glass.31  
 
Another theme that arose during this time period involved the high level of 
litigation involving issues surrounding student newspapers, with four total cases 
involving official newspapers and seven total cases involving underground newspapers.  
Together they represent 11 of the 19 case outcomes listed in Table 2, or 58%, indicating 
strong support for protection of student newspapers, whether school-sponsored or not. 
Two of the three total cases under the rationale “Protecting speech in public forums” 
                                                
30 Eisner, supra note 29; Thomas & Reineke, supra note 25; Tinker, supra note 1. 
 
31 Shanley, supra note 24, at 972-73. 
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were newspaper cases.32 Thus usage of public forum doctrine was slowly creeping into 
the case law. 
In Zucker v. Panitz,33 a group of students formed an “Ad Hoc Student Committee 
Against the War in Vietnam” and planned to place an advertisement in opposition to the 
war in the student newspaper. The school principal directed that it not be published. The 
court wrote, “The gravamen of the dispute concerns the function and content of the 
school newspaper.”34  
The students argued that the newspaper was a forum for the dissemination of 
student ideas while the school considered it an educational tool developed as part of the 
curriculum. As such, the school had in place a rule that “‘no advertising will be permitted 
which expresses a point of view on any subject not related to New Rochelle High 
School.’ Even paid advertising in support of student government nominees is prohibited 
and only purely commercial advertising is accepted.”35 It argued that the war was not a 
“school-related” activity and did not, therefore, qualify for “news, editorial [or] 
advertising treatment.”36 
 The court wrote, “If the Huguenot Herald's contents were truly as flaccid as the 
defendants' argument implies, it would indeed be a sterile publication. Furthermore, its 
function as an educational device surely could not be served if such were the content of 
the paper. However, it is clear that the newspaper is more than a mere activity time and 
                                                
32 Zucker, supra note 29; Gambino v. Fairfax County School Board, 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977).  
 
33 Zucker, supra note 29. 
 
34 Id. at 103. 
 
35 Id.  
 
36 Id.  
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place sheet.”37 The court proceeded to list a number of items previously published that 
involved the war and draft in addition to other meaty fare, such as high school drug use 
and racial violence. The court determined that it was a forum for the dissemination of 
ideas and, absent a material and substantial disruption per Tinker, denying the student 
group access to this forum to advertise on a topic discussed editorially on more than one 
occasion was an unconstitutional infringement of students’ rights.  
The court concluded, “This lawsuit arises at a time when many in the educational 
community oppose the tactics of the young in securing a political voice. It would be both 
incongruous and dangerous for this court to hold that students who wish to express their 
views on matters intimately related to them, through traditionally accepted nondisruptive 
modes of communication, may be precluded from doing so by that same adult 
community.”38 
In Gambino v. Fairfax County School Board,39 the school board refused to allow 
students to publish an article about birth control because 1) it was an “in-house organ” of 
the school, was funded and sponsored by the board, and therefore was not a public forum, 
2) the students were a captive audience, language that would be taken up nine years later 
in Bethel v. Fraser,40 and 3) “even if the newspaper itself is subject to the first 
amendment protection, the article is not protected because its publication would 
                                                
37 Id.  
 
38 Id. at 105. 
 
39 Supra note 32. 
 
40 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
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undermine a valid school policy which prohibits the teaching of birth control as part of 
the curriculum.”41 
The Fourth U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s findings that 
the newspaper was created as a public forum for student expression and, therefore, was 
protected by the First Amendment; that students are not a captive audience merely 
because their attendance is compulsory; and because the newspaper was considered a 
public forum, it could not be viewed as part of the curriculum, thereby barring the board 
from determining the newspaper’s content.  
During the third time period, which begins with Hazelwood, the rationale 
“Protecting speech from prior restraint” stands out from the rest of the rationales. A total 
of three cases involved distribution of literature, two of which were underground 
newspapers.42  
Also noteworthy is the rationale “Protecting non-disruptive, off-campus speech.” 
All three cases involved online materials that students created on their home computers. 
They included a fake and derogatory Internet profile of the school Principal43; another 
profile of a school principal depicting him as a sex addict and pedophile44; and a Web site 
ridiculing a group of students, the use of much profanity, and, as the court noted, “a 
                                                
41 Supra note 32, at 158. 
 
42 Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1988); Nelson v. Moline Sch. Dist. No. 40, 725 F. Supp 965 
(C.D. Ill. 1989); Rivera v. East Otero School District R-1, 721 F. Supp. 1189, 1194 (D. Colo. 1989). 
 
43 Layshock v. Hermitage School Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011).  
 
44 J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 08-4138 (3d Cir. June 13, 2011) (Slip Opinion). 
 
  
 
145 
depressingly high number of spelling and grammatical errors.”45 Each student’s case was 
protected under the Tinker standard.  
As the Third U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Layshock v. Hermitage School 
District noted, discussing Tinker,  
The school district’s only interest in banning the speech had been the ‘mere 
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an 
unpopular viewpoint’ or ‘an urgent wish to avoid the controversy which 
might result from the expression.’ The Court held that this interest was not 
enough to justify banning ‘a silent, passive expression of opinion, 
unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance.’46  
 
The Third Circuit also decided another of these three cases, J. S. v. Blue Mountain, and, 
as will be demonstrated in the discussion relating to “Table 5: Rationales for Protecting 
the School System,” this produced a circuit court split among the Third, Second, and 
Fourth Circuits as to the constitutionality of schools policing students’ off-campus 
speech. The U. S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in all cases in January 2012.  
 
Rationales for Protecting the Well-Being of K-12 Students  
As shown below in Table 3, no cases during the first time period, two cases 
during the second time period, and two cases during the third time period were driven by 
rationales for “Protecting the Well-Being of K-12 Students. The primary rationale that 
stands out was “Considering the sensitivity of topics” in the second time period. These 
cases dealt with 1) an attempt by students to distribute a sex questionnaire to 11th and 12th 
grade students in 1977 and 2) an advertisement in an underground newspaper, in 1980, 
for a “head shop.”   
                                                
45 Coy v. Board of Education of North Canton Schools, 205. F. Supp.2d 791, 795 (N.D. Ohio 2002). 
 
46 Layshock, supra note 43, at 212 (quoting Tinker, supra note 1). 
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Table 3: Rationales for Protecting the Well-Being of K-12 Students 
 
 
Taking age into 
consideration 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
Recognizing that 
students are often a 
“captive audience” 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Considering the 
sensitivity of topics 
 
0 
 
2 
 
1 
   Time Periods:           3/3/40—2/23/69      2/24/69—1/12/88        1/13/88—2011     
 
 
Another theme arose when it was observed that so few cases were categorized 
relating to age and maturity, while a reading of the case law made it clear that these 
factors were no doubt significant influences in many cases, particularly post-Hazelwood.  
Discussions in 36 of the total 47 cases during the third time period included the Tinker 
Court’s famous quote, “It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”47  
In 22 of these 36 cases, the courts then quoted the U. S. Supreme Court case 
Bethel v. Fraser in saying, “… the constitutional rights of students in public school are 
not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,” 48 signaling 
these courts’ perspective that age was indeed a factor in their decision-making. Moreover, 
courts regularly discussed the need for schools, in their in loco parentis role (whether 
                                                
47 Tinker, supra note 1, at 506. 
 
48 Supra note 40, at 682. 
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they specifically used this terminology or not), to manage their schools such that cases 
need not even reach the judiciary.  
 
Rationales for Teaching K-12 Students Acceptable Social Behaviors  
 
  In Table 4, below, rationales for teaching K-12 students acceptable social 
behaviors again rarely drove judicial decision-making. Interestingly, however, all three 
cases were U. S. Supreme Court cases, and the Court infrequently hears student 
expression cases. As discussed above, West Virginia v. Barnette49 during the first time 
period accounted for the one rationale dealing with “Awakening students to cultural 
values.” Bethel50 involved a student delivering a lewd and vulgar speech at a school 
assembly and accounted for the single instance of a K-12 case driven by “Teaching the 
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.” Finally, in the third time period, the Court 
held in Morse v. Frederick51 that a student’s display of a banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 
JESUS” at a school-sponsored, off-campus event could be regulated by school 
administrators. The greater part of the majority opinion dealt with the Court’s grave 
concerns about K-12 students using drugs, which it felt the banner promoted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
49 Supra note 12. 
 
50 Supra note 40. 
 
51 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
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Table 4: Rationales for Teaching K-12 Students Acceptable Social Behaviors 
 
 
Teaching civility 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Teaching good taste 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
Teaching the 
boundaries of 
socially appropriate 
behavior 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
Awakening students 
to cultural values 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
  Time Periods:            3/3/40—2/23/69      2/24/69—1/12/88       1/13/88—2011     
 
  
Rationales for Protecting the K-12 School System 
As indicated in Table 5, below, during the first two time periods analyzed, the 
courts’ reasoning and outcomes rarely involved protecting K-12 school systems. During 
the first and second time periods, in fact, the courts repeatedly lectured schools about 
both allowing the issues to reach the judiciary and the importance of not misconstruing 
case outcomes adverse to students so as to further regulate speech. In 1152 of the total 30 
cases for these time periods, the courts included comments such as the following: 
In Nitzberg v. Parks, the court wrote,  
This is the third time that this circuit has been confronted with the free speech 
aspects of secondary public school regulations and found it necessary to 
                                                
52 Stanton v. Brunswick School Department, 577 F. Supp. 1560 (D. Me. 1984); Shanley, Nitzberg & 
Sullivan, supra note 24; Dodd, Pliscou & Thomas, supra note 25; Zucker & Eisner, supra note 29; 
Blackwell, supra note 17; Burnside, supra note 18. 
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intervene in the conduct of such matters by the local school authorities. We 
deplore this, as was said in the first case ‘because it is not the policy of 
Federal Courts to intervene in the resolution of conflicts which naturally arise 
in the daily operation of the school systems.’53  
 
In Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education, the court recognized that the case was 
“following in the choppy waters left by Tinker,”54 but continued to say, “It is to 
everyone’s advantage that decisions with respect to the operation of local schools be 
made by local officials. The greater the generosity of the Board in fostering – not merely 
tolerating – students’ free exercise of their constitutional rights, the less likely it will be 
that local officials will find their rulings subjected to unwieldy constitutional litigation.”55 
And in Dodd v. Rambis, a case in which the court upheld the school’s speech regulation, 
the court wrote, “It is hopeful that this decision will not be interpreted so as to result in a 
‘chilling effect’ on students advocating constitutionally protected conduct. On the other 
hand, the Court does not intend that this ruling shall give to the school officials a license 
or invitation to prohibit conduct that is constitutionally protected.”56  
By the third time period, such proclamations were rare, though courts continued 
to emphasize that schools were vested with the authority to “prescribe and control 
conduct” per Tinker.57 Barely a court upholding a school’s regulation of speech in this 
period did not include this language within its ruling. While no cases are listed under the 
rationale “Avoiding controversy,” it is certainly a theme as the discussion below 
                                                
53 Supra note 24, at 384. 
 
54 Supra note 29, at 807. 
 
55 Id. at 809. 
 
56 Supra note 25, at 31. 
 
57 Tinker, supra note 1, at 507. 
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suggests, and the case law reads. Schools were assuredly concerned with deterring 
controversy within and outside of school.  
 
 
Table 5: Rationales for Protecting K-12 School Systems 
 
 
Avoiding controversy 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Protecting the right of 
schools to regulate 
speech in non-public 
forums 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
2 
 
Maintaining 
discipline and order 
 
2 
 
2 
 
14 
Confirming the right 
of school to speak for 
itself/control its 
message 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
Controlling the 
curriculum 
 
0 
 
0 
 
3 
 
Promulgating 
reasonable rules and 
conduct 
 
 
0 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 
Controlling 
expression in school-
sponsored activities 
 
0 
 
0 
 
7 
   Time Periods:    3/3/40—2/23/69      2/24/69—1/12/88         1/13/88—2011     
 
As is evident in Table 5, the courts readily upheld school restrictions designed to 
maintain discipline and order and to control expression in school-sponsored activities. 
The latter is the direct result of the Hazelwood holding and gives schools extraordinary 
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power to regulate speech if it is part of the curriculum, and, therefore, school-sponsored. 
While only one case was driven by the rationale “Confirming the right of the school to 
speak for itself/control its message,” this rationale is inextricably tied to Hazelwood in 
that the Hazelwood Court said if the public might perceive the speech to bear the 
imprimatur of the school, it is school-sponsored speech subject to regulations that need 
only be reasonable, as discussed above. It is also tied to the rationale “Controlling the 
curriculum,” in that all three cases utilized parts of Hazelwood to uphold restrictions on 
speech within the classroom. 
Of the 14 cases under the rationale “Maintaining discipline and order,” eight 
related to students’ apparel, notably t-shirts, hats, and belt buckles with the confederate 
flag.58 When schools were able to demonstrate a history of racial tension and/or violence, 
the courts always upheld school rules regulating wearing items that might reasonably 
create a Tinker-level material and substantial disturbance, even if none occurred as a 
direct result of the student’s choice in clothing. When schools were unable to demonstrate 
a history of disturbance, the courts almost universally ruled that the dress codes were 
unconstitutional.  
Three other cases involved student-created online material produced in the privacy 
of their homes. In these cases, students’ punishments were found to be constitutional and 
were categorized under the rationale “Maintaining discipline and order.”  
                                                
58 Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua Cty., 324 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2003); Governor Wentworth Reg. Sch. V. 
Hendrickson, 421 F. Supp.2d 410 (D. N.H. 2006); BWA v. Farmington R-7 School Dist., 508 F. Supp. 2d 
740 (E.D. Miss. 2007); Wisniewiewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Central Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34 
(2d Cir. 2007); A.M. ex rel. McAllum v. Cash, 585 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 2009); Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick v. 
Heyward, 674 F. Supp.2d 725 (D. S.C. 2009); Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2010). 
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In Wisniewiewski v. Board of Education,59 an eighth-grader created an instant 
messaging icon suggesting that a particular teacher would be shot and killed. The Second 
U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the student’s suspension per Tinker’s material and 
substantial disruption standard.60 In Doninger v. Niehoff, a student called school officials 
“douchebags” on LiveJournal and told other students to call an administrator to “piss her 
off more.”61 Again, the Second Circuit ruled against the student’s speech, asserting that 
because the administrator received numerous phone calls and e-mails in addition to much 
student talk on-campus about the issue, the school was justified, per the Tinker disruption 
standard, in refusing to allow her to run for class secretary.  
Finally, in the 2011 case Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools,62 a student created a 
Web page on MySpace accusing another student of having a sexually transmitted disease. 
Also applying the Tinker standard, the Fourth U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals wrote,  
Kowalski indeed pushed her computer's keys in her home, but she knew that 
the electronic response would be, as it in fact was, published beyond her 
home and could reasonably be expected to reach the school or impact the 
school environment. She also knew that the dialogue would and did take 
place among Musselman High School students whom she invited to join the 
"S.A.S.H." group and that the fallout from her conduct and the speech within 
the group would be felt in the school itself. … There is surely a limit to the 
scope of a high school's interest in the order, safety, and well-being of its 
students when the speech at issue originates outside the schoolhouse gate. 
But we need not fully define that limit here, as we are satisfied that the nexus 
of Kowalski's speech to Musselman High School's pedagogical interests was 
sufficiently strong to justify the action taken by school officials in carrying 
out their role as the trustees of the student body's well-being.63  
 
                                                
59 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 
60 Id. 
 
61 527 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 
62 652 F. 3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 
63 Id. at 573. 
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Thus as mentioned above, the Second and Fourth Circuits upheld school punishment of 
students’ online material created in their homes and the Third Circuit struck down 
punishments in two cases involving the same.  
A final observation is fitting as a conclusion to this section of the findings. Courts 
in seven cases during this period employed and discussed, sometimes at length, a specific 
section of Justice Black’s dissent in Tinker as part of their reasoning for upholding speech 
restrictions.64 Four of these cases incidentally were decided by U. S. Circuit Courts of 
Appeals. Justice Black wrote, and these courts quoted and expanded upon this statement: 
“I wish therefore, . . . to disclaim any purpose . . . to hold that the Federal Constitution 
compels the teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender control of the 
American public school system to public school students.”65  
As shown below in Table 6, “Content of Student-Published Works” and “Speech 
Plus” were significant drivers of all case outcomes during the second time period. This 
largely was due to, respectively, the high number of newspaper cases that were regulated 
due to content and the high number of newspaper cases in which distribution of the 
newspapers was the primary issue. 
During the third time period, the types of speech were more evenly distributed 
than in the second time period; however, “Content of Student-Published Works” and 
“Symbolic Speech” constituted the majority of speech types. During this time period, the 
“Content of Student-Published Works” included a wider variety of materials, such as 
newspapers, underground newspapers, and Internet postings, Web pages, and profiles. 
                                                
64 Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989); Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse School, 98 F.3d 1530 
(7th Cir. 1996); Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002); Governor, Lowery, 
BWA & Hardwick, supra note 58. 
 
65 Tinker, supra note 1, at 419. 
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The vast majority of the speech accounted for under “Symbolic Speech” included apparel 
with the confederate flag, in addition to a handful of other designs and statements. 
 
Table 6: K-12 Case Categories 
 
 
Content of Student-
Published Works 
 
2 (33.3%) 
 
12 (46.2%) 
 
18 (38.3%) 
 
Verbalizations 
 
0 
 
1 (3.8%) 
 
5 (10.6%) 
 
Symbolic Speech 
 
2 (33.3%) 
 
2 (7.7%) 
 
14 (29.9%) 
 
Speech Plus 
 
0 
 
11 (42.3%) 
 
5 (10.6%) 
 
Funding 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Miscellaneous 
 
2 (33.3%) 
 
0 
 
5 (10.6%) 
      Time Periods:    3/3/40—2/23/69            2/24/69—1/12/88        1/13/88—2011     
 
 
POST-SECONDARY FREE EXPRESSION CASE LAW 
Overall, 43 post-secondary cases in this study were analyzed, with four being 
decided in the first time period, 21 being decided during the second time period, and 18 
being decided during the third time period, as shown below in Table 7. 
August 31, 1967, marked the first federal-level freedom of expression  
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post-secondary case,66 and all four cases (100.0%) in this time period were categorized 
under the outcome “Protecting Post-Secondary Student Expression.”  
 
 
Table 7: Timeline of Outcomes in Post-Secondary Free Speech Cases 
 
Protecting Post-
Secondary Student 
Expression 
 
 
4 (100%) 
 
16 (72.7%) 
 
14 (64.5%) 
Protecting Well-
Being of Post-
Secondary Students 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
Teaching Post-
Secondary Students 
Appropriate Social 
Behaviors 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
 
O 
U 
T 
C 
O 
M 
E 
S 
 
Protecting the Post-
Secondary School 
System 
 
 
0 
 
6 (27.3%) 
 
8 (36.5%) 
Total number of case 
outcomes 
 
4 
 
22 
 
22 
 
Total number of 
cases 
 
4 
 
21 
 
18 
          Time Periods:                 3/3/40—2/23/69      2/24/69—1/12/88      1/13/88—2011     
 
 
 During the second time period, there were 22 total case outcomes and 21 total 
cases. Of the total case outcomes, 16 (72.7%) were categorized under “Protecting Post-
Secondary Student Expression,” and the remaining six cases (27.3%) were categorized 
under “Protecting the Post-Secondary School System.” Protection of speech was upheld 
in 16 of the total 22 case outcomes, or 73% of the time. 
                                                
66 Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.C. S.C. 1967). 
  
 
156 
 During the third time period, there were 22 total case outcomes and 18 total cases. 
Of the total case outcomes, 14 case outcomes (64.5%) were categorized under 
“Protecting Post-Secondary Student Expression,” and the remaining eight case outcomes 
were categorized under “Protecting the Post-Secondary School System” (36.5%). 
Protection of speech was upheld in 14 of the total 22 case outcomes, or 65% of the time, 
which is roughly a 10% drop from the second time period. (Appendix D lists case names 
and citations related to numerical values in each cell of Table 7.) 
 
Rationales for Protecting Post-Secondary Student Expression 
 
 As shown in Table 8 below, during the first time period one case was driven by 
the rationale, “Protecting speech from prior restraint,” two cases were driven by the 
rationale, “Protecting speech from overbreadth and/or vagueness,” and one case was 
driven by the rationale “Protecting pure speech.” These four early cases began to lay the 
groundwork for protecting student speech, though stated expressions of support for 
students’ First Amendment rights were found in only one case. The other three cases 
were decided based upon established First Amendment principles and precedent, as 
demonstrated below in their discussion.  
 In the first case heard by the federal judiciary at the post-secondary level of 
education, Hammond v. South Carolina State College,67 numerous students demonstrated 
on campus to reject unspecified practices of the college. In place were rules prohibiting 
students from having celebrations, parades, or demonstrations without prior approval. 
Following the students’ indefinite suspension, they sued for violation of their First 
Amendment rights.  
                                                
67 Id.  
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Table 8: Rationales for Protecting Post-Secondary Student Expression 
 
 
Fostering an 
environment of 
robust debate 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
           
Providing access for 
all voices to be 
heard  
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
2 
 
 
2 
Preparing students 
for self-governance 
and citizenship 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Protecting viewpoint 
neutrality 
 
0 
 
6 
 
2 
Protecting speech in 
public or limited 
public forums 
 
0 
 
2 
 
6 
Determining that age 
and maturity require 
special consideration 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Protecting speech 
from prior restraint 
 
 
1 
 
 
3 
 
 
0 
 
Protecting speech 
from overbreadth 
and/or vagueness 
 
2 
 
0 
 
4 
 
Protecting Pure 
Speech 
 
1 
 
2 
 
0 
   Time Periods:          3/3/40—2/23/69      2/24/69—1/12/88        1/13/88—2011     
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In its decision, the court firmly recognized the rights of the college when it wrote, 
“Unless the [school] officials have authority to keep order, they have no power to 
guarantee education. If they cannot preserve order by rule and regulation, and insist on 
obedience to those rules, they will be helpless in the face of the mob, powerless to 
command or rebuke the fanatic, the irritant, the malingerer, the rabble rouser.”68  
While the court also recognized fundamental First Amendment values generally, 
it made no mention of the First Amendment rights of students specifically. Its ruling was 
based upon the idea that the right to assemble should not be restricted absent a “clear and 
present danger, of riot, disorder, or immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order,”69 
per Dennis v. United States.70 The rules in place requiring prior approval did not meet 
this standard and were considered an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. 
The second case, Dickey v. Alabama State Board of Education,71 was the first 
federal level, post-secondary newspaper case of many more to come in the second time 
period. The student editor at Troy State College, Dickey, was censored from publishing 
an article that not only criticized the state governor in his handling of a matter relating to 
prior censorship of another publication but also supported the university’s president in his 
repudiation of this censorship. Dickey’s faculty adviser and the president of the college 
told him he could not publish the editorial because a rule was in place at the college that 
prohibited criticism of the Governor or state legislature. The court wrote, “The rule has 
                                                
68 Id. at 949. 
 
69 Id. at 950. 
 
70 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (The U.S. Supreme Court upheld prohibitions on the advocacy to overthrow the 
government absent a clear and present danger). 
 
71 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (While this case was appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
the court found the case moot because Dickey had decided not to re-enroll at the college, thus the federal 
district court case still governs.). 
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been referred to in this case as the ‘Adams Rule.’ The theory of the rule, as this Court 
understands it, is that Troy State College is a public institution owned by the State of 
Alabama, that the Governor and the legislators are acting for the owner and control the 
purse strings, and that for that reason neither the Governor nor the Legislature could be 
criticized.”72    
Dickey ignored the faculty adviser and President, to a point, when he inserted a 
blank space under the proposed editorial’s headline and printed “Censored” diagonally 
across the blank space. He subsequently was suspended from the college for one year due 
to insubordination. The court began its discussion by writing,  
It is basic in our law in this country that the privilege to communicate 
concerning a matter of public interest is embraced in the First Amendment 
right relating to freedom of speech and is constitutionally protected against 
infringement by state officials. The Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution protects these First Amendment rights from state infringement, 
and these First Amendment rights extend to school children and students 
insofar as unreasonable rules are concerned. Boards of education, presidents 
of colleges, and faculty advisers are not excepted from the rule that protects 
students against unreasonable rules and regulations.73 
 
The court recognized that colleges needed to be able to maintain order; however, the 
rules they create for achieving this end must be reasonable. It found that the rule in 
question, absent any showing of disruption per Burnside, that resulted in Dickey’s 
suspension was unreasonable and, then, unconstitutional. The court further wrote, “The 
attempt to characterize Dickey's conduct, and the basis for their action in expelling him, 
as ‘insubordination’ requiring rather severe disciplinary action, does not disguise the 
basic fact that Dickey was expelled from Troy State College for exercising his 
                                                
72 Id. at 616. 
 
73 Id. at 617 (citing Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) & Barnette, supra note 12). 
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constitutionally guaranteed right of academic and/or political expression.”74 This case 
was classified under the rationale “Protecting pure speech” and was the first to declare 
that post-secondary students had First Amendment rights on campus. 
The third case, Snyder v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill.,75 was driven by the 
rationale “Protecting speech from overbreadth and/or vagueness.” At issue was the 
university’s repeated denial of an official student organization’s request to invite a 
Communist to speak on campus, unless the students and their faculty adviser could 
ensure the speaker “will not carry on, advertise or publicize the subversive and seditious 
activities of the Communist Party, U.S.A., and that, to the best of (your) knowledge, no 
violation of law will occur in connection with the speech.”76 At the time, the Clabaugh 
Act was in effect in Illinois, and it prohibited universities from allowing such speakers to 
use their facilities for publicizing or “carrying on” their subversive activities and 
ideologies.  
The court began by citing the public forum case Adderley v. Florida,77 to support 
the contention that public universities and their facilities are for the purpose of education 
and, as such, officials reasonably can regulate the time and manner of speech on 
government property. It went on to note that the university had an open-door policy 
regarding student organizations’ invitations to speakers, but that this organization’s 
speaker was denied due to viewpoint, which is in conflict with First Amendment 
principles. Once the school chose to create a speech activity (or forum), it could not then 
                                                
74 Id. at 618. 
 
75 286 F. Supp. 927 (E.D. Ill. 1968). 
 
76 Id. at 930. 
 
77 Supra note 21. 
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ban certain participants (or certain types of speech) based upon viewpoint. This would 
become a major theme found in the newspaper cases during the second time period. 
It then determined that the statute forbidding such speakers was unconstitutionally 
vague and broad because it “lacks the precision of language required for a statute 
regulating an area so closely intertwined with First Amendment liberties … and because 
it lacks the procedural safeguards required for a form of regulation amounting to 
censorship.”78 As such, it was an unjustifiable prior restraint of speech, also void under 
the Dennis79 rule stating there must be a clear and present danger of substantive evil 
before restricting speech. “The Supreme Court has consistently maintained this hostile 
attitude toward prior restraints,” the court noted.80  
While the court said that the First Amendment was in large part designed to 
prevent such suppression of political viewpoints in the marketplace of ideas, it, like the 
court in Hammond, made no mention of students’ First Amendment rights. Indeed, it 
concluded with, “We wish to emphasize that we do not by our decision today limit in any 
way the legitimate interest of the University officials in protecting the primary function 
of a state supported higher educational institution.”81 
The final case during this formative time period was Dickson v. Sitterson,82 which 
also involved the denial of a student organization’s speaker request. The denial resulted 
from university rules drafted to align with a North Carolina statute prohibiting 
                                                
78 Supra note 75, at 933. 
 
79 Supra note 70. 
 
80 Supra note 75, at 934. 
 
81 Id. at 937. 
 
82 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D. N.C. 1968). 
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Communist or other subversive speakers from utilizing the University of North 
Carolina’s facilities. The court began its discussion by saying,  
This Court is not blind to world affairs, and can understand and appreciate 
the vital concern of the people of the State of North Carolina over the 
unregulated appearance of dedicated members of the Communist Party on the 
campuses of its State-supported institutions. The record in this case clearly 
establishes that the Communist conspiracy is dedicated to the destruction of 
freedom, and attempts to achieve its goals of world conquest through discord, 
deceit and untruths. The record further establishes that the use of college 
campuses affords the Communist Party with an optimum chance of reaching 
and influencing a maximum number of young people. Certainly, the State is 
under no obligation to provide a sanctuary for the Communist Party, or a 
platform for propagandizing its creed.83 
 
Nonetheless, the court found the state statute and the university’s rules pertaining to such 
speakers unconstitutionally vague. Again, however, there was no discussion of students’ 
First Amendment rights. In fact, the court wrote, “Institutions of higher learning are 
engaged in the education of students, rather than satisfying their whimsical curiosity.”84 
 During the second time period, the mood began to shift in that courts not only 
discussed students’ First Amendment rights but also began both to acknowledge and to 
use the U. S. Supreme Court’s holding in Tinker as support and precedent for their 
decision-making. Instead of picking apart school policies, as was done during this time 
period at the K-12 level of education, courts instead typically utilized the principles set 
forth in Tinker. This likely accounted for no entries under the rationale “Protecting 
speech from overbreadth and/or vagueness.” In roughly half, or 11 of the total 21 cases 
during this period, courts at all levels of the federal judiciary cited and/or discussed 
                                                
83 Id. at 497. 
 
84 Id.  
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Tinker as part of their reasoning for protecting post-secondary students’ rights.85 This 
theme will be illustrated by analyzing one case from each level of the federal judiciary 
that utilized Tinker to support protecting post-secondary student freedom of expression.  
As early as April 1969, just three months after the Court decided Tinker, the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Tennessee decided the case Smith 
v. Univ. of Tenn.86 At issue was the university’s refusal to allow two well-known though 
controversial speakers to participate in a lecture series. Part of its discussion of Tinker 
was as follows: “The [U. S. Supreme] Court indicated that the area in which school 
officials may limit free speech is confined to speech that ‘would materially and 
substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.’”87 The court did not go on to 
distinguish Tinker (as a K-12) case from the post-secondary case with which it dealt. In 
fact, it proceeded to use the case as precedent, along with another non-school-related 
case, to find four of the contested school guidelines concerning speakers unconstitutional. 
It wrote, “This [specific aspects of the policy guidelines] vests in the administrative 
officials discretion to grant or withhold a permit upon criteria unrelated to proper 
regulation of school facilities and is impermissible.”88 
                                                
85 Smith v. Univ. of Tenn., 300 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Tenn. 1969); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 
(D. Mass. 1970); Channing Club v. Board of Regents of Texas Tech University, 317 F. Supp. 688 (N.D. 
Tex. 1970); Korn v. Elkins 317 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1970); University of So. Miss. Chapter of the Miss. 
Civil Liberties Union v. University of So. Miss., 452 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1971); Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. 
Supp. 1266 (D. Col. 1971); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 
1973); Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1973); Joyner v. Whiting, 
477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
 
86 Supra note 85. 
 
87 Id. at 781. 
 
88 Id. at 783. 
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In University of So. Miss. Chapter of the Miss. Civil Liberties Union v. University 
of So. Miss.,89 the Fifth U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals cited and relied upon Tinker six 
times during its discussion of the constitutionality of the university’s denial of official 
recognition of the University of Southern Mississippi Chapter of the Mississippi Civil 
Liberties Union. As in Smith, the court did not concern itself with Tinker being decided at 
the K-12 level of education. In its first and second citations of Tinker, it wrote, “It is no 
longer a serious contention that ‘either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights 
to freedom of speech or expression at the school-house gate.’ … Student rights of free 
expression may be prohibited only if they ‘materially and substantially [interfere] with 
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.’”90   
Next, analogizing restrictions on the organization’s meetings to “speaker bans” 
that restrict certain speakers based upon viewpoint, the court wrote, “To sustain such 
censorial practices, a University would at the very least have to demonstrate a strong 
probability of the kind of material disruption spoken of in the Tinker case.”91 It 
continued, “Serious, bona fide litigation carried on by a minority group as a peaceful 
means of guaranteeing its rights in a larger community is a form of expression and 
association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. … As such, it cannot 
serve as a justification for keeping the Civil Liberties Union off the campus of the 
University unless the litigation itself would result in the kind of disruption spelled out in 
Tinker.”92  
                                                
89 Supra note 85. 
 
90 Id. at 566 (also quoting Burnside, supra note 18). 
 
91 Id. at 567. 
 
92 Id. (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)). 
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In warning the university against allowing concerns about student litigation to 
become restrictions on fundamental First Amendment rights, the court wrote, 
…in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not 
enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any departure from 
absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the majority's 
opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on 
the campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start an 
argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this 
risk; and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom – this kind 
of openness – that is the basis of our national strength and of the 
independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively 
permissive, often disputatious, society.93 
 
 Finally, the U. S. Supreme Court’s usage of Tinker in Widmar v. Vincent94 will be 
discussed. While the Court did not rely as heavily on Tinker in its decision-making as 
other cases did, including those not discussed, it cited Tinker, in addition to its own 
decisions in Healy v. James95 and Shelton v. Tucker,96 for the pronouncement that the 
First Amendment extends to the college campus. While this might seem obvious given 
the above case discussions, it is significant because it came from the U. S. Supreme 
Court, which wrote, “The University's institutional mission, which it describes as 
providing a ‘secular education’ to its students … does not exempt its actions from 
constitutional scrutiny. With respect to persons entitled to be there, our cases leave no 
                                                
93 Id.  
 
94 Supra note 85. 
 
95 Id. 
 
96  546 U.S. 899 (1960) (The Court struck down an Arkansas statute requiring all state-operated university 
and college professors to sign a statement indicating all organizations of which they were members. The 
statute was designed to determine the fitness of professors based upon their ideologies and potential 
associations with subversive organizations or parties.). 
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doubt that the First Amendment rights of speech and association extend to the campuses 
of state universities.”97  
At issue was the university’s refusal to allow a student group to continue to use its 
buildings for meetings. The group was of a religious nature, and the university feared 
entanglement with the Establishment Clause. The Court wrote, “Through its policy of 
accommodating their [all student groups] meetings, the University has created a forum 
generally open for use by student groups. Having done so, the University has assumed an 
obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable constitutional 
norms.”98 Religion was not a constitutionally valid reason, according to the Court.  
While the Court acknowledged the university’s academic freedom to determine 
“who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to 
study"99 and its right to "make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce 
resources," in order to justify such a content-based exclusion, the university would have 
to demonstrate a compelling state interest that was narrowly tailored.100 In other words, it 
would have to survive strict scrutiny as is required per public forum doctrine when the 
exclusion is content- or viewpoint-based. Recognizing the university’s concerns about its 
association with religion, Justice Lewis Powell wrote, “… this Court has explained that a 
religious organization's enjoyment of merely ‘incidental’ benefits does not violate the 
prohibition against the ‘primary advancement’ of religion.”101 Furthermore, an “open 
                                                
97 Id. at 269.  
 
98 Supra note 85. 
 
99 Id. at 277. 
 
100 Id. at 270 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461, 464-465 (1980)). 
 
101 Id. at 274 (citing Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413  
  
 
167 
forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious 
sects or practices.”102 Additionally, the large number of student organizations that were 
non-religious indicated its overall secular effect.  “If the Establishment Clause barred the 
extension of general benefits to religious groups, ‘a church could not be protected by the 
police and fire departments or have its public sidewalk kept in repair,’” he wrote.103 This 
case would serve as weighty precedent during the third time period in cases involving 
student organizations.  
Five cases explicitly referred to speech as being or as being a part of a “forum,” 
which was understood during this time to be what is now called an open public forum.104 
And in 11 of the total 21 cases, courts said that once an activity or forum has been 
created/opened, schools cannot shut out certain forms of speech or certain speakers based 
upon either their viewpoints or the content of their speech. Thus while there were only 
three entries in the rationale category “Protecting speech in public or limited public 
forums,” public forum principles were clear in 11 cases.105  
Additionally, courts were uniform in their belief that these “forums” remained 
forums for student free expression regardless of how they were funded, which would not 
be true in all cases during the third time period, following the ruling in Hazelwood. The 
court in Antonelli v. Hammond wrote, “We are well beyond the belief that any manner of 
                                                                                                                                            
U.S. 756 (1973), Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736 (1976), Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 
734 (1973) & McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 422 (1961)). 
 
102 Id.  
 
103 Id. at 274-75 (quoting Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736 (1976)). 
 
104 Sword v. Fox, F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1971); Thonen v. Jenkins, 491 F.2d 722 (4th Cir. 1973); Arrington v. 
Taylor, 380 F. Supp. 1348 (M.D. N.C. 1974); Antonelli & Trujillo, supra note 85.  
 
105 Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969); Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 
1975); Antonelli, Bazaar, Trujillo, Joyner, & Widmar, supra note 85; Thonen, Arrington & Sword, supra 
note 104. 
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state regulation is permissible simply because it involves an activity which is part of the 
university structure and is financed with funds controlled by the administration [most 
were at this time]; The state is not necessarily the unrestrained master of what it creates 
and fosters … the creation of the form does not also give birth to the power to mold its 
substance.”106 
 As the data in Table 8 also show, six cases were classified under the rationale 
“Protecting viewpoint neutrality.” Five of these cases involved student punishment for 
the content of student newspapers, with one paper being an “underground newspaper.”107 
The sixth case involved the administration withholding funding for a student newspaper 
based upon its content.108  
The six newspaper cases above represent six of the total 10 cases litigated 
involving newspapers; therefore, cases involving newspapers accounted for 48% of the 
total 21 cases during this time period. In all cases, the courts struck down regulations of 
or student punishment for the content or distribution of the newspapers. While these cases 
spawned several rationales, with six cases categorized under “Protecting viewpoint 
neutrality,”109 two cases categorized under the rationale, “Protecting pure speech,” one 
case categorized under the rationale “Protecting speech from prior restraint,”110 and one 
case categorized under the rationale “Protecting speech in public or limited public 
                                                
106 Supra note 85, at 1337. 
 
107 Papish, Channing Club & Joyner, supra note 85; Thonen supra 104; Schiff, supra note 105.  
 
108 Stanley v. McGrath, 719 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1983). 
 
109 Papish, Channing Club & Joyner, supra note 85; Thonen, supra note 104; Schiff, supra note 105; 
Stanley, supra note 108.  
 
110 Antonelli, supra note 85.  
  
 
169 
forums,”111 three themes emerged that crossed rationale categories. Courts 1) expressed 
repugnance toward restricting speech based upon claims of indecency, 2) indicated an 
equal distaste toward administrators restricting speech based upon controversial content, 
and 3) never, during this time period, allowed administrators to use the power of the 
purse to unconstitutionally censor student newspapers, which at this time typically were 
assumed to be open forums regardless of funding or association with the curriculum. 
These newspaper cases account for roughly half of all cases, case outcomes, and 
rationales; involve four of the nine total rationale categories; and highlight the themes 
discussed above. One case per theme will be discussed below. 
In Thonen v. Jenkins, two student editors were expelled after publishing in the 
school newspaper a letter “critical of parietal regulations and ended with a ‘four-letter’ 
vulgarity referring to the president of the university.”112 In striking down the expulsion, 
the Fourth U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals wrote,  
The record reveals that university officials undertook to deny these college 
students the right to continue their education because one word in an 
otherwise unexceptionable letter on a matter of campus interest was deemed 
offensive to good taste. On at least one prior occasion the officials had 
remonstrated with the student editors about the use of vulgarity in the 
publication but had made it clear that they did not intend to act in a censorial 
fashion nor did they suggest that such vulgarity would not be tolerated in the 
future. It was only when the vulgarity was used in the open letter addressed to 
President Jenkins with respect to his dormitory policy that the school 
authorities viewed it as totally unacceptable and took disciplinary action 
against Thonen and Schell. That they may not do. The decisions of the 
Supreme Court make clear ‘that the mere dissemination of ideas no matter 
how offensive to good taste on a state university campus may not be shut off 
in the name alone of `conventions of decency.'113 
 
                                                
111 Trujillo, supra 85. 
 
112 Thonen, supra note 104, at 722. 
 
113 Id. at 723-24 (quoting Papish, supra note 85). 
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 In Stanley v. McGrath,114 the Eighth U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with a 
case involving an issue of the student newspaper that created a great deal of controversy 
within the administration and among community religious groups and citizens. It created 
such a stir that the Minnesota legislature held hearings on the matter. At issue was the 
paper’s “Finals Week” or “Humor Issue,” which was “styled in the format of 
sensationalist newspapers, [and] contained articles, advertisements, and cartoons 
satirizing Christ, the Roman Catholic Church, evangelical religion, public figures, 
numerous social, political, and ethnic groups, social customs, popular trends, and liberal 
ideas.”115  
Immediately, the university began conducting meetings to determine its course of 
action. It decided to use the power of the purse by allowing students who objected to the 
newspaper to be refunded that portion of their fees allocated to the newspaper. It also 
raised the Student Publication Board’s fees. The court ruled that the university could not 
take such retaliatory measures simply because it disagreed with the newspaper’s content. 
In the 1971 case Trujillo v. Love,116 the student government decided that it wanted 
to reallocate its fees distribution, apportioning less to the newspaper. The president of the 
university agreed to this and said the university would finance the printing of the 
newspaper. The president later announced that the university would assume the role of 
the publisher, and the mass communication department would supervise the newspaper. 
This is the first case in which funding of a college newspaper changed the editorial 
functioning of the newspaper. Students were to submit controversial articles to the faculty 
                                                
114 Supra note 108. 
 
115 Id. at 280. 
 
116 Supra note 85. 
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adviser before printing, to determine if they would be published. This information, 
however, was not properly conveyed to the newspaper’s staff, and when it produced its 
“Welcome Week” edition, the controversy began.   
The issue contained an article and cartoon poking fun at the university president’s 
decision to close campus pubs. The chairman of the mass communication department had 
the printer delete that page of the newspaper. Following this, the managing editor, 
uncertain of what the school would consider “controversial,” submitted two stories, 
which the chairman refused to publish and subsequently suspended her from her position 
and stopped publication of the newspaper altogether.  
The court ruled that prior to the change in funding, the newspaper served as a 
student forum. Even though the financing changed and the policy of faculty review was 
supposed to be instituted such that the newspaper could serve as an educational tool, in 
fact, students on staff continued to operate practically independently. As a result, the 
court ruled, the newspaper continued to serve as a student forum, and the “restraints 
placed on plaintiff's writing did abridge her right of free expression, and her suspension 
was an impermissible punishment for the exercise of that right.”117  
Thus this case represents the first discussion of how funding and faculty 
review/association with the curriculum of a newspaper specifically can change the forum 
status of a student newspaper. In ruling that the newspaper continued to operate as a 
forum for student expression even after the funding and policy changes, it implicitly 
stated that these factors could affect the forum status of a college newspaper if the paper 
had been regularly supervised as intended. These issue of subsidization and prior review 
would be taken up in the third time period in Hosty v. Carter, which, as has been 
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discussed in Chapters I and III, has raised much concern over the editorial independence 
of post-secondary newspapers. 
While there was only one entry under the rationale “Fostering an environment of 
robust debate” and only two entries under the rationale “Providing access for all voices to 
be heard,” which as stated in the K-12 discussion symbolized the marketplace of ideas, 
12 out of the total 21 cases either used language indicative of the marketplace of ideas or 
specifically used the term.118 Therefore, courts during this time period clearly emphasized 
the importance that colleges and universities contribute to and enrich the campus 
marketplace of ideas. 
During the third time period, there was slightly less discussion of the marketplace 
of ideas, with eight119 out of the total 18 cases discussing the benefits of robust debate, 
yet a theme emerged in which frequently such discussions were tied to public forum 
access and funding, hot issues during this time period. Public forums and limited public 
forums were understood to support and to benefit the marketplace of ideas. While 
“Protecting speech in public or limited public forums” was the driving rationale in six 
cases, nine120 out of the 18 cases during this time found the speech in question to be in 
one of the three types of fora.  
                                                
118 Channing Club, Antonelli, Univ. of So. Miss., Widmar, Bazaar, Smith, Healy & Trujillo, supra note 85; 
Arrington & Thonen, supra note 104; Brooks, supra note 105.  
 
119 Alabama Student Party v. Student Government Association, 867 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir. 1989); Lueth v. 
St. Clair County Cmty. College, 732 F. Supp. 1410 (E.D. Mich. 1990); Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 
969 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1992); Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1992); Rosenberger v. Rector and 
Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 
2001); DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2008); McCauley v. University of the Virgin 
Islands, 628 F.3d 232 (3d. 2010).  
 
120 Flint v. Dennison, 361 F. Supp.2d 1215 (D. Mont. 2005); Hosty v. Carter, 412 F. 3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005); 
Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings v. Martinez, 319 Fed. Appx. 645 (2010); Alabama 
Student Party, Lueth, Carroll, Hays County, Kincaid & Rosenberger, supra note 119.  
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Because the high Court had decided a number of important public forum cases by 
this time, courts didn’t assume a forum was an open forum as courts seemed to do in the 
newspaper cases during the second time period. Now, courts meticulously analyzed the 
policy, practice, and intent of universities toward the forum to determine its forum status. 
When they determined that a forum was an open or limited public forum, restrictions on 
speech typically received strict scrutiny. The court in Carroll wrote, in relation to the 
organization at issue,  
Such a forum, he [the university president during testimony] continued, is 
‘consonant with the educational mission’ of the university. In seeking to 
foster debate, exchange and contemplation about matters of campus and 
wider importance, SUNY Albany is hardly assuming a novel collegiate role. 
As Justice Brennan wrote in Keyishian, ‘[t]he classroom is peculiarly the 
`marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained 
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 
`out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative 
selection.' … Indeed, SUNY Albany's interest in sponsoring and maintaining 
a thriving campus forum of vigorous advocacy and political action is itself a 
concern of constitutional dimensions, since a central purpose of the First 
Amendment is to guarantee the free interchange of views and energetic 
debate.121 
 
The case involved two issues: compelled membership in the organization funded 
and compelled funding of the organization. The court determined that the 
compelled funding was constitutional because of the reasons above. The second 
aspect, compelled membership, was found unconstitutional and will be discussed 
under the outcome “Protecting the Post-Secondary School System.” 
There were several cases that utilized or purportedly declined to utilize 
Hazelwood to analyze the constitutionality of speech restrictions. Two cases, Kincaid v. 
                                                
121 Carroll, supra note 119, at 1001 (quoting, respectively, Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. at 603 
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Gibson122 and Hosty v. Carter, represent two of the four cases involved in the circuit 
court split over application of Hazelwood at the post-secondary level. In Kincaid, the 
administration was displeased with the quality and content of the student yearbook and 
withheld its distribution. The district court that initially heard the case applied Hazelwood 
to find that the yearbook was a non-public forum and that the school’s confiscation of the 
yearbooks was constitutional. On appeal to the Sixth U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, the 
three-judge panel that first heard the case also proceeded to analyze the case via 
Hazelwood. It, too, determined that the yearbook was a non-public forum and that the 
university’s action was constitutional.  
Finally, the full Sixth Circuit heard the case en banc, to determine primarily 
whether Hazelwood applied. After reviewing a number of public forum cases, the court 
wrote in footnote five, “Because we find that a forum analysis requires that the yearbook 
be analyzed as a limited public forum — rather than a nonpublic forum — we agree with 
the parties that Hazelwood has little application to this case.”123  
Following this backward logic, the court proceeded to cite Hazelwood three times, 
along with other popular public forum cases, to support the following contentions: 1) that 
the yearbook was not a “closely-monitored classroom activity in which an instructor 
assigns student editors a grade, or in which a university official edits content,”124 2) “In 
addition to the nature of the university setting, we find it relevant that the editors of The 
Thorobred and its readers are likely to be young adults — Kincaid himself was thirty-
seven at the time of his March 1997 deposition. Thus, there can be no justification for 
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suppressing the yearbook on the grounds that it might be ‘unsuitable for immature 
audiences,’”125 and 3) “the proposition put forth by the university officials and relied 
upon by the district court — i.e., that the government must open a forum for 
indiscriminate use by the general public in order to create a designated public forum — is 
erroneous.”126 
 Therefore, through distinguishing Hazelwood in the first two propositions and 
directly utilizing it as support for the third, it would appear that the court did rely on 
Hazelwood in its decision-making, albeit through means other than those employed by 
the federal district court and the three-judge panel.  
 In finding that the yearbook was a limited public forum, the court proceeded to 
determine if the university’s actions were within legal bounds. It wrote that restrictions 
on speech within limited public forums only could be restricted in time, place and 
manner, and that restricting such speech based upon the speaker’s view was 
unconstitutional. The restriction at hand met neither requirement and was held 
unconstitutional. 
 Hosty v. Carter127 also traveled through the federal courts as each tried to 
determine if Hazelwood applied, in this case to a student newspaper. In Hosty, the editor 
of the student newspaper previously had criticized actions of the dean of the university’s 
college of arts and sciences. After refusing to retract statements in that editorial or to print 
the administration’s response, the dean of student services and affairs, Carter, directed the 
printer to cease printing of the newspaper. When the federal district court heard the case, 
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it ruled that Hazelwood was inapplicable at the college level and found Carter’s actions to 
violate the constitution. A panel of the Seventh U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
the district court’s holding, and then the full Circuit Court granted certiorari.  
 The court began its discussion with, “Hazelwood provides our starting point”128 
and proceeded to directly analyze the case via the Hazelwood holding. In discussing both 
cases, the court wrote, 
To the extent that the justification for editorial control depends on the 
audience's maturity, the difference between high school and university 
students may be important. (Not that any line could be bright; many high 
school seniors are older than some college freshmen, and junior colleges are 
similar to many high schools.) To the extent that the justification depends on 
other matters — not only the desire to ensure ‘high standards for the student 
speech that is disseminated under [the school's] auspices’ (the Court 
particularly mentioned ‘speech that is ... ungrammatical, poorly written, 
inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or 
unsuitable for immature audiences … but also the goal of dissociating the 
school from ‘any position other than neutrality on matters of political 
controversy’ — there is no sharp difference between high school and college 
papers.129 
 
The court said that because it had to view the issue in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, in this case the student editor, the newspaper was a limited public forum. As 
such, Carter’s refusal to allow further printing was an unconstitutional abridgment of the 
student’s First Amendment right. Carter, however, received qualified immunity because 
the question of whether Hazelwood applied to the college press was unsettled law when 
she instructed the printer to cease publication. Her actions were based on legitimate 
pedagogical concerns, the second prong of the Hazelwood framework. 
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 The court made a point, nonetheless, to note that had the case gone to trial, things 
might have turned out differently. First, the newspaper’s charter indicated that the editor 
was responsible to the Director of Student Life, who might have established criteria for  
school-subsidized publications. Because no evidence of this was before the court, 
however, it was not an issue considered. Second, every publication on campus was 
supposed to have a faculty adviser. The parties disagreed about the extent of the 
newspaper’s faculty adviser’s role – whether it was merely to offer advice or if it also 
included exercise of editorial control. Because the district court acted on a motion of 
summary judgment, this issue also wasn’t presented for the full Circuit Court to evaluate. 
The court’s emphasis on these two issues clearly suggest that subsidization and the 
control this might have given the Director of Student Life, in addition to whether the 
faculty adviser had the power to exercise editorial control might have resulted in a 
finding that the newspaper was a non-public forum per Hazelwood.  
Access to funding and compelled funding were also dominant themes during this 
time period. In the precedent-setting case Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. 
Southworth,130 the U. S. Supreme Court was asked to determine if a group of students 
constitutionally could be compelled to help fund, through payment of fees, organizations 
with which they ideologically and/or politically disagreed. The Court wrote, “It is 
inevitable that government will adopt and pursue programs and policies within its 
constitutional powers but which nevertheless are contrary to the profound beliefs and 
sincere convictions of some of its citizens. The government, as a general rule, may 
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support valid programs and policies by taxes or other exactions binding on protesting 
parties.”131  
Because the sole purpose of collecting the fees at issue was to enhance the 
marketplace of ideas and the process was viewpoint neutral, the Court found it to be 
constitutional. Yet, as a number of commentators have pointed out, the Court also said 
that “If the challenged speech here were financed by tuition dollars and the University 
and its officials were responsible for its content, the case might be evaluated on the 
premise that the government itself is the speaker.”132 As such, the government could 
regulate the speech in any way it likes.  
Four cases accounted for the four entries under the rationale “Protecting against 
overbreadth and/or vagueness.” Each case dealt with anti-harassment policies. These 
were the only cases involving such policies, indicating that not one at the federal level 
passed constitutional muster. While the speech restrictions within all three cases could be 
construed as prior restraints and viewpoint discriminatory, in each case the rulings were 
based upon overbreadth and/or vagueness. One will be discussed at length because it 
encompasses the central issues at hand in all four, with the understanding that there were 
variations among the various speech codes’ provisions. 
 The case to be discussed is John DOE v. Univ. of Michigan in 1989.133 At issue 
was the constitutionality of the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor’s “Policy on 
Discrimination and Discriminatory Harassment of Students in the University 
Environment.” The university created the policy because of increasing racial hostilities 
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on the campus. The terms of the policy stated that it only applied to “educational and 
academic centers, such as classroom buildings, libraries, research laboratories, recreation 
and study centers.” Other rules governed speech and conduct in university housing 
(though the policy also intruded there in certain ways), and only physical violence and 
destruction of property were regulated in generally public areas of the campus.  
The policy prohibited a very large swath of expression, such as any speech that 
“stigmatizes or victimizes” another person based upon race, religion, sexual orientation, 
sex, handicap, age, marital status, creed, national origin, and ethnicity such that it 
interfered with that person’s academic efforts, employment, participation in university 
activities, or personal safety.134 It also regulated sexual advances, requests, favors, or any 
such related speech or conduct that might harm another in the ways listed above.135 
Punishments for violations ranged from formal reprimands to expulsion.  Shortly after the 
university approved the policy, it created an interpretative guide for students, telling them 
what they could and could not say to others. Some examples of regulated speech listed in 
the interpretive guide included telling jokes about homosexuals, laughing in class if 
someone stutters, displaying a confederate flag in the residence hall, excluding someone 
from a study group because of race or gender, etc.  
A male student, DOE, was a graduate student in psychology who feared he would 
be reprimanded for discussing controversial theories regarding his specialty, 
biopsychology. The court wrote,  
Were [it] to look only at the plain language of the Policy, it might have to agree 
with the University that Doe could not have realistically alleged a genuine and 
credible threat of enforcement. The Policy prohibited conduct which ‘stigmatizes or 
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victimizes’ students on the basis of ‘race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual 
orientation’ and other invidious factors. However, the terms ‘stigmatize’ and 
‘victimize’ are not self defining. These words can only be understood with 
reference to some exogenous value system. What one individual might find 
victimizing or stigmatizing, another individual might not.136  
 
Further, because the record before the court indicated the drafters of the policy “intended 
that the speech need only be offensive to be sanctionable,”137 because students had been 
disciplined under the policy, and because the interpretive guide was filled with examples 
of relatively common behaviors, DOE was correct in fearing he could be reprimanded. 
The court found the policy to be both overbroad and vague.  
The court wrote, “While the Court is sympathetic to the University's obligation to 
ensure equal educational opportunities for all of its students, such efforts must not be at 
the expense of free speech. Unfortunately, this was precisely what the University did. … 
The apparent willingness to dilute the values of free speech is ironic in light of the 
University's previous statements of policy on this matter.”138 
  
Rationales for Protecting the Well-Being of Post-Secondary Students 
 As shown below in Table 9, there were no entries for any of the rationales across 
time periods. This is likely due to the judiciary’s even greater reluctance to intervene in 
matters relating to older, post-secondary students. Courts in the first and second time 
periods didn’t appear to place much emphasis on age in their decision-making. In the 
newspaper cases, courts readily embraced Tinker, a decision made at the K-12 level. By 
the third time period, however, age did become a factor in the courts’ reasoning; it just 
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wasn’t found to be the driving rationale. Nonetheless, courts in nine cases139 discussed 
either the differences in age between K-12 and post-secondary students or the differences 
in the missions of both levels of education. Typically, the discussion was aimed at 
asserting that there was, indeed, a difference, though this was not always the case. 
Interestingly, each of the nine cases was decided after 2001, each of the anti-harassment 
cases is included,140 and four of the cases involved usage of Hazelwood in judicial 
decision-making.141  
 
Table 9: Rationales for Protecting the Well-Being of Post-Secondary Students 
 
 
Taking age into 
consideration 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
Recognizing that 
students are often a 
“captive audience” 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Considering the 
sensitivity of topics 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
  Time Periods: 3/3/40—2/23/69      2/24/69—1/12/88        1/13/88—2011     
 
 
 
 
                                                
139 Welker v. Cicerone, 174 F. Supp.2d 1055 (C.D. Col. 2001); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002); 
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Rationales for Teaching Post-Secondary Students Acceptable Social Behaviors 
 As shown below in Table 10, there are no entries for any rationales across 
time periods. Typically courts did not even discuss these rationales, as the issues 
raised in the post-secondary cases did not lend themselves to analysis linked to 
these rationales. 
 
Table 10: Rationales for Teaching Post-Secondary Students Acceptable Social 
Behaviors 
 
 
Teaching civility 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
Teaching good taste 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
Teaching the 
boundaries of 
socially appropriate 
behavior 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
Awakening students 
to cultural values 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
  Time Periods:   3/3/40—2/23/69      2/24/69—1/12/88       1/13/88—2011     
 
 
 
Rationales for Protecting the Post-Secondary School System 
 As shown below in Table 11, there were zero entries for all rationales during the 
first time period. During the second time period, the rationale “Promulgating reasonable 
rules and conduct” clearly stands out from the other rationales. Indeed, five of the total 
seven rationales categories had zero entries, and there is only one entry for the rationale 
“Maintaining discipline and order.” In large part, this is the result of so few case 
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outcomes being classified under this outcome, as only six outcomes from five cases, of 
the total 22 case outcomes during this time period (29%) were found to be protective of 
the school system.  
In the case classified under the rationale “Maintaining discipline and order,” 
Norton v. Discipline Comm. of East Tenn. State Univ.,142 a group of students produced 
inflammatory materials, critical of both the student body and the administration. They 
called for students to rise up in protest. The administration suspended the students 
following distribution, and the students brought suit. The court wrote, “It is not required 
that the college authorities delay action against the inciters until after the riot has started 
and buildings have been taken over and damaged. The college authorities had the right to 
nip such action in the bud and prevent it in its inception. This is authorized even in 
criminal cases.”143 The court found the university’s actions reasonable and constitutional. 
 The four cases, comprising five case outcomes, classified under the rationale 
“Promulgating reasonable rules and conduct” involved, respectively, 1) panel meetings 
and a discussion series, 2) a demonstration, 3) a sit-in, and 4) student refusal to fund, 
through payment of student fees, the student newspaper because they disagreed with its 
views.  
 During the third time period, the war in Vietnam was over, and protests and 
demonstrations on campuses nationwide were no longer a serious threat. The case law 
leading to protection of the school system during this period typically involved student 
punishment for speech in non-public forums, as will be discussed below. As shown in 
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Table 11, five case outcomes (four cases) were classified under the rationale “Protecting 
the right of schools to regulate in non-public forums.” Two cases were classified under 
the rationale “Controlling the curriculum,” and one case outcome was classified under 
“Promulgating reasonable rules and conduct.” 
 
Table 11: Rationales for Protecting the Post-Secondary School System 
 
 
Avoiding controversy 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Protecting the right of 
schools to regulate 
speech in non-public 
forums 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
5 
 
Maintaining 
discipline and order 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
Confirming the right 
of school to speak for 
itself/control its 
message 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
Controlling the 
curriculum 
 
0 
 
0 
 
2 
 
Promulgating 
reasonable rules and 
conduct 
 
0 
 
5 
 
1 
Controlling 
expression in school-
sponsored activities 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
  Time Periods:              3/3/40—2/23/69      2/24/69—1/12/88         1/13/88—2011     
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In Alabama Student Party v. Student Government Ass’n,144 the court was presented 
with two related issues, which accounts for the two outcomes in the case: 1) the 
restriction of campaign literature to certain days and 2) limitation of debates to the week 
before the election. Applying Hazelwood, the court found that the election was created as 
a learning or laboratory experience. As such, it was a non-public forum. The court wrote,  
The University should be entitled to place reasonable restrictions on this 
learning experience. The district court concluded after a hearing that although 
the regulations were ‘rather narrow and limiting,’ they were neither 
‘unreasonable,’ nor ‘arbitrary and capricious.’ The district court noted that by 
promulgating such regulations, the University sought to minimize the 
disruptive effect of campus electioneering, an interest which the district court 
found to be legitimate. There was no evidence that the regulations were 
anything but viewpoint-neutral.145 
 
As such, the regulations were found to be constitutional. Restrictions on speech in non-
public forums need not be compelling, only reasonable and viewpoint-neutral, which the 
court found each aspect of the election process to be. This case represents one of the four 
cases involved in the circuit court split regarding application of Hazelwood to post-
secondary speech. 
In Flint v. Dennison,146 the Ninth U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to 
decide if it was constitutionally permissible for a university to impose a dollar amount on 
how much a student may spend while campaigning for student office. After the court 
determined that the election constituted a limited public forum, it wrote,  
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The University uses ASUM [the student government] primarily as an 
educational tool—a means to educate students on principles of representative 
government, parliamentary procedure, political compromise, and leadership. 
In contrast to participation in state or national politics, participation in ASUM 
student elections is limited to ASUM-enrolled University students—students 
must maintain at least a 2.0 grade point average to run for office and only 
students are allowed to vote in the election.147 
 
It then considered whether the campaign limit was in any way viewpoint 
discriminatory. It found that it was not. From here it analyzed if the campaign limit was 
reasonable per Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ, Fund, Inc.148 It determined 
that the restriction was reasonable in light of the legitimate pedagogical interests of the 
university and, therefore, constitutional. (It did not cite Hazelwood, from which the test 
of legitimate pedagogical concerns or interests derives.) 
 And in Carroll v. Blinken,149 discussed earlier, the court also was called upon to 
determine the second part of the complaint that dealt with compelled membership in the 
organization at issue. The court found that the university could not compel students to be 
affiliated with an organization with which they ideologically and politically disagreed. 
 The final case under this rationale was the recent U. S. Supreme Court case 
Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings v. Martinez.150 At issue was the 
campus organization Christian Legal Society’s rejection of students as voting members 
who would not sign a statement of faith and who were homosexuals. The university law 
school had in place an “all-comers” policy that required student organizations to allow all 
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students, regardless of status or beliefs, to be allowed membership in any student group 
they wished to join.  
 Speaking to the speech via associational claim, the Court wrote,  
…as evidenced by another set of decisions, this Court has rigorously 
reviewed laws and regulations that constrain associational freedom. In the 
context of public accommodations, we have subjected restrictions on that 
freedom to close scrutiny; such restrictions are permitted only if they serve 
‘compelling state interests’ that are ‘unrelated to the suppression of ideas’—
interests that cannot be advanced ‘through … significantly less restrictive 
[means].’ …‘Freedom of association,’ we have recognized, ‘plainly 
presupposes a freedom not to associate.’151 
  
Utilizing public forum cases, the Court found the RSO program to be a limited public 
forum and found that the all-comers policy was reasonable per Cornelius,152 provided 
adequate alternative channels of communication per Perry Educ. Assoc’n v. Perry Local 
Educators' Assoc’n,153 if the organization should decide to forego official recognition, 
was viewpoint neutral, and, as such, constitutional. 
Finally, the two cases under the rationale “Controlling the curriculum” will be 
discussed because the first, Brown v. Li,154 utilized Hazelwood and represents one of the 
four cases in the circuit court split, and because the federal district court in O’Neal v. 
Falcon155 also utilized Hazelwood in its decision-making. 
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In Brown,156 a graduate student received approval for his thesis, but before 
sending it to the library, he added a “Disacknowledgements” section that began with, “I 
would like to offer special Fuck You's to the following degenerates for being an ever-
present hindrance during my graduate career … .”157 It then proceeded to identify the 
“Dean and staff of the UCSB graduate school, the managers of Davidson Library, former 
California Governor Wilson, the Regents of the University of California, and ‘Science’ as 
having been particularly obstructive to Plaintiff's progress toward his graduate degree.”158 
When administrators got word of this, they instructed him to remove the 
“Disacknowledgements” section. He refused to do so and submitted it again, absent the 
profanity. Again, he was instructed to remove it, and he received a letter from the dean 
stating that his degree would be conferred only after he removed that section of his thesis. 
After appealing to a variety of academic offices and officials with no relief, Brown filed 
suit. 
The Ninth U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals looked to Hazelwood through which to 
analyze the case because, as the court wrote, “We have found no precedent precisely on 
point. However, a review of the cases discussing the relationship between students' free 
speech rights and schools' power to regulate the content of curriculum demonstrates that 
educators can, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech provided that 
the limitation is reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical purpose.”159 
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It further noted, “The Supreme Court has suggested that core curricular speech — 
that which is an integral part of the classroom-teaching function of an educational 
institution — differs from students' extracurricular speech and that a public educational 
institution retains discretion to prescribe its curriculum.”160 Moreover, the court wrote, 
the curriculum is one means by which a university expressed its policy and mission. 
More than once the court wrote that it did not know if the U. S. Supreme Court 
would rule that Hazelwood governs in such a case, but it said that it was the most 
analogous case to that at hand. While the court never determined, nor attempted to 
determine forum status, it found that the university’s curricular requirements were 
legitimate pedagogical concerns and constitutional. 
Finally, in O’Neal v. Falcon,161 a community college student wanted to, as her 
topic for a speech, discuss abortion. Her teacher told her that abortion was too 
controversial and told her to find another topic. The court utilized Hazelwood, while also 
discussing several of the other cases that also have chosen to use it at the post-secondary 
levels, and wrote,  
After reviewing the precedents concerning students' rights of free speech 
within a public school, we find few cases that address the conflict between 
the student's rights of speech in the classroom and a teacher's responsibility to 
encourage decorum and scholarship, including her authority to determine 
course content, the selection of books, the topic of papers, the grades of 
students and similar questions. Students do not lose entirely their right to 
express themselves as individuals in the classroom, but federal courts should 
exercise particular restraint in classroom conflicts between student and 
teacher over matters falling within the ordinary authority of the teacher over 
curriculum and course content.162 
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The court said that Hazelwood did not require it to “balance the gravity of the school's 
educational purpose against a student's First Amendment right to free speech, only that 
the educational purpose behind the speech suppression be valid.”163 The court found that 
the professor had a legitimate pedagogical concern about allowing students to write on 
such a controversial topic and found the speech restriction constitutional. The court in 
this case also did not attempt to determine forum status but instead relied upon the 
legitimate pedagogical concerns prong of Hazelwood. 
As shown below in Table 12, during the first time period, two cases were 
classified as “Content of Student-Published Works,” two cases were classified as 
“Symbolic Speech,” and two cases were classified as “Miscellaneous.” They involved, 
respectively, student newspapers, wearing of “Freedom Buttons,” and refusals to salute 
the flag. 
During the second time period, the newspaper cases accounted for most entries 
under “Content of Student-Published Works,” two cases under “Speech Plus” due to 
school refusal to distribute the newspapers, and two cases under “Funding,” when schools 
refused to further fund papers following controversial content. Thus, while they are 
spread out here, these cases no doubt influenced the overall results during this time 
period. The “Miscellaneous” category dealt with the denial of official recognition to 
student organizations and the speaker cases.  
During the third time period, the types of speech were fairly evenly distributed, 
outside of the zero entry for “Symbolic Speech.” The “Miscellaneous” category dealt 
with election campaigning issues, an all-comers policy, and a membership requirement. It 
                                                
163 Id. at 986. 
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would not appear that any one category of speech drove the overall results during this 
time period. 
 
 
 
Table 12: Post-Secondary Case Categories 
 
 
Content of Student-
Published Works 
 
2 (33.3%) 
 
7 (31.8%) 
 
5 (22.7%) 
 
Verbalizations 
 
0 
 
0 
 
4 (18.2%) 
 
Symbolic Speech 
 
2 (33.3%) 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Speech Plus 
 
0  
 
5 (22.7%) 
 
1 (4.5%) 
 
Funding 
 
0 
 
4 (18.2%) 
 
6 (27.3%) 
 
Miscellaneous 
 
2 (33.3%) 
 
6 (27.3%) 
 
6 (27.3%) 
       Time Periods:      3/3/40—2/23/69            2/24/69—1/12/88        1/13/88—2011    
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CHAPTER VI 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE FINDINGS 
The first research question posed in this dissertation asked if post-secondary 
freedom of expression case law was following a similar developmental path to that at the 
K-12 level of education. The answer is primarily yes, though there were a few 
exceptions. As discussed below, the two K-12 landmark U. S. Supreme Court decisions, 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District1 and Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier,2 which 
delineated the three time periods, set the stage upon which the majority of post-secondary 
decisions would be decided. After each of these two cases was decided, courts hearing 
cases at both levels of education utilized them relatively at the same pace and with the 
same frequency, indicating that post-secondary free speech case law is, substantively, 
following in a similar developmental path as case law at the K-12 level of education. One 
of the exceptions, however, is that courts at the K-12 level lagged behind courts at the 
post-secondary level in utilizing Tinker.  
Nonetheless, application of the Tinker standards of both material and substantial 
disruption and of disruption forecast typically, though not exclusively, resulted in a high 
degree of protection for students at both levels of education. When not protected, courts 
either determined that schools reasonably forecasted a material and substantial disruption, 
or that such a disruption did, indeed, occur.  
                                                
1 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 
2 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
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As may be recalled from Chapter III, the ideal concept of free speech proposed in 
this dissertation asserts that expressive conduct not intended to or likely to incite 
imminent lawless action should be fully protected; therefore, the overall findings of this 
research indicate that courts deciding student expression cases have, in many instances, 
adopted a parallel concept of free speech protection to protect student expression. The 
major exception to this has been when courts applied the Hazelwood standard to student 
expression. 
Additionally, during the second period of time, roughly 73 percent of cases at 
each level of education were protective of student speech. Also during this time, 
approximately half of all cases at both levels involved either official or “underground” 
newspapers containing offensive or controversial material, for which protection of speech 
also was high. During the third period of time, the types of speech litigated were much 
more varied at both levels of education, and courts at both levels readily utilized public 
forum doctrine in their decision-making. Moreover, when cases were analyzed via 
Hazelwood, speech protection at both levels of education was low.  
The issues of age, maturity, and the differing missions of the schools also was not 
a huge consideration in judicial decision-making at both levels of education during the 
second time period, though courts began to speak to the issue more following Bethel 
School District No. 403 v. Fraser3 and then after Hazelwood, which was decided just two 
years later.  Finally, discussions relating to the marketplace of ideas were relatively high 
during the second time period at both levels of education. During the third time period, 
however, such discussions decreased, though not substantially. 
                                                
3 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
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One of the developmental distinctions between the two levels of education 
involved the number of cases litigated across time periods. At the K-12 level, there was a 
steady increase in the number of cases, with six cases decided during the first time 
period, 24 decided during the second time period, and 47 decided during the third time 
period. In contrast, at the post-secondary level, four cases were decided during the first 
time period, 21 cases were decided during the second time period, and 18 cases were 
decided during the third time period. Thus at the post-secondary level, the number of 
cases increased significantly from the first to the second time periods but remained fairly 
stable from the second to third time periods. In this regard, post-secondary case law is not 
following a similar developmental path to that at the K-12 level of education. Also, while 
protection of speech remained quite stable across all three time periods at the post-
secondary level, it did not at the K-12 level. From the second to the third time periods at 
the K-12 level, speech protection went from 73 percent to 34 percent, as shown in Table 
1. At the post-secondary level, protection of speech from the second to third time periods 
went from 72 percent to 65 percent, as shown in Table 7. 
The second research question asked how the Hazelwood framework was used at 
the post-secondary level. As expected, it has been utilized as precedent in several cases, 
and that number appears to be increasing. Additionally, aside from two cases, the 
remaining cases did not utilize both prongs of the framework in their reasoning. Instead 
of determining the type of forum at hand, the first prong, they relied solely on the second 
prong, or analyzing if the speech regulation was related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns. Clearly, the law in this area is unsettled, and it is expected to continue to be 
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unless the U. S. Supreme Court makes a decision concerning the applicability of 
Hazelwood to post-secondary expression.  
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ITS PROTECTION WITHIN SCHOOLS  
After discussing the importance of the First Amendment generally and as it 
applies to students, the discussion here will turn to the highlights and discrepancies 
discovered in the case law. Both the reasons and the possible reasons why the data appear 
as they do will be examined. 
 In our democratic nation, freedom of speech is understood to be a fundamental 
human right that serves a number of functions: to ensure that the individual, as an 
autonomous human being bestowed with natural rights, is free to determine the course of 
his or her life; to support robust debate in the marketplace of ideas such that citizens may 
make informed political decisions and fulfill their sovereign role in our democratic 
republic; to allow citizens to “let off steam,” in order for a balance between social change 
and social stability to be maintained; and to allow both citizens and journalists to serve as 
the watchdogs of government, or to help ensure that government does not trample upon 
the rights of both majority and minority groups. Without the right to free expression, one 
of the fundamental principles behind democracy – that government should impose no 
more than the necessary minimum restrictions on individuals – would be a difficult, if not 
insurmountable, obstacle to overcome.  
 In our society, this right to free speech is not limited to adult citizens in society-at-
large. Students at both the K-12 and post-secondary levels of education, who represent 
minority groups in society, also have the right to free expression as persons under the 
Constitution of the United States. In fact, the Bill of Rights was created, in part, to protect 
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the rights of such minority groups against the tyranny of the majority. As such, the 
federal courts have recognized, to varying degrees, the First Amendment rights of both 
groups of students. As the future leaders of our nation, the value of student free speech 
cannot be underestimated.  
As demonstrated in Chapter V, Table 1, there has been a steady increase in the 
number of cases presented to the federal judiciary at the K-12 level of education, with six 
cases being decided during the first time period (two of which were speech-protective), 
24 being decided during the second time period (post-Tinker/pre-Hazelwood, with 19 
speech-protective case outcomes), and 47 being decided during the last time period (post-
Hazelwood, with 16 speech-protective outcomes). As shown in Table 7, at the post-
secondary level, four cases were decided during the first time period (all of which were 
speech-protective), 21 cases were decided during the second time period (16 of which 
were speech-protective), and 18 cases were decided during the third time period (14 of 
which were speech-protective).  
During the first time period, there were only 10 total cases decided by the federal 
judiciary, as indicated above. Aside from the fact that courts at the post-secondary level 
were much more protective of speech than their counterparts at the K-12 level of 
education, no anomalies stood out within the data. These cases were foundational, 
however, as discussed in Chapter V.  
One of the notable aspects in the Table 1 data involves the protection of K-12 
speech during the second time period as compared with the third time period. During the 
time period between Tinker and Hazelwood, student speech was protected to a high 
degree. In roughly 73% of all cases decided during this time period, courts struck down 
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administrative regulations of, or punishments for, student speech. During the third time 
period, K-12 speech was protected only 34% of the time.   
While protection for student expression at the K-12 level was high during the 
second time period, most courts did not utilize Tinker in their decision-making due to 
expressed uncertainty concerning whether it did or did not allow for prior restraint. This 
uncertainty hinged on the word “forecast,” which was used only once in the Tinker 
decision. The Court wrote, “As we have discussed, the record does not demonstrate any 
facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption 
of or material interference with school activities, and no disturbances or disorders on the 
school premises in fact occurred.”4  
Roughly half of all cases involved official or “underground” newspapers, yet, 
instead of applying Tinker, the courts analyzed the school policies involving student 
publications. In all cases, they found such policies deficient and unconstitutional prior 
restraints, not by the Tinker disruption standard but due to overbreadth and/or vagueness. 
As shown in Table 2, this rationale accounted for seven of the total 26 case outcomes. By 
the third time period, courts at the K-12 level readily applied the Tinker holding. Thus 
critics who assert that Tinker is “dead” are quite mistaken. Almost exclusively, the cases 
in which the Tinker “forecast” standard was utilized involved controversial and offensive 
apparel or controversial and offensive speech made on home computers.  
As indicated in Chapter V, when schools had a history of racial violence or 
tension, courts always upheld restrictions of such apparel per the forecast part of the 
Tinker holding. When speech made online on home computers bled into the school 
causing significant disruptions, courts also used Tinker to uphold student punishment. 
                                                
4 Supra note 1, at 514. 
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The latter cases, however, were not driven by whether the school reasonably could 
forecast a disruption, but, rather, based upon whether the speech did, in fact, create a 
material and substantial disruption. This partially accounts for the high number of entries 
in Table 5 under the rationale “Maintaining discipline and order,” which jumped from 
two in the second time period to 14 in the third. Another interesting aspect of the data in 
Table 5 relates to the rationale “Controlling expression in school-sponsored activities,” 
which went from zero entries during the second time period to seven in the third time 
period. This is attributed to the Hazelwood holding and the number of cases that utilized 
the framework to rule in favor of school restrictions on speech. 
At the post-secondary level of education, courts readily used Tinker in their 
decision-making during the second time period. And again, in nearly 73 percent of the 
cases, speech was protected. Like the cases at the K-12 educational level, official and 
“underground” newspaper cases accounted for roughly half of all cases decided.  
Table 6 highlights two more interesting K-12 findings regarding types of speech. 
First, only two cases involved “Symbolic Speech” during the second time period, while 
there were 14 cases involving symbolic speech in the third time period. This is the result 
of the numerous cases during the third time period involving controversial apparel. 
Second, there were 11 cases classified as “Speech Plus” during the second time period 
and only five during the third time period. The majority of the 11 cases involved 
distribution of official and “underground” newspapers. Newspapers accounted for the 
stability between the second and third time periods in relation to the number of cases 
classified as “Content of Student-Published Works.” The one difference, however, is that 
most of the newspapers during the second time period were “underground” newspapers, 
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while during the third time period most were official school newspapers. Newspapers 
also accounted for the majority of the “Content of Student-Published Works” at the post-
secondary level during the second time period, as shown in Table 12. 
It is unsurprising that newspapers accounted for such a large percentage of the 
total cases during this time period at both levels of education. First, the nation was at war, 
not only with Vietnam but also with itself, in that students and citizens alike began to 
demand equal protection under the law. Second, newspapers were the primary vehicles 
for students to express their views on these social and political issues. There was no 
Internet. There were no cell phones from which to send mass text messages. To reach at 
least a fairly large audience, students needed to do so through creating and distributing 
newspapers and other printed materials. While courts hearing K-12 cases expressed their 
distaste for hearing the cases, they nonetheless were highly supportive of students’ 
speech on the controversial topics of the times.  
Courts at both levels of education during this time period certainly did not shy 
away from striking down punishment of offensive or controversial speech. This accounts 
for most of the 16 case outcomes in Table 7 under the rationale “Protecting Post-
Secondary Student Expression.” There were only two fewer cases under this outcome 
during the third period. Additionally, there also was stability between the two time 
periods for the outcome “Protecting the Post-Secondary School System.” The number of 
cases in both outcomes during the second time period likely was due to the high level of 
student activity during this era of civil unrest. During the third time period, these issues 
were no longer a factor, and the speech cases appearing before the courts were of a wide 
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variety, though access to and funding for student organizations and Hazelwood-related 
cases dominated (both of which also contributed to the number of public forum cases). 
Courts hearing cases at the post-secondary level from 1969-1988 rarely based 
their decision-making on age, maturity, or the different missions of the schools. It was 
not until Hazelwood that courts deciding post-secondary cases began to emphasize these 
factors. In about half of those later cases, in fact, courts used these factors to assert either 
1) that there was a distinct difference between the two groups of students or 2) that there 
was no real difference between the two. As discussed in the findings, those cases in 
which the courts asserted that age made a difference involved anti-harassment policies,5 
and three of the four cases in which courts said that age and the missions of the schools 
were not critical factors involved utilization of the Hazelwood framework. The anti-
harassment policy cases also explain the jump from zero entries in the second time period 
to four entries during the third time period for the rationale “Protecting speech from 
overbreadth and/or vagueness” in Table 8.  
At the K-12 level, age and maturity were not significant influences within the case 
law during the second time period but became more prominent following Hazelwood. As 
for this aspect of the findings, it could be the result of less tumultuous times. By 1975, the 
war was over. Protests and demonstrations on secondary and post-secondary campuses 
had died down. This alone could account for the stability in the number of cases litigated 
at the post-secondary level from the second to the third time periods, as discussed above.  
Students were simply less vocal because they were not confronted with war, 
segregation, and extreme sexism. College students nationwide regularly engaged in mass 
                                                
5 As a reminder, all federal courts struck down schools’ anti-harassment policies because they were 
determined to be overbroad and/or vague.  
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demonstrations and protests, and were prolific writers engaged in spreading their 
messages pertaining to the social and political upheavals during the second time period. 
When the war ended and they, along with citizens in society-at-large, had achieved many 
of the social reforms they fought so zealously for, one would expect the number of cases 
litigated to “level off,” just as they did.  
It also is important to point out that during the second time period, discussions 
concerning the importance of the marketplace of ideas were frequently included in the 
courts’ reasoning. At the K-12 level, 11 of the total 24 cases included discussions of the 
marketplace of ideas, though the specific term was not always used. Four of these cases 
highlighted the importance of teaching students to be self-governing citizens. While the 
latter number is low, the concept was embedded in discussions concerning the 
marketplace of ideas.  At the post-secondary level during this time, 12 of the total 21 
cases discussed the significance of the marketplace of ideas, or used language indicative 
of the concept, in students’ educational growth. No cases were driven by the rationale 
“Preparing students for self-governance,” yet again this concept was often embedded 
and/or implied within the courts’ discussions of the marketplace.  
During the third time period, there was slightly less discussion of the marketplace 
of ideas within post-secondary cases; however, when discussed, it often was tied to 
discussions about access to and funding for public forums. In fact, in roughly 50 percent 
of post-secondary cases analyzed during this time, courts determined that the speech in 
question was part of or one of the three types of fora. This accounted for the five entries 
in Table 11 under the rationale “Protecting the right of schools to regulate speech in non-
public forums.” 
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As indicated in Chapter V, the notion of the public forum at the K-12 level was 
beginning to creep into judicial reasoning during the second time period. Three cases 
indicated that the speech at hand either was part of a public forum or, by itself, was a 
public forum. By the third time period, the idea that student speech activities were 
generally non-public forums prevailed due to the Hazelwood ruling. Thirteen of the 47 
total cases utilized Hazelwood as precedent. 
At the post-secondary level of education, the public forum concept also slowly 
became incorporated into the case law, with courts in three cases during the second time 
period determining that the speech at hand was part of a public forum. At this time, it was 
assumed that if there was a forum for student expression, it was a traditional public 
forum, open to all. Yet it was also here that a court spoke for the first time about how 
funding might impact forum status.  
By the third time period, the speech in nine of the total 18 cases was found to be 
an outlet of one of the three types of fora. No longer, however, did the courts assume a 
forum was a traditional open forum. Clearly, both levels of education were integrating 
public forum doctrine at roughly the same pace; however, post-secondary courts were 
much more likely to analyze in great depth the public forum cases that had been handed 
down by the U. S. Supreme Court to determine which type of forum the speech outlet 
constituted.  
When the Hazelwood framework reached post-secondary speech in 1989, the 
landscape within this area of the law began to change. Courts already had employed 
public forum doctrine to post-secondary freedom of expression case law, but not one 
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court until this time had utilized the speech-restrictive Hazelwood framework to 
determine the constitutionality of speech regulations or punishments. 
Aside from the obvious concerns relating to mere application of such a standard 
to the post-secondary context – one that courts typically interpret as not requiring 
viewpoint neutrality – its application becomes all the more vexing because of the 
divergent ways in which the courts have applied it. In two of the four circuit court of 
appeals cases analyzed here that constitute the federal circuit court split over this matter, 
the courts utilized the framework in full. This meant they determined the forum status of 
the speech at hand based upon the principles articulated in Hazelwood before they turned 
to the second prong or made a determination as to whether the speech restriction was 
reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical purpose.  
In the first case to apply Hazelwood, Alabama Student Party v. Student 
Government Association,6 the court found that the speech itself, which involved 
electioneering, was a non-public forum and that the school’s regulation of the speech was 
reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical interest. The case resulted in upholding the 
speech regulation.  
The second case decided at the federal circuit court level, Kincaid v. Gibson,7 
involved confiscation of the student yearbook based upon administrative disapproval of 
the style and content of the yearbook. The court in this case said that Hazelwood didn’t 
apply in the post-secondary context, yet it proceeded to utilize Hazelwood to determine 
the forum status of the student yearbook. It found that it was a limited public forum and 
that its confiscation was unconstitutional. 
                                                
6 867 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 
7 236 F. 3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001). 
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In a third case, Brown v. Li,8 the Ninth U. S. Circuit Court did not even undertake 
to determine whether the speech, a graduate student’s thesis, was or occurred in a public 
forum. It based its decision solely on the fact that the speech at hand was curricular and, 
as such, restrictions needed only to be reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical 
concern. It found that it was.  
In Hosty v. Carter,9 the Ninth Circuit determined, employing the Hazelwood 
framework, that the speech, in this case the student newspaper, constituted a limited 
public forum. It specifically indicated that age was not a factor in determining the status 
of a forum. It then sought to determine if the restriction on the speech was for a legitimate 
pedagogical purpose. Because not all of the factual evidence was presented to the court, it 
could not ascertain if the speech restriction was based upon such an interest. Nonetheless, 
the point is that the court recognized and utilized both prongs of the Hazelwood 
framework. Such cannot be said for the other two circuit courts that applied Hazelwood 
to the cases at hand. 
As such, not only are the circuit courts applying Hazelwood in different ways, 
therefore giving little guidance to the lower courts in their circuits as to its proper 
application, but the results also have not been speech-protective. As discussed in Chapter 
III, while the court in Hosty held that the speech restriction was unconstitutional, it also 
indicated that if the case had gone to trial for factual determinations, it may have led to a 
different result had there been a closer relationship between the newspaper and 
administrative review. Further, it implied that funding of the newspaper also could have 
                                                
8 308 F. 3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 
9 412 F. 3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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changed the forum status. Thus while the students “won,” they also lost the battle purely 
due to the court’s utilization of Hazelwood to a student newspaper.  
Application of Hazelwood to evaluate the constitutionality of a speech restriction 
involving a newspaper is not in keeping with U. S. Supreme Court precedent regarding 
post-secondary student expression. Unless or until the Court rules on this matter,  
post-secondary students nationwide are subject to enhanced censorship should a court 
choose to apply this standard to the case at hand.  
An additional three cases utilizing Hazelwood will be discussed below. The first 
was not included above because it was decided by a federal district court, and, therefore, 
is not a part of the federal circuit court split. It was, though, analyzed as part of the 
findings. The second two cases, both of which were heard by federal circuit courts, were 
not included in the findings because the first was settled out of court and the second is on 
appeal. They are discussed here, however, because they further illustrate the way in 
which Hazelwood has been variously applied.  
In O’Neal v. Falcon,10 decided by a federal district court in Texas, involved a 
university professor’s refusal to allow a student to use abortion as the topic for an 
assigned speech. The court, in upholding the speech restriction, utilized Hazelwood for 
the contention that curricular decisions, as long as they are related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns, are constitutional. Here again, the court did not determine forum 
status of either the classroom or the proposed speech. 
Finally, the two circuit court cases not analyzed in this dissertation but that also 
utilized Hazelwood, involved 1) a student who refused to say “Fuck” and to take the 
Lord’s name in vain as part of her theatre class and 2) a graduate student who was 
                                                
10 668 F. Supp.2d 979 (W.D. Tex. 2009). 
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expelled because she refused to counsel homosexuals due to her religious beliefs. In the 
first case, Axson-Flynn v. Johnson,11 the Tenth U. S. Circuit Court held that Hazelwood 
applied because the speech in question was curricular. The same was true in the second 
case.12 
Taken together, the circuit courts appear to be signaling that all curricular and 
non-curricular speech on college campuses potentially is subject to a Hazelwood analysis, 
which, thus far, has resulted in upholding punishment for student speech save one case, 
Hosty v. Carter.13 Even this case, however, indicates that if a newspaper is not 
completely editorially and financially independent, it could become a non-public forum 
per Hazelwood. Moreover, those cases involving purely curricular speech are utilizing a 
framework that is built upon an analysis of forum status, but which these cases clearly 
ignore.  
Thus subjecting curricular and non-curricular speech to such a restrictive K-12 
holding severely curtails the marketplace of ideas. It is, in large part, through both extra-
curricular activities and the learning that takes place within the classroom that prepares 
students for the “real world;” that teaches them they are free to investigate, dispute, and 
question assumptions and beliefs; that their ideas do, indeed, matter; and, for those who 
aspire to become journalists, that questioning authority is not only their right but also 
their responsibility. Utilizing Hazelwood in these contexts teaches post-secondary 
students that their rights do, indeed, stop at the schoolhouse gate. 
 
                                                
11 356 F. 3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 
12 Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 
13 Supra note 9. 
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CONCLUSION 
  The Tinker standard of material and substantial disruption is, in many ways, very 
similar to the Brandenburg v. Ohio test, in which “… the constitutional guarantees of free 
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of 
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”14  
In Tinker, the Court reasoned that if schools could not forecast a material and 
substantial disruption to the orderly operation of schools, it could not forbid or punish the 
speech. Just as Emerson’s “General Theory of the First Amendment”15 makes a 
distinction between conduct that is expressive and conduct that is not, the Court in Tinker 
recognized that students wearing black armbands in protest of the war was a form of 
conduct, but one with an expressive purpose. As such, it was pure symbolic speech. As 
discussed in Chapter II, the ideal concept of free speech proposed in this dissertation 
asserts that expressive conduct that is not intended to or likely to incite imminent lawless 
action should be fully protected.  
Application of the Tinker standard within the K-12 and post-secondary student 
speech cases analyzed here overall has resulted in heightened protection for speech. 
While not all cases utilizing the standard result in the protection of all student speech, the 
courts, for the most part, have utilized it in the manner for which it was created – to 
ensure safety in the schools and to ensure that the school environment is conducive to 
learning. Thus the K-12 and post-secondary free expression case law that in this 
                                                
14 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969). 
 
15 THOMAS EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (Random House 1963). 
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dissertation has been analyzed via Tinker, comes fairly close to the ideal concept of free 
speech put forth in this study.  
Application of the Tinker standards of both material and substantial disruption 
and of disruption forecast typically, though not exclusively, resulted in a high degree of 
protection for students at both levels of education. When not protected, courts either 
determined that schools reasonably forecasted a material and substantial disruption, or 
that such a disruption did, indeed, occur. As may be recalled from Chapter III, the ideal 
concept of free speech proposed in this dissertation asserts that expressive conduct not 
intended to or likely to incite imminent lawless action should be fully protected.  
The overall findings of this research indicate that courts deciding student 
expression cases have, in many instances, adopted a parallel concept of free speech 
protection to protect student expression when utilizing the Tinker standard to determine 
disruption. As in Brandenburg v. Ohio, inflammatory speech that did not create an 
imminent threat to a material and substantial disruption typically was protected. As 
demonstrated in the findings, however, within the context of student speech, the bar for 
determining imminence is lower than that articulated in Brandenburg. As just discussed, 
for instance, courts typically upheld restrictions on and punishments for wearing 
inflammatory t-shirts if there had been a history of racial violence; such a requirement 
demonstrating past occurrences does not necessarily indicate that similar speech would 
produce the same reaction, which the Brandenburg Court recognized. Nonetheless, even 
though the Tinker standard may be less stringent than Brandenburg, when considering 
that schools are, indeed, unique environments, it arguably provides a sufficient standard 
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against which to evaluate student speech if students are to value constitutional freedoms 
and become productive, self-governing citizens. 
Regarding the Hazelwood standard, it clearly is not a parallel concept of free 
speech to that articulated in Brandenburg. As discussed throughout this dissertation, it 
frequently has been utilized in ways that appear wholly unrelated to the maintenance of 
order within schools. Those cases analyzed via Hazelwood do not come close to this 
idealized concept of free speech. Based upon the findings in Chapter V and the 
discussion provided here, the holding in Tinker is the most appropriate method for 
analyzing speech at both levels of education if teaching students to become self-
governing citizens is an outcome considered critical to the future of democracy in this 
nation. If students are to understand and to appreciate freedom, they must be educated in 
an environment that respects and supports their freedom as provided for in the 
Constitution of the United States. 
Finally, due to the increasing number of cases relating to off-campus, online 
speech at the K-12 level of education, a trend that is expected to continue, future research 
in this area would be worthwhile. Moreover, because the findings here, which 
demonstrate that for the most part post-secondary freedom of expression case law is, 
indeed, following a similar developmental path to that at the K-12 level, one would 
expect in the future to see federal-level litigation at post-secondary schools involving 
online speech as well. Court rulings on this form of speech also should be monitored over 
time with further research. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
K-12 AND POST-SECONDARY CASE LISTS 
 
 
K-12 
 
A.M. ex rel. McAllum v. Cash, 585 F. 3d 214 (5th Cir. 2009) 
Baker v. Downey City Board of Education, 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. CA 1969) 
Barber Ex Rel. Barber v. Dearborn Public Schools, 286 F. Supp. 2d 847 (E.D.  
Mich. 2003). 
Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973) 
Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. NY 1974) 
Baxter v. Vigo County School Corporation, 26 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 1994) 
Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) 
Beussink v. Woodland R0IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp.2d 1175 (E.D. Miss. 1998) 
Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education, 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966) 
Boucher v. School Board of the School District of Greenfield, 134 F. 3d 821 
(7th Cir. 1998) 
Bragg v. Swanson, 371 F. Supp.2d 814 (S.D. W. Va.  2005) 
Bull v. Dardanelle Public School Dist. No. 15, 745 F. Supp. 1455 (E.D. Ark. 1990) 
Burch v. Barker, 861 F. 2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1988) 
Burnside v. Byers, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966) 
Butts v. Dallas Independent School District, 436 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971) 
BWA v. Farmington R-7 School Dist., 508 F. Supp. 2d 740 (E.D. Miss. 2007) 
Bystrom v. Fridley High School, 822 F. 2d 747 (8th Cir. 1987) 
Castornia v. Madison County Sch. Bd. 246 F.3d 536 (6th 2001) 
Chambers v. Babbit, 145 F.Supp.2d 1068 (D. C. Minn. 2001) 
Clark v. Dallas, 806 F. Supp. 116 (N.D. Tex. 1992) 
Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38, 566 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2009) 
Coy v. Board of Education of North Canton Schools, 205. F. Supp. 2d 791  
(N.D. Ohio 2002) 
Curry ex rel Curry v. Hensiner, 513 F.3d (6th Cir. 2008) 
DeFabio v. East Hampton Free Sch. District, 623 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2010) 
Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2010) 
Dodd v. Rambis, 535 F. Supp. 23 (S.D. Ind. 1981) 
Doe v. Pulaski County Special School District, 306 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2002) 
Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008) 
Draudt v. Wooster Cisty Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 246 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ohio 2003) 
Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education, 40 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971) 
Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002) 
Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) 
Fujishima v. Board of Education, 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972) 
Gambino v. Fairfax County School Board, 564 F. 2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977) 
Governor Wentworth Reg. Sch. V. Hendrickson, 421 F. Supp. 2d 410 (D. N.H. 2006) 
Griggs v. Fort Wayne Sch. Dist., 359 F. Supp.2d 731 (N.D. Ind. 2005) 
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Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, 674 F. Supp. 2d 725 (D. S.C. 2009) 
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) 
J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 08-4138 (3d Cir. June 13, 2011)(Slip Opinion) 
Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1973) 
Katz v. McAuley, 438 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1971) 
Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, 652 F. 3d 565, (4th Cir. 2011) 
LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001) 
Layshock v. Hermitage School Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011).  
Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F. 3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007) 
M.A.L. ex rel M.L. v. Kinsland, 543 F.3d 841 (6th Cir. 2008) 
M. B. v. Liverpool Central Sch. Dist., 487 F. Supp.2d 117 (N.D. N.Y. 2007) 
McCann v. Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist., 50 F. Supp.2d 918 (E.D. Mo. 1999) 
Minersville School Dist., Bd. of Educators of Minersville Sch. Dist. V. Gobitis, 310 U.S.  
586 (1940) 
Morrison v. Board of Educ. of Boyd County, 521 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2008) 
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) 
Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse School, 98 F. 3d 1530 (7th Cir. 1996) 
Nelson v. Moline Sch. Dist. No. 40, 725 F. Supp 965 (C.D. Ill. 1989) 
Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F. 2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975) 
Phillips v. Oxford Separate Main Sch. Dist., 314 F. Supp.2d 643 (N.D. Miss. 2003) 
Pliscou v. Holtville Unified School Dist., 411 F.Supp. 842 (S.D. Cal. 1976) 
Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989) 
Posthumus v. Bd. of Educ. Of the Mona Shores Public Schools, 80 F. Supp.2d 891  
(W.D. Mich. 2005) 
Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971) 
Reineke v. Cobb County School District, 484 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1980) 
Rivera v. East Otero School District R-1, 721 F. Supp. 1189, 1194  
(D. Colo. 1989) 
S.C. v. Sagreville Bd. of Educ., 33 F.3d 417 (3d Cir. 2003) 
Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua Cty., 324 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2003) 
Scoville v. Board of Ed. of Joliet Tp. HS Dist. 204, County of Will, State of Ill., 286  
F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ill. 1968) 
Seamons v. Snow, 206 F.3d 1021 (10th Cir. 2000) 
Settle v. Dickson County School Bd., 53 F. 3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995) 
Shanley v. Northeast Ind. Sch. Dist., Bexar County, Tex., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972) 
Stanton v. Brunswick School Department, 577 F. Supp. 1560 (D. Me. 1984) 
Sullivan v. Houston Ind. Sch. Dist., 333 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D. Tex. 1971) 
Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Regional Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2002) 
Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville Central School District, 607 F. 2d 1043  
(2d Cir. 1979) 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F. 2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977) 
Virgil v. School Board of Columbia County, 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1989) 
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) 
Williams v. Spencer, 622 F. 2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1980) 
Wisniewiewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Central Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34  
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(2d Cir. 2007) 
Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. (S.D. NY 1969) 
 
Post-Secondary  
 
Alabama Student Party v. Student Government Association, 867 F.2d 1344  
(11th Cir. 1989) 
Amidon v. Student Assoc. of the State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, 508 F.3d 94  
(2d Cir. 2007) 
Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970) 
Arrington v. Taylor, 380 F. Supp. 1348 (M.D. N.C. 1974) 
Bair v. Shippensburg Univ. 280 F. Supp.2d 357 (M.D. Penn. 2003) 
Bayless v. Martine, 430 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1970) 
Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1973) 
Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 US 217 (2000) 
Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 412 F.2d 1171 (5 th Cir. 1969) 
Brown v. Li, 308 F. 3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002) 
Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1992) 
Channing Club v. Board of Regents of Texas Tech University, 317 F. Supp. 688  
(N.D. Tex. 1970) 
Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings v. Martinez, 319 Fed. Appx. 645  
(2010) 
Clemson Univ. Vietnam Moratorium Comm. v. Clemson Univ., 306 F. Supp.  
129 (A.D. S.C. 1969) 
DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2008) 
Dickey v. Alabama State Board of Education, 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967) 
Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D. N.C. 1968) 
Flint v. Dennison, 361 F. Supp.2d 1215 (D. Mont. 2005) 
Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.C. S.C. 1967) 
Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1992) 
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) 
Heenan v. Rhodes, 761 F.Supp.2d 1318 (M.D. Ala. 2011) 
Hosty v. Carter, 412 F. 3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) 
John DOE v. Univ. of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) 
Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973) 
Keeton v. Anderson, 664 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 2011) 
Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F. 3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001) 
Korn v. Elkins 317 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1970) 
Lopez v. Candaele, 622 F. 3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2010) 
Lueth v. St. Clair County Cmty. College, 732 F. Supp. 1410 (E.D. Mich. 1990) 
McCauley v. University of the Virgin Islands, 628 F.3d 232 (3d. 2010) 
Norton v. Discipline Comm. of East Tenn. State Univ., 419 F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1969) 
O’Neal v. Falcon, 668 F. Supp.2d 979 (W.D. Tex. 2009) 
Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) 
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) 
Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975) 
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Smith v. Univ. of Tenn., 300 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Tenn. 1969) 
Snyder v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill., 286 F. Supp. 927 (E.D. Ill. 1968) 
Sonnier v. Crain, 613 F.3d 43 (E.D. La. 2008) 
Stanley v. McGrath, 719 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1983) 
Sword v. Fox, 446 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1971) 
Thonen v. Jenkins, 491 F.2d 722 (4th Cir. 1973) 
Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Col. 1971) 
University of So. Miss. Chapter of the Miss. Civil Liberties Union v. University of So.  
Miss., 452 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1971) 
Welker v. Cicerone, 174 F. Supp.2d 1055 (C.D. Col. 2001) 
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) 
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APPENDIX B 
 
CASE LISTS FOR OUTCOMES 
 
 
K-12: 3/3/40—2/23/69 
 
A) Protecting K-12 Student Expression 
 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) 
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966) 
 
B) Protecting the Well-Being of K-12 Students 
 
 No cases 
 
C) Teaching K-12 Students Acceptable Social Behaviors 
 
Minersville School District, Board of Education of Minersville School District  
v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) 
Baker v. Downey City Board of Education, 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969) 
 
D) Protecting the K-12 School System 
 
Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education, 363 F.2d 749  
(5th Cir. 1966) 
Scoville v. Board of Education of Joliet Township High School District 204,  
County of Will, State of Illinois, 286 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ill. 1968) 
 
 
 
K-12: 2/24/69—1/12/88 
 
A) Protecting K-12 Student Expression 
 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. (S.D. NY 1969) 
Butts v. Dallas Independent School District, 436 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971) 
Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education, 40 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971) 
Sullivan v. Houston Ind. Sch. Dist., 333 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D. Tex. 1971) 
Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971) 
Fujishima v. Board of Education, 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972) 
Shanley v. Northeast Ind. Sch. Dist., Bexar County, Tex., 462 F.2d 960  
(5th Cir. 1972) 
Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1973) 
Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973) 
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Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. NY 1974) 
Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F. 2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975) 
Pliscou v. Holtville Unified School Dist., 411 F.Supp. 842 (S.D. Cal. 1976) 
Gambino v. Fairfax County School Board, 564 F. 2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977) 
Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville Central School District, 607 F. 2d 1043  
(2d Cir. 1979) 
Reineke v. Cobb County School District, 484 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1980) 
Dodd v. Rambis, 535 F. Supp. 23 (S.D. Ind. 1981) 
Stanton v. Brunswick School Department, 577 F. Supp. 1560 (D. Me. 1984) 
 
B) Protecting the Well-Being of K-12 Students 
 
Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F. 2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977) 
Williams v. Spencer, 622 F. 2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1980) 
 
C) Teaching K-12 Students Acceptable Social Behaviors 
 
Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) 
 
D) Protecting the K-12 School System 
 
Katz v. McAuley, 438 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1971). 
Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) 
Dodd v. Rambis, 535 F. Supp. 23 (S.D. Ind. 1981) 
Bystrom (Cory) v. Fridley High School, 822 F. 2d 747 (8th Cir. 1987) 
 
 
 
K-12: 1/13/88—2011 
 
A) Protecting K-12 Student Expression 
 
Burch v. Barker, 861 F. 2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1988) 
Nelson v. Moline Sch. Dist. No. 40, 725 F. Supp 965 (C.D. Ill. 1989) 
Rivera v. East Otero School District R-1, 721 F. Supp. 1189, 1194  
(D.Colo. 1989) 
Clark v. Dallas, 806 F. Supp. 116 (N.D. Tex. 1992) 
 Beussink v. Woodland R0IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp.2d 1175 
(E.D. Miss. 1998) 
Seamons v. Snow, 206 F.3d 1021 (10th Cir. 2000) 
 Chambers v. Babbit, 145 F.Supp.2d 1068 (D. C. Minn. 2001) 
Castornia v. Madison County Sch. Bd. 246 F.3d 536 (6th 2001) 
Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Regional Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243  
(3d Cir. 2002) 
Coy v. Board of Education of North Canton Schools, 205. F. Supp. 2d  
791 (N.D. Ohio 2002) 
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 Barber Ex Rel. Barber v. Dearborn Public Schools, 286 F. Supp. 2d 847  
(E.D. Mich. 2003). 
Bragg v. Swanson, 371 F. Supp.2d 814 (S.D. W. Va.  2005) 
Griggs v. Fort Wayne Sch. Dist., 359 F. Supp.2d 731 (N.D. Ind. 2005) 
Layshock v. Hermitage School Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011).  
M. B. v. Liverpool Central Sch. Dist., 487 F. Supp.2d 117 (N.D. N.Y. 2007) 
J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 08-4138 (3d Cir. June 13, 2011)  
(Slip Opinion) 
 
B) Protecting the Well-Being of K-12 Students 
 
Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse School, 98 F. 3d 1530 (7th Cir. 1996) 
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) 
 
C) Teaching K-12 Students Acceptable Social Behaviors 
 
 Bull v. Dardanelle Public School Dist. No. 15, 745 F. Supp. 1455  
(E.D. Ark. 1990) 
Posthumus v. Bd. of Educ. Of the Mona Shores Public Schools, 80 F.  
Supp.2d 891 (W.D. Mich. 2005)  
 
D) Protecting the K-12 School System 
 
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) 
Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989) 
Virgil v. School Board of Columbia County, 862 F.2d 1517  
(11th Cir. 1989) 
Bull v. Dardanelle Public School Dist. No. 15, 745 F. Supp. 1455  
(E.D. Ark. 1990) 
 Settle v. Dickson County School Bd., 53 F. 3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995) 
Boucher v. School Bd. of the School Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821  
(7th Cir. 1998)  
McCann v. Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist., 50 F. Supp.2d 918 (E.D. Mo. 1999) 
LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001) 
Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002) 
S.G.. v. Sagreville Bd. of Educ., 33 F.3d 417 (3d Cir. 2003) 
Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua Cty., 324 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2003) 
Draudt v. Wooster Cisty Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 246 F. Supp. 820  
(N.D. Ohio 2003) 
Phillips v. Oxford Separate Main Sch. Dist., 314 F. Supp.2d 643  
(N.D. Miss. 2003) 
Governor Wentworth Reg. Sch. V. Hendrickson, 421 F. Supp. 2d 410  
(D. N.H. 2006). 
BWA v. Farmington R-7 School Dist., 508 F. Supp. 2d 740  
(E.D. Miss. 2007) 
Wisniewiewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Central Sch. Dist., 494  
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F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007) 
Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F. 3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007) 
Barr v. Lafen, 538 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2008) 
Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008) 
Curry ex rel Curry v. Hensiner, 513 F.3d (6th Cir. 2008) 
 M.A.L. ex rel M.L. v. Kinsland, 543 F.3d 841 (6th Cir. 2008) 
 Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38, 566 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2009) 
A.M. ex rel. McAllum v. Cash, 585 F. 3d 214 (5th Cir. 2009) 
Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, 674 F. Supp. 2d 725  
(D. S.C. 2009) 
Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2010) 
DeFabio v. East Hampton Free Sch. District, 623 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2010) 
Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, 652 F. 3d 565, (4th Cir. 2011) 
  
   
 
Post-Secondary: 3/3/40—2/23/69 
 
A) Protecting Post-Secondary Student Expression 
 
Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (O.D. S.C. 1967) 
Dickey v. Alabama State Board of Education, 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967) 
Snyder v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 286 F. Supp. 927  
(N.D. Ill. 1968) 
Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D. N.C. 1968) 
 
B) Protecting the Well-Being of Post-Secondary Students 
 
 No cases 
 
C) Teaching Post-Secondary Students Acceptable Social Behaviors 
 
 No cases 
 
D) Protecting the Post-Secondary School System 
  
No cases 
 
 
Post-Secondary: 2/24/69—1/12/88 
 
A) Protecting Post-Secondary Student Expression 
 
Snyder v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 286 F. Supp. 922 (N.D. Ill. 1968) 
Smith v. Univ. of Tenn., 300 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Tenn. 1969) 
 Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 412 F.2d 1171 (5 th Cir. 1969) 
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 Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970) 
University of So. Miss. Chapter of the Miss. Civil Liberties Union v. University  
of So. Miss., 452 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1971)  
Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Col. 1971) 
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) 
Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1973) 
 Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973) 
 Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) 
 Thonen v. Jenkins, 491 F.2d 722 (4th Cir. 1973) 
Arrington v. Taylor, 380 F. Supp. 1348 (M.D. N.C. 1974) 
Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975) 
 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) 
 Stanley v. McGrath, 719 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1983) 
   
B) Protecting the Well-Being of Post-Secondary Students 
 
 No cases 
 
C) Teaching Post-Secondary Students Acceptable Social Behaviors 
 
 No cases 
 
D) Protecting the Post-Secondary School System 
 
Norton v. Discipline Comm. of East Tenn. State Univ., 419 F.2d 195  
(6th Cir. 1969) 
Clemson Univ. Vietnam Moratorium Comm. v. Clemson Univ., 306 F.  
Supp. 129 (A.D. S.C. 1969) 
Bayless v. Martine, 430 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1970) 
Sword v. Fox, 446 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1971) 
 
 
 
Post-Secondary: 1/13/88—2011 
 
A) Protecting Post-Secondary Student Expression 
 
John DOE v. Univ. of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) 
Lueth v. St. Clair County Comm. College, 732 F. Supp. 1410 (E.D. Mich. 1990) 
 Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1992) 
 Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1992) 
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) 
Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 US 217 (2000) 
Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F. 3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001) 
Welker v. Cicerone, 174 F. Supp.2d 1055 (C.D. Col. 2001) 
Bair v. Shippensburg Univ. 280 F. Supp.2d 357 (M.D. Penn. 2003) 
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Hosty v. Carter, 412 F. 3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) 
Amidon v. Student Assoc. of the State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, 508 F.3d 94  
(2d Cir. 2007) 
DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301 (3rd Cir. 2008) 
McCauley v. Univ. of the Virgin Islands, 618 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2010) 
 
   
B) Protecting the Well-Being of Post-Secondary Students 
 
 No cases 
 
C) Teaching Post-Secondary Students Acceptable Social Behaviors 
  
No cases 
 
D) Protecting the Post-Secondary School System 
 
Alabama Student Party v. Student Government Ass’n, 867 F.2d 1344, 1347  
(11th Cir. 1989) 
Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1992) 
Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 US 217 (2000) 
Brown v. Li, 308 F. 3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002) 
Flint v. Dennison, 361 F. Supp.2d 1215 (D. Mont. 2005) 
O’Neal v. Falcon, 668 F. Supp.2d 979 (W.D. Tex. 2009) 
Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings v. Martinez, 319 Fed.  
Appx. 645 (2010) 
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APPENDIX C 
 
K-12 RATIONALES CASE LISTS 
 
 
3/3/40—2/23/69 
 
A) Protecting K-12 Student Expression 
 
1 – Fostering an environment of robust debate 
 
 No cases 
 
2 – Providing access for all voices to be heard 
 
Burnside v. Byers, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966) 
 
3 – Preparing students for self-governance and citizenship 
 
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) 
 
4 – Protecting viewpoint neutrality 
 
 No cases 
 
5 – Protecting free speech in public or limited public forums 
 
 No cases 
 
6 – Protecting speech from prior restraint 
 
 No cases 
 
7 – Protecting non-disruptive, off-campus speech 
 
 No cases 
 
8 – Protecting pure speech 
 
 No cases 
 
9 -- Protecting speech from overbreadth and/or vagueness 
 
 No cases 
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B) Protecting the Well-Being of K-12 Students 
 
1 – Taking age into consideration 
 
 No cases 
 
2 – Recognizing that students are often a “captive audience” 
 
 No cases 
 
3 – Considering the sensitivity of topics 
 
 No cases 
 
 
C) Teaching K-12 Students Acceptable Social Behaviors 
 
1 – Teaching civility 
 
 No cases 
 
2 – Teaching good taste 
 
 No cases 
 
3 – Teaching the boundaries of socially appropriate behaviors 
 
 Baker v. Downey City Board of Education, 307 F. Supp. 517  
(C.D. Cal. 1969) 
 
4 – Awakening students to cultural values 
 
 Minersville School Dist., Bd. of Educators of Minersville Sch. Dist. V.  
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
 
 
 
D) Protecting the K-12 School System 
 
1 – Avoiding controversy 
 
 No cases 
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2 – Protecting the right of schools to regulate speech in non-public forums 
 
 No cases 
 
3 – Maintaining discipline and order 
 
Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education, 363 F.2d 749  
(5th Cir. 1966) 
Scoville v. Board of Ed. of Joliet Tp. HS Dist. 204, County of Will, State  
of Ill., 286 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ill. 1968) 
 
4 – Confirming the right of the school to speak for itself/control message 
 
 No cases 
 
5 – Controlling the curriculum 
 
 No cases 
 
6 – Promulgating reasonable rules 
 
 No cases 
 
7 – Controlling expression in school-sponsored activities 
 
 No cases 
 
 
 
2/24/69—1/12/88 
 
A) Protecting K-12 Student Expression 
 
1 – Fostering an environment of robust debate 
 
Reineke v. Cobb County School District, 484 F. Supp. 1252  
(N.D. Ga. 1980) 
 
2 – Providing access for all voices to be heard 
 
Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. NY 1974) 
 
3 – Preparing students for self-governance and citizenship 
 
  Butts v. Dallas Independent School District, 436 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971) 
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4 – Protecting viewpoint neutrality 
 
 No cases 
 
5 – Protecting free speech in public or limited public forums 
 
Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. (S.D. NY 1969) 
Gambino v. Fairfax County School Board, 564 F. 2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977) 
Stanton v. Brunswick School Department, 577 F. Supp. 1560  
(D. Me. 1984) 
 
6 – Protecting speech from prior restraint 
 
  Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education, 40 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971) 
Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education, 40 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971) 
  Sullivan v. Houston Ind. Sch. Dist., 333 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D. Tex. 1971) 
 
7 – Protecting non-disruptive, off-campus speech 
 
Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville Central School District, 607 F.  
2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979) 
 
8 – Protecting speech from overbreadth and/or vagueness 
   
  Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971) 
Fujishima v. Board of Education, 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972) 
Fujishima v. Board of Education, 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972) 
Shanley v. Northeast Ind. Sch. Dist., Bexar County, Tex., 462 F.2d 960  
(5th Cir. 1972) 
Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973)  
Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F. 2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975)   
Pliscou v. Holtville Unified School Dist., 411 F.Supp. 842  
(S.D. Cal. 1976) 
 
9 – Protecting pure speech 
 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1973) 
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B)  Protecting the Well-Being of K-12 Students 
 
1 – Taking age into consideration 
 
 No cases 
 
2 – Recognizing that students are often a “captive audience” 
 
 No cases 
 
3 – Considering the sensitivity of topics 
 
Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F. 2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977) 
Williams v. Spencer, 622 F. 2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1980) 
 
 
 
C) Teaching K-12 Students Acceptable Social Behaviors 
 
1 – Teaching civility 
 
 No cases 
 
2 – Teaching good taste 
 
 No cases 
 
3 – Teaching the boundaries of socially appropriate behaviors 
 
  Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) 
 
4 – Awakening students to cultural values 
 
  No cases 
 
 
 
D) Protecting the K-12 School System 
 
1 – Avoiding controversy 
 
 No cases 
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2 – Protecting the right of schools to regulate speech in non-public forums 
 
 No cases 
 
3 – Maintaining discipline and order 
 
Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) 
Dodd v. Rambis, 535 F. Supp. 23 (S.D. Ind. 1981) 
 
4 – Confirming the right of the school to speak for itself/control message 
 
 No cases 
 
5 – Controlling the curriculum 
 
 No cases 
 
6 – Promulgating reasonable rules 
  
Katz v. McAuley, 438 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1971). 
Bystrom (Cory) v. Fridley High School, 822 F. 2d 747 (8th Cir. 1987) 
 
7 – Controlling expression in school-sponsored activities 
 
  No cases 
 
 
 
1/13/88—2011     
 
A) Protecting K-12 Student Expression 
 
1 – Fostering an environment of robust debate 
 
  Beussink v. Woodland R0IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp.2d 1175 
(E.D. Miss. 1998) 
  Chambers v. Babbit, 145 F.Supp.2d 1068 (D. C. Minn. 2001) 
  
2 – Providing access for all voices to be heard 
 
Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Regional Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243  
(3d Cir. 2002) 
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3 – Preparing students for self-governance and citizenship 
 
  Clark v. Dallas, 806 F. Supp. 116 (N.D. Tex. 1992) 
 
4 – Protecting viewpoint neutrality 
 
  Castornia v. Madison County Sch. Bd. 246 F.3d 536 (6th 2001) 
  Barber Ex Rel. Barber v. Dearborn Public Schools, 286 F. Supp. 2d 847  
(E.D. Mich. 2003). 
 
5 – Protecting free speech in public or limited public forums 
 
Bragg v. Swanson, 371 F. Supp.2d 814 (S.D. W. Va.  2005) 
 
6 – Protecting speech from prior restraint 
 
 Burch v. Barker, 861 F. 2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1988) 
Nelson v. Moline Sch. Dist. No. 40, 725 F. Supp 965 (C.D. Ill. 1989) 
Rivera v. East Otero School District R-1, 721 F. Supp. 1189, 1194  
(D.Colo. 1989) 
Seamons v. Snow, 206 F.3d 1021 (10th Cir. 2000) 
  Griggs v. Fort Wayne Sch. Dist., 359 F. Supp.2d 731 (N.D. Ind. 2005) 
 
7 – Protecting non-disruptive, off-campus speech 
 
Coy v. Board of Education of North Canton Schools, 205. F. Supp. 2d  
791 (N.D. Ohio 2002) 
Layshock v. Hermitage School Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011).  
J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 08-4138 (3d Cir. June 13, 2011)  
(Slip Opinion) 
 
8 – Protecting speech from overbreadth and/or vagueness 
 
  M. B. v. Liverpool Central Sch. Dist., 487 F. Supp.2d 117  
(N.D. N.Y. 2007) 
 
9 – Protecting pure speech  
  
 No cases 
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B) Protecting the Well-Being of K-12 Students 
 
1 – Taking age into consideration 
 
 Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse School, 98 F. 3d 1530  
(7th Cir. 1996) 
 
2 – Recognizing that students are often a “captive audience” 
 
 No cases 
 
3 – Considering the sensitivity of topics 
 
 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) 
 
 
 
      C) Teaching K-12 Students Acceptable Social Behaviors 
 
1 – Teaching civility 
 
 Posthumus v. Bd. of Educ. Of the Mona Shores Public Schools, 80 F.  
Supp.2d 891 (W.D. Mich. 2005)  
 
2 – Teaching good taste 
 
 No cases 
 
3 – Teaching the boundaries of socially appropriate behaviors 
 
 No cases 
 
4 – Awakening students to cultural values 
 
 No cases 
 
 
 
D) Protecting the K-12 School System 
 
1 – Avoiding controversy 
 
 No cases 
 
 
 
  
 
228 
 
2 – Protecting the right of schools to regulate speech in non-public forums 
 
Phillips v. Oxford Separate Main Sch. Dist., 314 F. Supp.2d 643  
(N.D. Miss. 2003) 
M.A.L. ex rel M.L. v. Kinsland, 543 F.3d 841 (6th Cir. 2008) 
 
3 – Maintaining discipline and order 
 
Boucher v. School Bd. of the School Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821  
(7th Cir. 1998) 
LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001)  
S.C. v. Sagreville Bd. of Educ., 33 F.3d 417 (3d Cir. 2003) 
Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua Cty., 324 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2003) 
Governor Wentworth Reg. Sch. V. Hendrickson, 421 F. Supp. 2d 410  
(D. N.H. 2006). 
BWA v. Farmington R-7 School Dist., 508 F. Supp. 2d 740  
(E.D. Miss. 2007) 
Wisniewiewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Central Sch. Dist., 494  
F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007) 
Barr v. Lafen, 538 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2008) 
Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008) 
A.M. ex rel. McAllum v. Cash, 585 F. 3d 214 (5th Cir. 2009) 
Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, 674 F. Supp. 2d 725  
(D. S.C. 2009) 
Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2010) 
DeFabio v. East Hampton Free Sch. District, 623 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2010) 
Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, 652 F. 3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011) 
 
4 – Confirming the right of the school to speak for itself/control message 
 
  Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F. 3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007) 
  
5 – Controlling the curriculum 
 
Virgil v. School Board of Columbia County, 862 F.2d 1517  
(11th Cir. 1989) 
Settle v. Dickson County School Bd., 53 F. 3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995) 
Curry ex rel Curry v. Hensiner, 513 F.3d (6th Cir. 2008) 
 
6 – Promulgating reasonable rules 
 
Draudt v. Wooster Cisty Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 246 F. Supp. 820  
(N.D. Ohio 2003) 
 
 
  
 
229 
7 – Controlling expression in school-sponsored activities 
 
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) 
  Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989) 
Bull v. Dardanelle Public School Dist. No. 15, 745 F. Supp. 1455  
(E.D. Ark. 1990) 
McCann v. Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist., 50 F. Supp.2d 918 (E.D. Mo. 1999) 
  Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002) 
Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38, 566 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2009) 
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APPENDIX D 
 
POST-SECONDARY RATIONALES CASE LISTS 
 
 
3/3/40—2/23/69 
 
 
A) Protecting Post-Secondary Student Expression 
 
1 – Fostering an environment of robust debate 
 
 No cases 
 
2 – Providing access for all voices to be heard 
 
 No cases 
 
3 – Preparing students for self-governance and citizenship 
 
 No cases 
 
4 – Protecting viewpoint neutrality 
 
 No cases 
 
5 – Protecting free speech in public or limited public forums 
 
 No cases 
 
6 – Determining that age and maturity require special consideration 
 
 No cases 
 
7 – Protecting speech from prior restraint 
 
Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947  
(O.D. S.C. 1967)  
 
8 – Protecting speech from overbreadth and/or vagueness 
 
Snyder v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill., 286 F. Supp. 927  
(N.D. Ill. 1968) 
 Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D. N.C. 1968) 
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9 – Protecting pure speech 
 
 Dickey v. Alabama State Board of Education, 273 F. Supp. 613  
(M.D. Ala. 1967). 
 
 
 
B) Protecting the Well-Being of Post-Secondary Students 
 
1 – Taking age into consideration 
 
 No cases 
 
2 – Recognizing that students are often a “captive audience” 
 
 No cases 
 
3 – Considering the sensitivity of topics 
 
 No cases 
 
 
 
C) Teaching Post-Secondary Students Acceptable Social Behaviors 
 
1 – Teaching civility 
 
 No cases 
 
2 – Teaching good taste 
 
 No cases 
 
3 – Teaching the boundaries of socially appropriate behaviors 
 
 No cases 
 
4 – Awakening students to cultural values 
 
 No cases 
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D) Protecting the Post-Secondary School System 
 
1 – Avoiding controversy 
 
 No cases 
 
2 – Protecting the right of schools to regulate speech in non-public forums 
 
 No cases 
 
3 – Maintaining discipline and order 
 
 No cases 
 
4 – Confirming the right of the school to speak for itself/control message 
 
 No cases 
 
5 – Controlling the curriculum 
 
 No cases 
 
6 – Promulgating reasonable rules and conduct 
 
 No cases 
 
7 – Controlling expression in school-sponsored activities 
 
 No cases 
 
 
 
2/24/69—1/12/88 
 
 
A) Protecting Post-Secondary Student Expression 
 
1 – Fostering an environment of robust debate 
 
  Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1973) 
 
2 – Providing access for all voices to be heard 
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University of So. Miss. Chapter of the Miss. Civil Liberties Union v.  
University of So. Miss., 452 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1971)  
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) 
 
3 – Preparing students for self-governance and citizenship 
 
 No cases 
 
4 – Protecting viewpoint neutrality 
 
Channing Club v. Board of Regents of Texas Tech University, 317  
F. Supp. 688 (N.D. Tex. 1970) 
Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973) 
  Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667  
(1973) 
  Thonen v. Jenkins, 491 F.2d 722 (4th Cir. 1973) 
  Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975) 
  Stanley v. McGrath, 719 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1983) 
 
5 – Protecting speech in public or limited public forums 
 
Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Col. 1971) 
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) 
 
6 – Determining that age and maturity require special consideration 
 
 No cases 
 
7 – Protecting speech from prior restraint 
 
  Smith v. Univ. of Tenn., 300 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Tenn. 1969) 
  Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969) 
  Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970) 
 
8 – Protecting speech from overbreadth and/or vagueness 
 
 No cases 
 
9 – Protecting pure speech 
  
Korn v. Elkins 317 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1970) 
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B) Protecting the Well-Being of Post-Secondary Students 
 
1 – Taking age into consideration 
 
 No cases 
 
2 – Recognizing that students are often a “captive audience” 
 
 No cases 
 
3 – Considering the sensitivity of topics 
 
 No cases 
 
 
 
C) Teaching Post-Secondary Students Acceptable Social Behaviors 
 
1 – Teaching civility 
 
 No cases 
 
2 – Teaching good taste 
 
 No cases 
 
3 – Teaching the boundaries of socially appropriate behaviors 
 
 No cases 
 
4 – Awakening students to cultural values 
 
 No cases 
 
 
 
D) Protecting the Post-Secondary School System 
 
1 – Avoiding controversy 
 
 No cases 
 
 
  
 
235 
2 – Protecting the right of schools to regulate speech in non-public forums 
 
 No cases 
 
3 – Maintaining discipline and order 
 
Norton v. Discipline Comm. of East Tenn. State Univ., 419 F.2d 195  
(6th Cir. 1969) 
 
4 – Confirming the right of the school to speak for itself/control message 
 
 No cases 
 
5 – Controlling the curriculum 
 
 No cases 
 
6 – Promulgating reasonable rules and conduct 
 
Clemson Univ. Vietnam Moratorium Comm. v. Clemson Univ., 306 F.  
Supp. 129 (A.D. S.C. 1969) 
Bayless v. Martine, 430 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1970) 
Sword v. Fox, 446 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1971) 
Sword v. Fox, 446 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1971) 
Arrington v. Taylor, 380 F. Supp. 1348 (M.D. N.C. 1974) 
 
7 – Controlling expression in school-sponsored activities 
 
 No cases 
 
 
 
 
1/13/88—2011     
 
A) Protecting Post-Secondary Student Expression 
 
1 – Fostering an environment of robust debate  
 
             No cases 
   
2 – Providing access for all voices to be heard 
 
  Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1992) 
  Welker v. Cicerone, 174 F. Supp.2d 1055 (C.D. Col. 2001) 
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3 – Preparing students for self-governance and citizenship 
 
 No cases 
 
4 – Protecting viewpoint neutrality 
 
Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 US 217  
(2000) 
  Amidon v. Student Assoc. of the State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, 508 F.3d  
94 (2d Cir. 2007) 
 
5 – Protecting speech in public or limited public forums 
 
Lueth v. St. Clair County Comm. College, 732 F. Supp. 1410  
(E.D. Mich. 1990) 
Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1992) 
Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1992) 
  Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819  
(1995) 
  Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F. 3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001) 
Hosty v. Carter, 412 F. 3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) 
 
6 – Determining that age and maturity require special consideration 
 
 No cases 
 
7 – Protecting speech from prior restraint 
 
  No cases 
 
8 – Protecting speech from overbreadth and/or vagueness 
   
John DOE v. Univ. of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) 
 Bair v. Shippensburg Univ., 280 F. Supp.2d 357 (M.D. Penn. 2003) 
  DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301 (3rd Cir. 2008) 
  McCauley v. Univ. of the Virgin Islands, 618 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2010) 
 
9 – Protecting pure speech  
 
  No cases 
 
 
 
B) Protecting the Well-Being of Post-Secondary Students 
 
1 – Taking age into consideration 
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 No cases 
 
2 – Recognizing that students are often a “captive audience” 
 
 No cases 
 
3 – Considering the sensitivity of topics 
 
 No cases 
 
 
 
C) Teaching Post-Secondary Students Acceptable Social Behaviors 
 
1 – Teaching civility 
 
 No cases 
 
2 – Teaching good taste 
 
 No cases 
 
3 – Teaching the boundaries of socially appropriate behaviors 
 
 No cases 
 
4 – Awakening students to cultural values 
 
 No cases 
 
 
 
D) Protecting the Post-Secondary School System 
 
1 – Avoiding controversy 
 
 No cases 
 
2 – Protecting the right of schools to regulate speech in non-public forums 
 
Flint v. Dennison, 361 F. Supp.2d 1215 (D. Mont. 2005) 
Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings v. Martinez, 319  
Fed. Appx. 645 (2010) 
Alabama Student Party v. Student Government Ass’n, 867 F.2d 1344  
(11th Cir. 1989) 
  
 
238 
Alabama Student Party v. Student Government Ass’n, 867 F.2d 1344 
(11th Cir. 1989) 
Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1992) 
 
 
3 – Maintaining discipline and order 
 
 No cases  
 
4 – Confirming the right of the school to speak for itself/control message 
 
 No cases 
 
5 – Controlling the curriculum 
  
Brown v. Li, 308 F. 3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002) 
O’Neal v. Falcon, 668 F. Supp.2d 979 (W.D. Tex. 2009)   
 
6 – Promulgating reasonable rules and conduct 
 
  Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 US 217  
(2000) 
 
7 – Controlling expression in school-sponsored activities 
 
  No cases 
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